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Croatian–Hungarian Legal History Summer School 
 
The Croatian–Hungarian Legal History Summer School was organised for the first time in 
2016 in Budapest as a result of the cooperation of the Eötvös Loránd University, Faculty of 
Law and the University of Zagreb, Faculty of Law. The two History of State and Law 
Departments of these universities published the best student presentations in the books 
entitled Sic itur ad astra I (ISBN 978-963-284-935-5, Eötvös Loránd University Faculty of Law, 
Budapest, 2017, 64 p.), Sic itur ad astra II (ISBN 978-963-284-935-5, University of Zagreb 
Faculty of Law, Zagreb, 2018, 64 p.) and Sic itur ad astra III (ISSN 2631-181X, Eötvös Loránd 
University Faculty of Law, Budapest, 2019, 134 p.). 
Our fourth summer school was organized again in Zagreb in 2019. The topic was „The 
development and the progress of the civil law's institutions”. Fourteen, Master and Ph.D. 
level students held their presentations, all of them – beside the publication of Dr. Kinga 
Beliznai Bódi who held the Professor’s Lecture – are listed in this book. 
We hope that our students will actually reach the stars and that we will find their names 








Dr. Kinga BELIZNAI BÓDI: The history of judicial robe in Hungary in a 
nutshell 
Eötvös Loránd University, Faculty of Law 
 
„The fashion of the judicial gown is nice and smart, because this gown always warns the 
judge that whilst practising his profession he is obliged to leave behind all one-sidedness 
and all biases, as well as all prejudices and all subjective aspects.”1 
 
1. Judicial Costume in Europe 
 
Legal and judicial dress has its origins in royal and ecclesiastical history. University professors 
and scholars started to wear robes in the 12th century for two reasons. First, the long 
garments kept the wearers warm in the cold buildings and second, long robes indicated the 
status of the individual. The legal profession began to acquire its own distinctive form of 
dress modified from lay person dress during the medieval period.2 Judges adjudicated 
usually in a knee-length robe or even as long as falling to the ankles, which was fastened 
with a belt at their waist, and wearing a cap of the same colour as their robe. 
Judicial dress was far from being uniform, neither in colour nor in cut. Whilst a Welsh 
judge would wear a green robe, a count in the Kingdom of Germany in the 13th century 
would wear a tightly fitting yellow garment and a cap adorned with yellow and red ribbons 
when deciding a case in his own countship.3 In Cologne a municipal judge dispensed justice 
wearing a blue knee-length robe with buttons and a similarly blue sleeveless cape reaching 
mid-shin.4 
 
1 Bírói ítélet [Judicial judgement]. Világ [World], No. 146, 1924, p. 1. 
2 HARGREAVES-MAWDSLEY, W. N.: A History of Legal Dress in Europe. Oxford, 1963, Clarendon Press, p. 3.; Innocent 
Diversions: Australian Legal Fashion. An exhibition in the Sir Harry Gibbs Legal Heritage Centre, September 
2014, https://media.sclqld.org.au/documents/lectures-and-exhibitions/2014/innocent-diversions-exhibition-
catalogue.pdf [Access on July 22, 2019] 
3 WERKMÜLLER, Dieter (ed.): Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte (HRG). vol. IV, Berlin, 1990, p. 1044. 
4 ARLINGHAUS, Franz-Josef: Gesten, Kleidung und die Etablierung von Diskursräumen im städtischen 
Gerichtswesen (1350–1650). In: BURKHARDT, Johannes, WERKSTETTER, Christine (ed.): Kommunikation und Medien 
in der Frühen Neuzeit. München, 2005, De Gruyter Oldenbourg, p. 472. 
4 
In the 14th and 15th centuries judges and lawyers started wearing an attire similar to the 
long cassock of the clergy. Such simple dress was considered appropriate as secular clothing 
enabled „too much finery and personal vanity”, when „the calm and reserved representative 
of the immutable law could not be a man of fashion”. Such uniform also helped those 
seeking legal services as judges and lawyers were easily distinguishable from clients by their 
clothing.5 
The judges of the highest judicial forum of France, the Parliament of Paris, were among 
the first who following the fashion of the royal court started wearing full-size long-sleeved 
robes with an ermine6 collar. The judges of different ranking were distinguished by the 
fabric, colour, quality and adornment of their respective gowns. From the 15th century the 
colour of the gown was mainly black, but the judges of the towns having „the privilege of 
the glaive” (that is the right of imposing and carrying out the execution of a death penalty) 
wore a scarlet gown whilst adjudicating. In some countries (for instance, Switzerland or Italy) 
the black gown – in Spanish style – was decorated with a white ruff.7 
The English judicial dress is also rich in traditions and symbols. There were no strict rules 
in the early Middle Ages as to the colour or fabric of judicial dress. Judicial costume changed 
with the seasons. It was only customary that judges’ winter robe was lined with fur and 
summer robes finished with taffeta. By the beginning of the 15th century the colour of winter 
garments was violet, green during summer, and red on ceremonial occasions. 
Following publication of the scholarly work The Discourse on Robes and Apparel in 1625, 
the Commission of Westminster passed a Royal Decree on court dress. The Judges’ Rules set 
out guidelines for the dressing of judges of the Inns of Court in 1635, however they failed to 
introduce any novelties; they only summarised the practice established by the 17th century. 
The judges of Westminster Hall (today’s High Court) wore black8 or violet gowns during 
sittings accompanied with a cape and hood of the same colour. Their headwear consisted 
of a coif made of linen, covered by a round velvet clerical skullcap, and finally a four cornered 
 
5 (D.): Ügyvédi és bírói uniformis [The uniform of attorneys and judges]. Pesti Hírlap [Pest News], No. 186, 1912, 
p. 6. 
6 The ermine is the symbol of power and authority. Wearing a robe or mantle (or cloak) made of ermine or 
padded with ermine was the privilege of kings and as well as of noble families. The ermine collar of judges has 
been for centuries also the emblem of spotless justice and strictest integrity. 
7 HRG. Vol. IV, p. 1093. 
8 The black colour of the gown derives from a mourning dress adopted by the Bar after the death of Charles II 
in 1685. 
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black hat of limp (pileus quadratus). For ceremonial occasions they were dressed in a scarlet 
robe trimmed with silk or ermine depending on the season.9 The fabrics were traditionally 
bestowed on the judges by the monarch. 
The wig embodying judicial authority came into use by French influence10 during the 
reign of Charles II (1660–1685). He and the royal court returned to England, bringing with 
them the practice, for gentlemen to wear wigs. All of fashionable society adopted this habit, 
and so the judges and lawyers – being dedicated followers of fashion – did the same. 
Originally, judges and barristers alike wore long, or „full-bottomed” wigs. The powdered 
bush wig was part of a judge’s ordinary attire, even when not sitting in court.11 By the late 
18th century, judges had bowed to fashion and, perhaps, comfort, by adopting an „undress” 
wig – a short wig with one vertical curl at the back and two queues behind, for ordinary 
sittings in court – reserving the full-bottom for ceremonial occasions. 
Until the beginning of the 18th century wigs were made of black horsehair, which required 
constant care, perfume and hair-powder. The ointments and powdering corroded the 
material of the expensive judicial gowns, thus the end of short wigs were tied in small black 
rosettes or dress bags. To reduce the constant need to maintain wigs, Humphrey 
Ravenscroft12 in 1822 patented the curly judicial wig made of white horsehair, which did not 
require any further frizzing, curling or powdering.13 
Lord Taylor, upon his appointment as Lord Chief Justice in 1992, precipitated a debate on 
judicial attire by expressing his desire to abolish wigs in court.14 Due to modernisation 
endeavours judges hearing civil and family law cases were no longer required to wear old-
fashioned wigs in England and Wales since 1 October, 2008. 
 
9 KENGYEL, Miklós: Perkultúra – A bíróságok világa, a világ bíróságai [The Culture of Litigation – The World of Courts, 
Courts around the World]. Budapest–Pécs, 2010, pp. 252–253. 
10 The wig had been in use since Louis XIII went prematurely bald and disguised his baldness with a wig in 
1624. MCLAREN, James G.: Legal dress. A brief history of wigs in the legal profession. International Journal of the 
Legal Profession, No.2, 1999, p. 224. 
Louis XIV of France was compelled to wear a wig because of some hair illness; it is just a matter fact that no 
court person could have been imagined without wearing a wig. Such fashion therefore derived from the 
covering up of a physical imperfection. RÁTH-VÉGH, István: Királyok divatjától a divatkirályokig [From the 
Fashion of Kings to the Kings of Fashion]. In: HATVANY, Lili (ed.): Öltözködés és divat [Dressing and Fashion]. 
Budapest, 1936, p. 50. 
11 FERGUSON WALKER, J.: Judicial Costume in England. The Green Bag, No. 12, 1900, p. 615. 
12 Wigs are still manufactured by Ede & Ravenscroft, which is London’s oldest tailor and wig maker. It was 
founded in 1689 and has been supplying specialist legal wear tailoring and wig making for over 300 years. 
13 https://legal.edeandravenscroft.co.uk/EvolutionOfLegalDress.aspx [Access on July 14, 2019] 
14 MCLAREN 1999, p. 241. 
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In 1868 it was Sir Robert Collier who first urged the abolition of wigs. 
 
“During the last two days the learned judge and the bar have been sitting without their 
wigs, and in opening a case Sir Robert Collier called attention to the innovation and 
apologised for not appearing in full forensic costume. His lordship said he had set the 
example of leaving off the wig in consequence of the unprecedented heat of the 
weather as he thought there were limits to human endurance. Sir Robert Collier 
expressed that his precedent might be generally followed and hoped the obsolete 
institution of the wig was coming to an end – a hope in which many of the profession 
concur.” 
(The Times, 24 July 1868)15 
 
Similar reform ideas also popped up at the beginning of the 20th century, as according to 
English public law „a judgement delivered bald or sitting down may not be good or fair”.16 
However, unusually hot weather in London upset traditions on a number of occasions, for 
instance in 1934, when a judge took off his wig – in the middle of a trial – and „eventually 
wiped off his forehead dripping with sweat”.17 
 
2. The judicial gown in Hungary 
 
“The gown has arrived at the borders of Hungary.” – informed the Jogtudományi Közlöny 
(Jurisprudential Bulletin) in January 1898. In Austria the ministerial decree issued on 9 August, 
1897 (RGBl. No. 187/1897) rendered the wearing of official attire mandatory. Accordingly, as 
of 1 January 1898 every judge and prosecutor, as well as all expert lay judges were obliged 
to wear the official dress consisting of a black gown and beret at trials. 
 
15 MCQUEEN, Rob: Of Wigs and Gowns. A Short History of Legal and Judicial Dress in Australia. Law in Context, 
No. 1, 1998, p. 37. 
16 Paróka nélkül [Without a wig]. Népszava [Word of People], No. 150, 1934, p. 7. 
17 Ibid. 
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The gown reaching until the ankles was made of a light woollen cloth, „thickly plaited” 
and buttoned on the front. The neckline was made from violet velvet, the sleeve of the gown 
was ornamented with black and violet silk stripes. The attire was supplemented with a bow 
tie made of glossy black silk and a white shirt. The decree specified in detail how many 
buttons, of what size and type were to be sewn on the gown, and where should the pocket 
be placed. The beret had to be worn when delivering judgements and making oaths. On the 
neck of the gown and the beret there were six different signs denoting ranking. The gown 
of the President of the Oberster Gerichtshof was ornamented with a twelve centimetres wide 
ermine collar, and his beret also had a violet velvet stripe, the attire of the Vice-President 
only differed in that his ermine collar was only six centimetres wide.18 
In Hungary judges did not wear an official uniform. The judges heard a case in their 
national dress, and at the regional courts they only girded their sword, which was more of a 
sign of their nobility and not as a symbol of adjudication. Between 1869 and 1912 a number 
of enthusiastic or less eager opinions was expressed in Hungary in daily newspapers, law 
journals, and discussed among lawyers and jurists relating to the judicial dress. Devotees of 
a judicial uniform regarded the introducing of such a dress as a token of judicial authority, 
but there were others who stressed that maintaining the dignity corresponding to the 
judicial profession has more to do with the individual character of a judge, his qualification, 
knowledge and sense of justice rather than wearing a uniform. 
The Jogtudományi Közlöny (Jurisprudential Bulletin) reported on the real cavalcade of 
attires and colours of the courtrooms. At one of the hearings of the Royal Court of Budapest 
in 1892 
 
„the president was ruling wearing a grey sacco suit, a more fashionable judge due to 
vote a yellow jaquet suit, the other voting judge a brown double-breasted coat and 
blue trousers. The royal prosecutor represented the State in yellow-black checked 
clothing. Such colours orgy was somewhat dimmed by the black coat of the 
defence”.19 
 
18 Judicial robe – black gown and beret – of defence attorneys and clerks in Austria was regulated by the Decree 
of the Minister of Justice, 17 June, 1904 (Verordnung RGBl. No. 59/1904). 
19 SZAKOLCZAI, Árpád: „Minima” [„Minim”]. Jogtudományi Közlöny [Jurisprudential Bulletin], No. 39, 1892, p. 310. 
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In July 1898 a long debate ensued among our renowned lawyers as to what should the 
official attire look like in the Hungarian courts (gown or national dress „atilla”), and whether 
it should be compulsory only for the judges or also for the prosecutors and attorneys. Many 
jurists expressed their opinions in the Országos Hírlap (National News). 
 
According to the arguments of Leó Zsitvay, the President of the Royal Criminal Court of 
Budapest: 
 
„Let us beware of exaggerations, which regard the Hungarian judges as Hungarian 
men who are all soldier-like, a born horse rider, like a hero, and wanting him to wear 
full-size tight apparel with shiny trimmings. […] let us consider the modern Hungarian 
man who toils day in day out and only straightens up with difficulty under a heavy 
workload to give the impression of a somewhat attractive figure, and let us also 
consider that we do have good judges who may hardly be able to be impressive 
wearing some ‘festive dress’ due to their less fortunate appearance. So, maybe 
because of the cut of the judicial attire the presidents of regional courts will look like 
old-fashioned hussar colonels, who competing will only recruit others based on an 
impressive figure.”20 
 
Jenő Hammersberg, Chief Royal Prosecutor of Budapest, did not find it necessary or 
reasonable to introduce a special official attire: 
 
„Our courts have had to date and still have the required respect and dignity, and I do 
not believe that a gown or any kind of special attire would be able to enhance such 
respect or the public trust vested in their adjudication. The source of a judge’s dignity 
should not be derived from his attire or other formalities, but from his moral and 
 
20 Talárt a bíráknak [Gown for the judges]. Országos Hírlap [National News], No. 189, 1898, p. 4. 
http://epa.oszk.hu/00200/00242/00231/pdf/00231.pdf 
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intellectual characteristics, his conscientious carrying out of his duties, his serious 
conduct, and the fairness of his judgements.”21 
 
According to the opinion of Dezső Márkus, a judge at the Royal Court of Budapest, 
 
„Though the salon suit is beyond doubt the best option, it may not be made 
mandatory as it is rather costly, and even though I believe it to be the most suitable 
and because of its simplicity the most elegant solution for any work carried out in 
public, I would choose the gown [...], because I find it more expedient for the following 
reasons: the gown is cheap, comfortable, it equalises, covers any physical 
imperfections, and provides a solemn and dignified appearance for the trial [...]. The 
Hungarian national dress is not practicable because: it is expensive; tight trousers, 
boots, a sword – are not really comfortable for everyday wear, and it is not as easily put 
on and taken off at the office as the gown, consequently it should be worn all 
throughout the day; it calls for different degrees of ornamentation [...], which may be 
rather inconvenient […] when considering that a great number of people judge you 
by the appearance; finally, it highlights the physical imperfections, let alone that the 
Hungarian dress with all its accessories is not advantageous for all Hungarian men, 
even if fair and sound.”22 
 
Only a few years later, the legislator dealt with the issue of judicial dress. §104 of Act 54 
of 1912 on the implementation of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act 1 of 1911) authorized the 
Minister of Justice „to order by decree the wearing of specific dress for the judges”. 
According to the reasoning of the Act: 
 
„The issue to introduce an appropriate judicial attire has been raised several times. It 
is true that neither would it be beneficial for the honour of the justice nor for the 
dignity of the courts if members of the courts or the prosecution wore bright colours 
 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., p. 7. 
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or some ostentatious clothing whilst practising their profession before an audience, 
therefore this proposal allows for the regulation of the judicial attire by decree. The 
proposal does not contemplate a uniform or a gown as is the case at foreign courts, 
but a kind of dress, which conforms to the solemnity of their function while retaining 
their Hungarian character and also taking convenience into consideration.”23 
 
3. Application for the design of the judicial cap and gown (1912) 
 
The Ministry of Justice announced an application in September 1912 for the design of a 
judicial cap and gown. The Hungarian Association of Applied Arts was called upon to be in 
charge of the application; apart from members delegated by the association to the 
committee assessing the applications two further members were nominated by the Minister 
of Justice. 
 
Pursuant to the call for application: 
 
„A small-scale coloured design is required of the judicial (prosecutors, scriveners 
included) gown, a full-size design of the judicial insignia, and a small-scaled design of 
counsels’ cap and gown which is of the same cut as the judicial cap and gown but still 
easily distinguishable. The applicant must take into consideration that the Hungarian 
judicial dress may not be an imitation of some foreign judicial attire in any way, and it 
must feature the necessary solemnity and have an individual character; finally, the 
gown must be able to cover the ordinary clothes fully. St Stephen’s crown is the most 
suitable as a form of insignia as being the source of the Hungarian judge’s power.”24 
 
 
23 Képviselőházi irományok [Papers of House of Representatives], 1910, vol. XI, 280-347, XXXI–XXXVII, No. of 
papers 1910-330, p. 325. 
24 The detailed call for application, „Application for the design of the judicial attire (gown) and cap” was 
published in the journal Magyar Iparművészet [Hungarian Applied Arts], No. 6, 1912, p. 236. 
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The applications were evaluated by the assessment committee in January 1913.25 Forty-
four applications were submitted. The 1st prize was awarded to Nándor Honti, lithographer 
and graphic designer, the 2nd prize went to Jenő Jeney, painter, and the 3rd prize was 
awarded to János Böhm, stamp designer. 
 
According to the winning design of Nándor Honti: 
 
„The fabric of the gown is black lustre, the collar and cap is made of black moiré. The 
President, judge and prosecutor is distinguished by a medal of St Stephen’s crown 
hanging from the neck on a chain or golden braid. The clerk wears the medal as a 
badge without a lace pinned over his heart. Counsels do not have a badge. The cut of 
the gowns are the same, the gown of the President of a superior court is red from the 
inside, and that of the President of a lower court is blue inside, as for all the others it is 
all fully black.”26 
 
The winning designs were submitted to the Minister of Justice by suggesting that before 
making the final decision, the gowns designed should be made by the tailor’s workshop of 
the Hungarian Royal Opera, and only subsequently should the choice be made as to which 
gown design would be ultimately used as the official attire for judges (and prosecutors, etc.). 
Though the competing designs were submitted in 1913, and from 1914 a decree issued 
by the Minister of Justice obliged the judges, prosecutors, scriveners and counsels to wear a 
cap and gown, the introduction of the gown was dropped as „the war came and its misery 
did not allow our judges to wear gowns”.27 
 
 
25 The chairman of the committee was Ignác Alpár the Vice-President of the Hungarian Association of Applied 
Arts, and its members were Dr Gyula Rickl, ministerial advisor delegated by the Minister of Justice, and Dr János 
Marschalko, justice of the Royal Court of Appeal, Elek K. Lippich, ministerial advisor delegated by the Hungarian 
Association of Applied Arts, and Jenő Kéméndy, painter, costume designer and scenist, Chief Scenist of the 
Opera. 
26 A bírói talár [The judicial gown]. Vasárnapi Ujság [Sunday News], No. 6, 1913, p. 115. 
27 A bírósági tisztviselők egyenruhája [The uniform of the court officers]. Esztergom és Vidéke [Esztergom and its 
Region], No. 50, 1914, p. 3. 
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4. The judicial dress in the 20th century 
 
In the first decades of the 20th century no single viewpoint developed on the introduction of 
a uniform judicial dress. And it was not considered to be the right time to discuss the issue. 
A judge wore a dark suit and a tie as an everyday apparel in Hungary between the two World 
Wars, however at trials of greater publicity something more solemn had to be worn. By the 
beginning of the 1950s this „required elegance” disappeared, judges who remained (and 
even were left) in their position, and the newly qualified people’s cadre of judges who just 
finished the one-year judicial academy all endeavoured to meet the requirements of the 
days. 
The appearance of women judges brought about a new situation as far as dressing is 
concerned. The elegance expected in the courtroom was dependent on the actual fashion 
trends in their case. The first bigger shock happened when the mini skirt appeared in the 
end of the sixties. According to the wording in the second half of the eighties the judge 
„should dress in a manner worthy of his or her position”, that is „women judges are not to 
adjudicate in miniskirts, or shorts, and men judges are not to wear short-sleeved shirts 
without a tie” when delivering decisions.28 
In the spring of 1990, the judges of the Constitutional Court appeared in a dark blue gown 
in public. Nearly a year later the judges of the Supreme Court were dressed in a black gown. 
The President of the court announced in December 1990 that the justices of the Supreme 
Court will be wearing a gown henceforth. 
The first judges to deliver judgements in a gown – as of September 1993 – were the 
judges of the Komárom-Esztergom County Court.29 After Komárom-Esztergom County, 
judges of some other counties also joined in wearing a gown, however in different forms. 
The National Judicial Council provided for the general introduction and wearing of an official 
judicial attire in 1999 in its regulation, thus as of 1 June, 2000 wearing a black gown with 
violet trimmings became mandatory for all judges.30 
 
28 KENGYEL, Miklós: Talárban és talár nélkül. Öltözködési kultúra a bírósági tárgyalóteremben [With or without a 
gown. Dressing culture in the courtroom]. Bírák Lapja [Paper of Judges], No. 3–4, 1993, p. 4. 
29 Bírák – talárban ... [Judges – wearing a gown …]. 24 óra [24 Hours], No. 244, 1993, p. 1. 
30 Júliustól minden bírónak kötelező a talár [The gown is mandatory for all judges as of July]. Népszabadság 
[People’s Freedom], No. 108, 2000, p. 6. 
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The gown to date 
 
„conveys judicial dignity, which enhances the respect of the courts. This has to be 
expressed in the attire of a lay judge and of the recorder participating at a hearing, or 
of a court secretary conducting such procedure”. 
(Directive No. 9/2012 of the President of the National Office for Judiciary) 
 
The National Office for Judiciary announced an application in September 2016 for the 
students of Moholy-Nagy University of Art and Design Budapest (MOME) to design a new 
judicial gown. The assessment of the thirteen designs submitted was carried out by 
members of the Gown Committee31 as well as of the judiciary. According to a preliminary 
survey the judges still prefer the black colour for the judicial gown and found no reason to 
distinguish between the gown of women and men judges. 
Students taking part in the application presented their sample gowns in the autumn of 
2016 for the first time, which were later improved and changed both in their fabric and 
ornamentation based on the observations of the judges. The announcement of the winning 
design took place in June 2017. The most successful applicants received an award and a 
certificate of merit.32 
  
 
31 Members of the Gown Committee were: President of the National Office for Judiciary, President of the Curia, 
President of the National Judicial Council, presidents of the courts of appeal and the regional courts, artists 
and I. 
32 The students having received an award and a certificate of merit: Eszter Béla, Júlia Ilona Horváth, Alma 
Vetlényi and Noémi Gyimóthy. The designs and a detailed description of the project are available in the 2016 
Yearbook of the MOME, as well as on the website of the National Office for the Judiciary. 
https://birosag.hu/hirek/kategoria/birosagokrol/lezarult-talarpalyazat 
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Luca VARGA: Mistrust or rationality? - The history of the marriage 
settlement 




Nowadays there are only a few marriages that have not had the root that the would-be-
married ones make a marriage settlement before their wedding. The marriage settlement 
has the purpose that if the spouses want to get divorced, they do not have to go to the court 
for a long litigation because of their properties’ ownership. To make a valid contract is 
cheaper, than have a matrimonial cause. 
The main part of my essay will be about in what ways and how successfully you can 
validate your marriage settlement according to the breakdown reasons. In this part I will also 
present that although between the spouses the divorce and the matrimonial properties’ trial 
are two different litigations, how their divorce’s trial can have an impact on their other 
litigation. To understand all of this system, we need to know the meaning of the matrimonial 
property laws, and the meaning and content of the marriage settlement. We also need to 
discuss how the properties’ owners change after the divorce, namely the things that the 
spouses bring into their marriage to increase their wealth.  
Last but not least, I am going to write about the prenuptial agreements’ present. In this 
part I will make verifications about the marriage settlement’s present and what impact it 
would have on the future couple’s decisions. My verifications are about if the marriage 
settlement will be as popular as it is nowadays or it will lose its popularity and the pairs will 
go back to the idea, that they would not be able to separate and live happily ever after.  
 
2. The history of the civil marriage in Hungary  
 
The wish of the religious marriage was spreading extremely fast as the Christianity appeared 
in the countries, although before Christianity there were also some religious habits between 
15 
the old Jewish people and the heathen people who converted to Christianity and brought 
their old habits that could be fitted into the new religion with minor changes.1 
In Hungarian legal history the oldest data about the church wedding was from the time 
of King Coloman the Learned (1095–1116). His act on marriage probably never had any 
practical significance, but it was a good example of how they wanted to implant the church 
wedding.2 There were two opinions around this marriage law. The main opinion about the 
law was that the clandestine marriages were banned before the Council of Trent, which was 
held in 1563. Sneaky marriage means that the marriage happens without any help of the 
church. This approach changed with the Act 7 of 1791, which said: “The law considers 
marriage only as a civil contract. The legislative power shall establish for all inhabitants, without 
distinction, the method by which births, deaths, and marriages are to be declared, and it shall 
designate the public officials who are to receive and preserve the records therefore.” 
In Hungary, after the foundation of the state, the Church had the right to make the 
legislation about marriages. The state was supportive about the question and observant of 
the church’s supremacy. The old habits like marriage by abduction or marriage by purchase 
remained until the 12th century and spread a principle rested on the canon law that 
“marriage is the result of a bilateral nuptial will between man and woman (consensus facit 
nuptias).3 From the beginning, there were bans of the marriages like consanguinity. The 
marriage was banned between the relatives. Since they did not have control of this, after the 
Lateran synod of 1215, Pope Gregory IV. refilled this regulation with the rule of uneven 
collateral relatives banned.4 
During the 16th century, there were chaotic situations because of the spread of the 
Protestantism. Where the decree annunciation did not happen, the Protestant people got 
married according their religion’s rules. The regulation of the Council of Trent said that in 
mixed marriages (when there is a catholic and a not-catholic person, who get married) one 
 
1 ROSZNER, Ervin: Régi magyar házassági jog [Old Hungarian Marriage Law]. Budapest, 1887, Franklin Társulat, p. 
90. 
2 Ibid., p. 91. 
3 HERGER, Csabáné: A nővételtől az állami anyakönyvvezetőig – A magyar házassági köteléki jog és az európai 
modellek [From buying of woman until the state registrar - The Hungarian marriage law and the European models], 
Budapest-Pécs, 2006, Dialóg Campus Kiadó, p. 75. 
4 ROSZNER, op. cit., p. 192. 
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member had to relinquish about their religion (characteristically it was the protestant one), 
so they got married by the catholic rules.5 
In the 19th century, there were two regulations, which had the function to solve the 
situation until an utter regulation. The one of them was the Act 48 of 1868 about the 
litigations of mixed marriages saying that both of the spouses was judged by the religion’s 
regulation. The other was the Act 53 of 1868.6 This said that for valid mixed marriages it is 
enough if one denomination’s clerk announced the wedding. The new rule also declared 
that the newborns had followed their parents’ religion by their genders, so if the baby is a 
girl and the mother is catholic, the baby was also catholic.7 The utter rule for the civil 
marriages was born on 9 December 1894, when Franz Joseph I sanctioned the Act 31 of 1894 
about the civil marriage.8 
 
3. The matrimonial property rights and the marriage settlement 
 
In the Hungarian law, the parts of the matrimonial property rights are: the separate property, 
the dotal property, the community property, dower and the marriage settlement.9 The 
separate property is the spouses’ property, which they have by the time of their wedding or 
something they earned during their marriage for free. The spouses exclusively give orders 
about their separate properties. The dotal property is a kind of assets, which has been given 
by the marrying woman or somebody (as usual her family) to the newly husband to reduce 
the bulk of the marriage. The dotal property is the property of the wife, but the husband has 
the right of fruition on it. If the marriage is coming to an end, the husband’s right would be 
no more and would be obligated to give back the settlement to the woman or her heir.  
The community property is the whole bulk of things that the spouses earned during their 
marriage, except the ones, which were free. The community properties were handled by the 
 
5 HERGER, op. cit., p. 76. 
6 RÁCZ, Lajos: A polgári házasság intézményének megvalósulása Magyarországon [The realization of the 
institution of civil marriage in Hungary]. Jogtörténeti Értekezések [Essays on Legal History] 4, Budapest, 1972, p. 
22. 
7 Ibid., p. 22 
8 BALÁZS, Réka: A magyar házassági bontójog fejlődése [The evolution of the Hungarian matrimonial law]. SZTE-
ÁJK Department of Civil Law and Civil Procedure Law, Masters of Law, p.12. 
9 JANCSÓ, György: A házassági vagyonjogról [About the matrimonial property]. Budapest, 1898, p. 191. 
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one who earned it but at the end of the marriage, the community property was split in equal 
parts. 
The dower has two breeds, but the more important one has the same confiscation as the 
marriage settlements.10 The marriage settlement can made before the wedding and during 
the wedding, so this is the reason why the prenuptial agreement is not a perfect title for it. 
If the would-be-married ones make their contract before their wedding, the title of it is 
prenuptial agreement. If they make it after their wedding, during their marriage the name 
for the contract is marriage settlement agreement. According to the revised fourth Draft of 
Legislative Proposal on the Civil Code for Hungary in 1928 “with the help of the marriage 
settlement agreement the spouses have the choice to make different regulations from the law 
about the community property’s ownership”. 11 
The object of the marriage settlement can be the things mentioned above also the 
holding. According to the marriage settlement, the woman can decide how much she wants 
to conduce the costs, the system of the community properties. The marriage settlement is 
valid till the end of the marriage, if the spouses had not make an appointment for the 
availability or get divorced.12  
The main goal of the marriage settlement is that if it comes to divorce, the ex-married 
ones get the properties which they brought to their marriage and a fair part of the 
community property. The community property has to be separated by the facts that if one 
of the spouses could not be able to conduce to the charges, there were other ways to do it, 
like raising their child or housekeeping.13 For a valid marriage settlement agreement these 
contracts have to be certified by a notary, so the assign body sets it down. Its function is to 
provide the content of the contract.14 If one of the spouses was the reason of the end of the 
marriage, the other one has the right to decide if their marriage settlement agreement is in 
force or leaves off. If no one caused the divorce just they hate each other the marriage 
settlement agreement is invalid.15 
 
10 Ibid., p. 192. 
11 Draft of Legislative Proposal on the Private Law Code for Hungary in 1928, 165. § 
12 RAFFAY, Ferenc: A házassági szerződések [The marriage settlements]. In: RAFFAY, Ferenc: A magyar magánjog 
kézikönyve [The handbook of the Hungarian Private Law] I. Győr, 1909, p. 491. 
13 Ibid., p. 489. 
14 HERCEGH, Mihály: A házassági vagyonjog Magyarországban [The matrimonial property in Hungary]. 
Jogtudományi Közlöny [Jurisprudential Bulletin], 1873, no. 24., p. 183. 
15 Ibid., p. 184. 
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4. The presence and the future of the marriage settlement 
 
The popularity of the marriage settlements is accomplished. But what is the reason of this 
popularity? As It was written it in the beginning of my paper, the marriage settlements are 
cheaper than the matrimonial causes. Making of a marriage settlement can be seemed as 
mistrust, and I am sure that some of the older generations think it is straightforward 
shocking, but on the other hand, we can see it as a very rational decision, because the 
marriage settlement proves what the would-be married ones bring into their marriage, and 
it gives some freedom for the parties to know what their separate properties are. My opinion 
about the marriage settlement is, that they will not be less popular than nowadays, because 
the growing up generations see the advantages of the marriage settlements in their 




Noémi KOVÁCS: Marriage impediments in 19th century in Hungary 




In my study I would like to present the marriage impediments in 19th century in Hungary. 
These impediments were enacted in the Act on civil marriage in 1894. The Act was an 
important step in the modernisation of the Hungarian private law system because it helped 
to minimize the presence of the church in the legal field. Prior to the Act the church had total 
control over the marriages but in 19th century it became unacceptable. Although the 
political leaders considered the country not to be ready for the introduction of the civil 
marriage yet therefore, they postponed the draft for a couple of decades. In 1894 the 
Parliament enacted the Act on civil marriages which meant that the only legal way of 
marrying was the civil ceremony presented by the state. The Act was largely instrumental in 
the makeover of the Hungarian legislation.  
 
2. Marriage impediments 
 
In the following part I would like to present the marriage impediments based on the Act of 
civil marriage (1894). This Act regulated the marriages and stated that only civil marriages 
will be accepted as civil contracts. The Act also declared the impediments which make the 
marriage illegal. These impediments can be divided into two groups: impediments are either 
diriment, which invalidate an attempted marriage, or prohibitive, which make a marriage 
illicit, but it remains valid. The diriment impediments are the following1: 
The first impediment was incapability. When someone cannot gain rights and 
obligations, naturally it means that they cannot marry anyone. Being under-aged is also an 
impediment, the Act stated that women under 16 years old and men under 18 years old 
cannot contract a marriage. The minister of justice could give an exemption in well-founded 
 
1 MESZLÉNY, Arthur: Házassági jog és bírói gyakorlata [The marriage law and its judicial practice]. Budapest, 1930, 
Grill Károly Könyvkiadóvállalata, pp. 6–10. 
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cases. Similarly, to under-aged people minors also cannot marry without the consent of their 
legal representative. This means that minors under the age of 20 cannot marry without the 
consent of the parents, if the legal representative is someone else. If the minor does not have 
a parent, then the guardianship authority will give the consent. The guardianship authority 
also gives the consent if the parent refuses to give it and the case is well-founded. The 
authority is obliged to follow the minor’s requests if possible. There are several other 
supplements to this rule, firstly, the entitled to give the consent is the father. If the father is 
not present or the child is born out of wedlock, then it is the mother. The other 
supplementary rule is that if the parents divorced then the entitled person is the mother, if 
she is not present then it is the father.  
The diriment impediments include the ones that forbid the marriage between relatives. 
This means that marriage was forbidden between lineal blood relatives, siblings, and 
sibling’s direct descendants. This rule served as the protector of moral values. In the 19th 
century the marriage of relatives was no longer accepted, in contrary with the previous 
centuries. The monarch could give an exemption in well-founded cases. It was also 
forbidden to marry the spouse’s blood relatives after the divorce. Although there was no 
blood relation between these people it was still important to protect the morality of 
marriage even after the divorce. This rule concerns only to the lineal relatives (ascendants, 
descendants). Therefore, for instance the widow can marry the late spouse’s sibling. The Act 
does not make any difference between siblings and half-siblings or illegitimate siblings. 
Those siblings who do not have common parents can marry each other.  
 
3. Prohibitive impediments2 
 
The most unequivocal impediment is an already existing marriage. The Act stated that those 
people who have valid previous marriage cannot marry. According to the Act marriage is 
also forbidden if one party tried to murder the other party’s previous spouse. This rule averts 
those murders which would happen due to make possible a new marriage without divorce. 
Marriage is forbidden if one party is under the process of being placed under curatorship 
 
2 Ibid., pp. 11–14. 
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because of being deaf-mute or having a mental-illness in the following cases: a temporary 
curator was appointed; they are under closure or if one party have been placed under 
curatorship but the verdict has not been made yet. People under curatorship (because being 
deaf-mute or having a mental illness) cannot marry without the consent of the curator. 
These rules protect those who are not fully capable of making such decisions like marriage. 
With these impediments it is impossible to take advantage of the vulnerable situation they 
are in. 
According to the Act it is forbidden for minors over the age of 20 to marry without the 
consent of the parents. There is also an impediment between cousins. The minister of justice 
had the right to give an exemption in well-founded cases. This rule concerns only first-
degree cousins. 
The Act has a very extensive regulation in the field of adoptive relationships. Marriage is 
forbidden between adoptive parent and adoptee because this relationship was considered 
to be similar to a parent-child relationship and therefore its moral value was to be protected. 
The rules expanded to the relationship between adoptee and adoptive parent, adoptee and 
adoptive parent’s previous spouse, adoptive parent and adoptee’s previous spouse, 
adoptive parent and adoptee’s descendant or descendant’s previous spouse and between 
adoptee and adoptive parent’s descendant or descendant’s previous spouse. In the two 
latter cases the minister of justice had the right to give an exemption. The Act does not make 
difference between legitimate and illegitimate origin. 
Similar to adoptive relationship marriage is forbidden between guardian and pupil as 
long as the tutelage consists because of the same reasons. Marriage is forbidden between 
those who have been interdicted from marrying each other because of adultery. The 
monarch had the right to give an exemption in well-founded cases. Spouses cannot marry 
until the previous null and void marriage is still valid. This impediment makes it impossible 
to have two marriages at the same time. To avoid the consisting of two marriages the Act 
forbid marriage when it was proved that the legally dead person outlived the date of the 
presumption of death and the spouse is aware of this fact. Marriage is forbidden for those 
who have committed murder on their previous spouse. This rule concerns those as well who 
attempted murder on their spouse. The monarch could give an exemption in well-founded 
cases. 
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For women there was a special rule regarding the marriage impediments. They cannot 
marry after the end or the invalidation of their previous marriage for 10 months. This rule 
does not concern those women who have given birth within the 10 months. The minister of 
justice had the opportunity to give an exemption in those cases where he found it 
reasonable. This rules purpose was to avoid any misunderstanding about the father’s 
identity. 
The consent of the church for people who are part of any ecclesiastical order is required 
to marry, without it marriage is not possible. Marriage is also forbidden without marriage 
license. This rule concerns to the soldiers of the National Army. They are required to ask a 
permission from the minister of defence. To marry it is required to make proper 
annunciation, when it is not made then the marriage is not possible. The administrative 
authority could give an exemption.  
 
4. Averting the marriage impediments3 
 
When creating the Act of civil marriage, it was highly important to establish impediments 
which protect the moral purity of this new rule. Although it was well-known by the 
lawmakers that the Act cannot regulate every single detail about the marriages because that 
would be too restrictive. Therefore, besides determining marriage impediments they also 
created the rules which can avert these impediments. In the following section I would like 
to present these possibilities. The impediments can be divided into two groups based on 
whether they can be averted or are not avertable. 
The marriage impediments which are not avertable serves higher moral purposes and 
therefore there is no possibility to avert them. For instance, blood relatives cannot marry in 
any circumstances because it is strongly against moral values. These impediments are the 
following: between blood relatives (except one’s sibling with one’s descendant) and lineal 
in-laws. When someone has an existing (not null) marriage or existing (null) marriage or 
attempted to murder the spouse or is under curatorship (either because of being deaf-mute 
or having a mental illness). It is also unavertable to outlive the presumptive date of death. 
 
3 RAFFAY, Ferencz: A magyar házassági jog [The Hungarian matrimonial law]. Budapest, 1902, Grill Károly cs. és 
kir. udvari könyvkereskedése, pp. 79–85. 
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All the other impediments are avertable because in those cases the regulation does not have 
to be rigid to protect the moral values. 
The tools of averting the marriage impediments are the following: the monarch or the 
minister of justice could give an exemption but only in cases where the Act made it possible. 
An exemption was an option only prior to the marriage. Giving an exemption is a 
discretional authority therefore it could be denied without justification. Ex-post approval 
makes the marriage valid from the date of marrying. It can avert the following impediments: 
incapability, being under-aged, being minor, compulsion, error and deception. 
Cohabitation averts the impediment ipso facto when the marriage is null because of 
essential modal deficiency and the cohabitation lasts more than one year. In other cases, it 
averts the impediment conditionally, then it is similar to the ex-post approval and averts the 
same impediments. The impediment based on minority can be averted with the consent of 
the parent, legal representative or the guardianship authority. In the cases of minors 
marrying under 20 years old the consent of the parent or the guardian is not needed if they 
gave their consent prior. 
The abolition of adoption averts all the impediments based on the adoption. Likewise, 
the abolition of tutelage averts all the impediments based on tutelage. Childbirth averts the 
10-months long period while the woman cannot marry after their previous marriage. A 
foudroyant fatal illness averts the impediment of proper annunciation. The last tool of 
averting the marriage impediments is desuetude, it consumes the possibility of legal actions 




When creating the Act of civil marriage, it was highly important to produce a rule that would 
serve the Hungarian law system for a long time effectively. The lawmakers aimed to regulate 
and modernize the field of marriages and when making the rules of the civil marriage it was 
also important to state the marriage impediments as well. These impediments were 
essential to protect the morality of the marriage and cannot be said that they were 
irrationally strict. Many of these impediments are part of the Hungarian marriage law today 
(for instance the prohibition of blood relatives or the previous valid marriage). These new 
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rules were completely based on modern law principles and followed the Western-European 
trends. 
The Act of civil marriage was an important step in the process of modernizing the 
Hungarian law system at the end of the 19th century. The new regulation of the marriage law 
was essential in order to catch up with the Western-European law systems which were far 
ahead of the Hungarian system at that time. With the modernisation of the public law 
system Hungary became a developed and advanced country which later gained a leading 




Panna BÁLITS: Legal regulation of divorce in Hungary at the end of the 
19th century 




As we know, human relationships can come to an end. People make mistakes, they choose 
the wrong person, they change, and these can all cause the end of a relationship. As one of 
the most important human relationships, a.k.a. marriage was institutionalised, its ending 
had to be institutionalised as well, so was divorce created. The regulation of divorce had 
more and more effect on people’s lives as the nature of marriage changed and divorce 
became more frequent. When the law regulated divorce reasons strictly, it was more difficult 
to end a marriage, but today’s regulation is more permissive, and the unredeemable 
marriage can be ended even by the mutual agreement of the spouses.1 
The Hungarian regulation of divorce was softened in 19th century due to the Act 31 of 
1894 on Civil Marriage. The Act regulated divorce actions more allowing than the private 
law before 1848, although there are still some major differences between the recent divorce 
regulation and the Act’s rules. 
 
2. The significance of religion 
 
The dissolution of marriage was always affected by the church since state and law exist. 
Divorce was regulated strictly in the Roman law despite of the fact that personal liberty was 
harmed by this strictness. Later the Christian emperors drew distinction between different 
divorce reasons, unjustified divorce was punished and the dissolution by mutual agreement 
was oppressed with financial disadvantage. Although marriage is sacred according to the 
Catholic Church, and therefore it cannot be annulled, the institution of divorce still existed 
in the medieval Christian countries. 
 
1 2013. évi V. törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvről [Act V of 2013 on the Civil Code], 4:21. §(1) 
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As long as the Church had a significant effect on the Hungarian law, the divorce 
regulation was stricter, but as legislation got more and more influenced by the concept of 
equal rights and rule of law the indissolubleness started to fade and the regulation became 
more permissive2. The Act regulated the possibility of divorce and so extended the personal 
liberty, which was a major progress compared to the divorce regulation before 1848. The 
Law’s starting point is that marriage meant to be for a lifetime, however it makes allowance 
for the common truth that relationships can to go wrong and end.3 
 
3. Reasons for divorce 
 
There are three ways to end a marriage according to the Act. Normally and most frequently, 
the dissolution is caused by the death of a spouse. Marrying someone new after the previous 
spouse disappeared and was declared dead in absentia ended the bonds of the former 
relationship. The third possibility was the divorce decree, which ended the marriage and the 
divorce action. The Act did not mention any other ways of ending a marriage that caused 
the invalidity of other transactions (for example the mutual agreement between the 
spouses.) 
The regulation of divorce decree was based on culpability, therefore the reason for 
divorce could only be such a behaviour that included the intention of breaching marital. This 
concept excludes those reasons where both spouses contributed in violating their duties. 
Act determined the divorce reasons in §76 to 80 and did not authorise the court to consider 




2 GOSZTONYI, Gergely: Szabadságjogok [Fundamental freedoms]. In: KÉPES György (ed.): A hatalommegosztás 
államszervezete, 1848–1949. Magyar alkotmány- és közigazgatástörténet a polgári korban [The state structure of 
separation of powers, 1848–1949. History of Hungarian constitution and public administration]. Budapest, 2013, 
ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, pp. 217–232. 
3 GROSSCHMID, Béni: Különös rész [Special Rules], In: GROSSCHMID, Béni: A házasságjogi törvény [The Act on 
marriage law], Budapest, 1908, Politzer-féle Könyvkiadó vállalat, pp. 643–645. 
4 NAGY, Domonkos – TÓTH, György: A házassági jog és a kuria gyakorlata [The marriage law and the practice of the 
Curia], Budapest, 1940, Attila-Nyomda Rt., pp. 121–125. 
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4. Absolute reasons 
 
According to the Act the divorce action can be brought by a spouse when the other spouse 
commits crime against sexual morality or marries someone else knowing about the 
existence of the first matrimony.5 Adultery had specific conclusion of facts. To be considered 
as adultery, the spouse had to have intentional sexual intercourse with a partner other than 
his/her spouse. The act had to happen during the conjugal community and had to be the 
reason for the union to end. The judicial practice did not presume that the sexual intercourse 
happened therefore it needed specific evidences. It almost seems absurd for us how some 
facts were not considered as enough evidence for adultery, for example when the evidence 
only proved that the spouse spent time in the room of a prostitute. Even the fact that the 
wife had a child while her husband was away, was not an absolute evidence for the 
presumption of fatherhood. The intent meant that the intercourse happened with the sense 
and will of the partners. This rule meant to ensure that only the culpable behaviour was 
punished. To prove the intercourse, the third person had to be named, so there could not 
be any divorce sentence if the third person was unknown. To be considered adultery the act 
should have happened while the spouses were living together. This meant sharing 
household, however the judiciary accepted other cases as well, for example when a spouse 
was away because of military reasons, sickness or for work. If the union did not end in 
consequence of the adultery, the judge assumed that the act was forgiven and dismissed 
the divorce action. 
The restrictive interpretation of adultery did not harm but helped the spouses, because 
the judge could end the marriage anyway based on §80. The divorce decree based on the 
§76 however, was followed by more serious sanctions, for instance the guilty spouse could 
not marry the person he/she committed adultery with, therefor the child born out of 
wedlock could not be legitimized.6 
The Act mentioned crimes against sexual morality as a divorce reason to give everyone 
with good morals a chance to end their relationship with a sinner. The law did not give any 
details about the meaning of the sexual crimes but authorised the court to ponder the facts 
 
5 NAGY – TÓTH, op.cit., p.137. 
6 Ibid., pp. 129–134. 
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and decide whether the case fits into this divorce reason or not.7 The Act also talks about 
treacherous abandonment as a divorce reason. The abandoned spouse could ask for a 
judicial order six months after the conjugal community was dissolved or one year after the 
other spouse’s location became unknown. If the leaving spouse did not come back without 
any righteous reason, the abandoned spouse could start a divorce action. The conjugal 
community is the base of matrimony, without it the marriage cannot function as it supposed 
to, however the judicial practice considered only a couple cases treacherous abandonment.  
Leaving for work or military reasons were not considered as treacherous abandonment, 
because in these cases there were no intention for ending the union. The most common 
reason for dissolving the conjugal community is that the place the married couple lived in 
was unsuitable. Another term of treacherous abandonment is that the abandoned spouse 
had to have intention for setting back the union, so if the spouse only asked for the judicial 
order to later file a petition against the leaving spouse, the judge dismissed the divorce 
action.8 
Another reason for divorce was the endangerment of the spouse’s life or health, which 
was a result of the non-functioning relationship9. During the divorce action the seriousness 
of the endangerment was considered, for instance infecting the spouse with syphilis 
resulted a divorce decree, while in case of smaller outrages the judge dismissed the action. 
The judge also examined how the spouse’s behaviour affected the relationship, and only 
ended the marriage when the married couple’s relationship was beyond all bearing.10 The 
judge ended a marriage on request of the spouse, when the other spouse was sentenced to 
death or more than five years of high - or medium - security prison after the wedding. This 
rule meant to save the innocent spouse’s honour, because the sentence affected the 




7 GROSSCHMID, op.cit., p. 676. 
8  MESZLÉNY, Arthur: Házassági jog és bírói gyakorlata [The marriage law and its judicial practice]. Budapest, 1930, 
Grill Károly Könyvkiadóvállalata, p. 59. 
9 GROSSCHMID, op.cit., pp. 687–689. 
10 MESZLÉNY, op.cit., pp. 85-86. 
11 GROSSCHMID, op.cit., p. 694. 
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5. Relative reasons 
 
The §80 shows relative divorce reasons, in which cases the divorce decree is based on the 
judicial discretion. In these cases, the judge considered the damage in the relationship 
caused by the culpable spouse and dissolved the marriage if the couple’s relation was 
beyond repair. One of the relative divorce reasons was the intentional breaching of the 
marital duties, which was not specified by the law because of the multifariousness of human 
behaviour. The nature of marriage requires love, respect and appreciation, and people 
invented all kinds of ways to harm them.12 Insobriety, spending too much of the spouse’s 
money, leaving the husband for becoming an actress, or the valid suspicion of the spouse 
starting a sexual relationship with someone else could be considered as enough reason for 
a divorce decree.13 
Another reason for divorce is when the spouse tempted the family’s children to immoral 
behaviour or committing crime, for example when a spouse helps her daughter commit 
adultery.14 The Act considers immoral lifestyle a relative reason for divorce as well. The judge 
considered the spouse’s insobriety, gambling addiction and infamous job, such as 
prostitution, and usually ended the marriage when the spouse did not show any ambition 
for making a change in his/her lifestyle.15 Based on the judge’s consideration, the marriage 
could be dissolved if one of the spouses was sentenced to less than five years of high or 
medium security prison or low security prison because of misdemeanour on account for 
greed of gain. 
 
6. A glimpse into the improvement 
 
Through the 20th century, the legal regulation of divorce became more and more permissive. 
The divorce decree wasn’t only based on culpability anymore, and even the safety of women 
got more attention. In the second half of the 20th century the Hungarian divorce regulation 
 
12 GROSSCHMID, op.cit., p. 698–702. 
13 MESZLÉNY, op.cit., pp. 87–91. 
14 NAGY – TÓTH, op.cit., pp. 206–207. 
15 MESZLÉNY, op.cit., p. 107. 
30 
required serious and solid reason and evidence for the divorce decree, however later on the 
married couple could end the marriage based on mutual agreement. The new regulation 
intended to save the institution of marriage by the two-round divorce action and the 
placating hearing, which gave time to the couple to reconsider the dissolution of marriage. 
Current rules extend personal liberty in the regulation of divorce as well and let people 
handle their relationships at their own discretion.16 I hope I managed to demonstrate that 
the first step towards a more liberal and more humane divorce regulation in the Hungarian 
legal system was the Act of 1894 on Civil Marriage. 
  
 
16 NAGY, Márta: A házasság megszűnése [The dissolution of marriage]. In: JAKAB, András – FEKETE, Balázs (eds.): 
Internetes Jogtudományi Enciklopédia [Internet Encyclopedia of Jurisprudence] (HEGEDŰS, Andrea (ed.): Family 
Law) http://ijoten.hu/szocikk/a-hazassag-megszunese (2018). [6] – [7] 
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Ana TURIĆ: The marital relationship and inheritance in Croatia – a 
historical overview 




Marriage is the living community of a woman and a man in whom personal and financial 
relations are realized, with a possible inheritance aspect.1 Throughout history, both Croatian 
and general, a surviving spouse did not always have the right to inherit a part of the estate 
of the deceased spouse. Moreover, if the spouse had that right, he/she was often 
discriminated against in the way that he/she was equal with the relatives of the deceased in 
a further order of succession. Particular attention should be given to the case where a widow 
is a surviving spouse, who in one period was directly legally and really discriminated, and in 
the second, formally equal with a man, but in reality, unequal which was an indicator of her 
position in society. 
The aim of this study is to show how marital relationship as a foundation of inheritance 
evolved in Croatia from the period of feudalism through the period of validity of the Austrian 
General Civil Code and the period of socialism until today, when we can say that marriage is 
fully recognized as a foundation of inheritance. 
 
2. The right of succession according to the Tripartitum 
 
In the period of feudalism inheritance law was marked by the variety due to the distinction 
of the estate in terms of acquisition and some other criteria.2 Also, the right to inherit was 
arranged differently for certain classes so it was important whether they were members of 
 
1 Croatian family law determinates that marriage is a living community of a man and woman regulated by law. 
Obiteljski zakon Republike Hrvatske [The Family Law of the Republic of Croatia], Narodne novine, no. 103, 
Zagreb, Art. 12 
2The law of succession was different for the inherited and acquired property and for the movable and 
immovable property. See more: KREŠIĆ, Mirela, PILIPOVIĆ, Matea: De succesione colonorum: O nasljednom pravu 
kmetova u Kraljevini Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji [De succesione colonorum: On the peasants’ right to inherit in the Kingdom 
of Croatia and Slavonia]. Povijesni prilozi, vol. 49, no. 49, 2015, pp. 211–233. 
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the nobility, citizens or the peasants.3 The main law on succession of the feudal period in 
Croatia and Slavonia was the Tripartitum made by István Werbőczy in 1514. It was in force in 
Croatia until the introduction of the Austrian General Civil Code in 1853. 
The Tripartitum does not recognize the succession rights of the spouses. In accordance 
with its provisions, the deceased's widow had certain rights to her husband's estate, and she 
had to claim them to the successors of her deceased husband. She was entitled to a portion 
of immovable property, that is, the right to an apartment and maintenance that are 
appropriate to her status and the right to equipment in the case of her re-marriage. Such 
right was called the widow's right, and it consisted only of the right to usufruct, but not the 
ownership right. However, certain items were attributed to the widow after the husband's 
death: the suit he was wearing most, his wedding ring, horses and carts most often driven 
by spouses, a certain portion of the horses and a part of the movable and pledged 
immovable property of the deceased equal to the parts given to his children. On the other 
hand, husband did not exercise any rights to the property of his late wife. If she died without 
descendants, her property should belong to her parents or relatives in the indirect order of 
succession.4 
Marriage is finally recognized as a foundation of inheritance by the Act 9 of 1687 by the 
Hungarian Parliament. Nevertheless, it has introduced mutual intestate succession of 
spouses who had no children in marriage, or who had not disposed their assets mortis causa. 
Furthermore, the possibility of mutual inheritance was narrowed to acquire movable 
property and pledged real estate. Acquired real estate entered that circle only if the name 
of the acquirer's spouse was mentioned in the acquisition certificate. For the widow, the rule 
was that she had the right to heritable movables only if there were no male relatives, but 






3 Ibid., p. 229 
4 LANOVIĆ, Mihajlo: Privatno pravo Tripartita [Private law according to the Tripartitum]. Zagreb, 1929, p. 115. 
5 Ibid., p. 118, 312. 
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3. The law of succession according to the Austrian General Civil Code 
 
The Austrian General Civil Code was introduced in Croatia and Slavonia in 1852, entered into 
force in 1853 and it put all previous regulations and practices in the area of civil law, namely 
the Tripartitum, out of force. It has removed the difference between the inherited and 
acquired and movable and immovable property, and the class of the deceased and the 
successors has become irrelevant.6 In other words, most of the features of feudalism have 
been removed from the law of succession by the General Civil Code. 
The legal basis of inheritance was the inheritance contract, a will and law. The application 
of the inheritance contract was limited to married or engaged couples if they marry 
eventually. On the other hand, the testator could almost completely freely dispose of his/her 
possessions by will. The only limitations were legal heirs determined on the basis of kinship 
and marital relationship. 
 
3.1. The surviving spouse as legal heir 
The General Civil Code speaks of "On the intestate succession of husband and wife"7 
although this expression is not quite accurate with regard to the content of its provisions. 
Namely, the surviving spouse's right to inherit was in most cases in competition with the 
rights of the deceased's relatives in the first order of succession, i.e. descendants. Because of 
that, the surviving spouse only had the right to usufruct. If his/her right to succession was 
combined with inheritance rights of relatives from further orders of succession, or if they did 
not exist, the surviving spouse enjoyed the position of the legal heir. 
The premise that should have been met in order for the surviving spouse to exercise 
his/her right to inherit was a lawful marriage with the deceased that lasted until the death 
of a spouse. If the marriage was declared null or void, or if they were divorced, the surviving 
 
6KREŠIĆ, Mirela: Zakonsko nasljeđivanje bračnih drugova prema Općem građanskom zakoniku na hrvatsko-
slavonskom pravnom području [The legal succession of the spouses according to the General Civil Code on the 
Croatian and Slavonian legal area]. Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, vol. 60, no. 2, 2010, p. 529. 
7 Opći građanski zakonik [General Civil Code], Art. 757–759. 
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spouse would lose the right to the estate. A null marriage was the marriage at whose 
conclusion existed one of the legally anticipated obstacles.8 
Special provisions of the General Civil Code also regarded to the case of separation from 
bed and board. It did not necessarily lead to the loss of the right to succession. If the 
surviving spouse had been separated from the bed and board by his/her own fault he/she 
could not claim any rights to the estate,9 and if that was not the case, the right to inherit 
remained intact. This right was retained even if the spouses lived separately, but did not 
initiate a process for separation from the bed and board. If the proceedings were initiated 
and the spouse died before its termination, the decisive fact was whether the spouses lived 
separately or not. If they did not live separately, the surviving spouse had exercised the right 
to succession and if they did not live together the right depended on the guilt of the 
surviving spouse for separation. Evidence were brought by the deceased's successor by 
protesting to the successor's statement given by the surviving spouse, challenging his right 
to usufruct or the right to own. If the guilt was not proved, the surviving spouse exercised 
his right to inherit the deceased spouse regardless of the initiation of separation 
proceedings.10 
 
3.1.1. The surviving spouse and the right of ususfructus 
As already mentioned in the previous excerpts, the surviving spouse could exercise the right 
to succession in the form of ownership or in the form of the right to usufruct. Which of these 
two forms would take place depends on who are the successors of the deceased. If potential 
legal heirs of the deceased were his descendants, the right belonging to the spouse was 
solely the right to use a certain part of the estate while the ownership right was reserved for 
his children. 
The surviving spouse had the right of ususfructus independently of his/her financial 
situation and regardless of remarrying. It did not cover the entire estate but only one portion 
 
8 Ibid., Art. 44–136 
9 Ibid., Art. 759. 
10 RUŠNOV, Adolf: Tumač obćemu austrijskomu gradjanskomu zakoniku – knjiga II [Commentary of the Austrian 
Civil Code – book II]. Zagreb, 1910, pp. 156–157. 
35 
of it determined by the number of deceased's children.11 If the deceased had less than three 
children, the surviving spouse was granted the right to enjoy 1/4 of the estate, and if the 
number of children was equal to three or more, the surviving spouse had the right to enjoy 
the same part as any of the children.12 It should be emphasized that the right to succession 
did not depend on whether the children of the deceased are also the children of the 
surviving spouse as well. Moreover, the children often denied the right to succession to the 
widow of their late father.13 
The provisions of the General Civil Code concerning the part of the estate available for 
ususfructus were not exclusive. The testator could alter the lawfully prescribed portion of the 
estate that the surviving spouse would enjoy for a lifetime after his death. However, the 
deceased could not convey the right to own a particular part of the estate to the spouse but 
only to increase the part foreseen for ususfructus.14 
 
3.1.2. The surviving spouse as owner 
The General Civil Code also regulates the situation when the deceased does not leave any 
descendants behind. Then his potential legal heir are relatives of the following five orders of 
succession and surviving spouse who receives ¼ of the estate.15 Unlike the case where the 
deceased leaves the children behind who become the owners of the estate, and the spouse 
is the beneficiary, here the spouse acquires the ownership right over the corresponding part 
of the estate and can indeed be considered as the legal heir of the deceased. Although such 
proprietary position of a surviving spouse at first sight is considered to be preferable, it 
should be taken into account that he/she only acquired a small part of what the spouses 
gained and maintained together, and the bigger part of the estate goes to relatives of the 
deceased which was clearly unjust. 
 
11 Under the name „the deceased's children “were considered the deceased's children born in marriage, and 
the legitimized and adopted children. If the late spouse was a wife, children born out of marriage also belonged 
to that circle. See more: General Civil Code, op.cit. Art. 752–755. 
12 Ibid., Art. 757. 
13 KREŠIĆ, op.cit., p. 534. 
14 Ibid., p. 535. 
15 General Civil Code, op. cit., Art. 758. 
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The last solution provided by the General Civil Code was the possibility that a surviving 
spouse became an exclusive legal heir.16 This was only possible if there were no relatives of 
the deceased from the six orders of succession which practically did not happen in practice. 
 
3.1.3. The widow as a surviving spouse 
The law of succession of the General Civil Code introduces gender equality. In other words, 
it becomes irrelevant whether a surviving spouse is a man or a woman. Nevertheless, this 
principle was not fully respected in practice, which manifests itself in cases where a surviving 
spouse is a woman. The position of women is generally subordinated in the General Civil 
Code. Women could not be tutors or custodians, nor witnesses of the will. The husband was 
the head of the family and he had the right to manage the household and the right to 
represent his wife. 
He was also obliged to provide the wife with a decent support regardless of whether she 
had her own property. The wife was obliged to take her husband's last name, his residence, 
execute his orders and make sure that others were also executing them.17 If it was not 
arranged differently by the marital contract, each spouse is the owner of the estate that 
he/she brought into marriage. Nevertheless, presumptio muciana from the Roman law was 
included into provisions of the General Civil Code.18 According to that presumption, the 
property that was gained in marriage, and in regard which existed a doubt to whom of the 
spouses it belongs, is considered to be husbands.  
However, women were allowed to carry out an independent vocation that took them out 
of the shell, in which they were considered as mothers, wives and housewives, and included 
them in the processes of urbanization and industrialization. Finally, women, by their 
involvement in economic life, have contributed to the gradual weakening of stereotypes 
about them, and have become entrepreneurs, teachers, clerks, etc. The position of women 
in Croatia has changed in different directions from the 19th to 20th century, but the increased 
economic significance of women over time has become one of the main factors that 
 
16 KREŠIĆ, op.cit., p. 539. 
17 General Civil Code, op.cit., Art. 91–92. 
18 General Civil Code, op.cit., Art. 1237. 
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ultimately provided women with the same rights as men. Today, discrimination based on 
sex is prohibited by the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and by a special law. 
 
4. The law of succession in Croatia in the second half of the 20th century 
 
At the time of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Independent State of Croatia, an attempt 
was made to replace the General Civil Code with the new Civil Code and the rules regarding 
succession were also amended. Nevertheless, these amendments never came into force, so 
the General Civil Code remained in force in Croatia until 1946 when it was extinguished by 
the Law on the irregularity of legal provisions issued before April 6, 1941, and during enemy 
occupation.19 The importance of the General Civil Code for Croatian legal history is 
manifested in the fact that even after its validity some of its provisions have been applied 
and this possibility existed in the legal order of the Republic of Croatia.20  
In its further development, the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia and later the 
Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia has almost entirely been included in the socialist 
legal circular which, in terms of inheritance law, stands out with certain characteristics. These 
are the overcoming of intestate succession as opposed to the dispossession of property by 
will, the narrowing of the circle of potential legal heirs, the empowered position of the 
spouse as a legal heir, the equality of women and men as spouses, and the appreciation of 
the specific circumstances and needs of particular heirs, such as spouse or parents.21 An 
important regulation for this period is the federal 1955 Law on Succession, which was drawn 
up in accordance with Swiss law of succession. It has put the surviving spouse as a potential 
legal heir side by side with the deceased's relatives with a substantially enhanced position 
in relation to the one he/she had under the General Civil Code.22 The condition that should 
have been met was a valid marriage that lasted until the death of the deceased. However, if 
 
19 Zakon o nevažnosti pravnih propisa donesenih prije 6. travnja 1941. i za vrijeme neprijateljske okupacije [The 
law on the irregularity of legal provisions issued before April 6, 1941, and during enemy occupation]. Službeni 
list FNRJ, no. 86, Art. 1–2. 
20 Zakon o načinu primjene pravnih propisa donesenih prije 6. travnja 1941. [The law on the application of legal 
provisions issued before April 6, 1941]. Narodne novine, no. 73, Art. 1–2. 
21 GAVELLA, Nikola, KLARIĆ, Petar, STIPKOVIC, Zlatan i ost.: Građansko pravo i pripadnost hrvatskog pravnog poretka 
kontinentalno-europskom pravnom krugu: teorijske osnove građanskog prava [Civil law and affiliation of Croatian 
legal order with the continental-European legal family: theoretical basis of civil law]. Zagreb, 2005, p. 97. 
22  Ibid., pp. 96–97. 
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the deceased has initiated divorce proceedings during his/her lifetime, and after his/her 
death it was found that the lawsuit was established, the spouse would lose the right to 
inherit. The same was true if, after the death of the spouse, it was established that the 
marriage was improper, and the surviving spouse knew the cause of its invalidity at the time 
when marriage was concluded. Finally, the surviving spouse would lose the right to inherit 
if the marriage union with the deceased has permanently ended, either by the fault of the 




The development of marital relationship as a factor that provided certain rights to inherit 
was long-lasting. At the beginnings of development, the only secured rights were the right 
to use a certain part of the estate and/or a small part of ownership rights. Today, in 
accordance with the Law on Succession of the Republic of Croatia, the surviving spouse is 
considered as the forced heir together with the descendants, the adopted children and their 
offspring. 
The beginning of such development was initiated by the Act 9 of 1687 which recognized 
marriage as a foundation of inheritance. Furthermore, great contribution was given by the 
General Civil Code where the marriage bond had a dual role. It has been used to establish a 
marriage kinship which is important for determining the potential circle of legal heirs, but 
also as a factor that enables surviving spouse to exercise certain rights on the estate of the 
late spouse. Nevertheless, the position of the spouse as a user or owner of a small part of the 
estate in relation to the relatives of the deceased was considered unjust. Because of that, in 
the socialist period the position of the spouse was improved, and he/she became a forced 
heir. Furthermore, the position of a woman as a surviving spouse was also advanced and she 
was no longer subject to discrimination in this field. 
Today, in Croatia, the marital relationship is fully recognized as a factor that puts the 
spouse in a position to inherit the deceased spouse with equal rights as the descendants, 
whereby they inherit the same parts. If the deceased did not leave any descendants, the 
estate is divided between his/her parents and the surviving spouse, where the spouse is 
entitled to half of the inheritance while the other half is shared between the parents where 
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each gets a quarter of the estate.23 If both of the deceased’s parents died before the 
deceased, the entire estate will belong to the surviving spouse.24 In other words, the marital 
relationship has evolved as the foundation of inheritance so that under certain 
circumstances the surviving spouse can become the sole successor of the deceased. Finally, 
it is a reflection of a modern era in which the role of a nuclear family in society is 
strengthened, further related ties are weak, which also reflects in a modern inheritance law 
where such relatives do not enter a circle of potential legal heirs. 
  
 
23Zakon o nasljeđivanju Republike Hrvatske [The Law on Succession of the Republic of Croatia]. Narodne 
novine, no. 48, Zagreb, Art. 11. 
24 Ibid. 
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Alen ŠUKURICA: Regulation of the parent – child relations during the 20th 
century Croatia 




The relation between parent and child is one of the foundations of family law, as today we 
can see numerous thesis about family being a subject that encompasses parents and their 
children. This relation is a sensitive and delicate matter since, eo ipso, children are minors 
and in legal view they do not have full legal capacity. That fact means that children cannot 
fully exercise and therefore protect all their rights on their own. Naturally due to that fact, 
parents are, in most cases, the ones that jump in position of having responsibility for 
children, for protection and exercise of their legal rights. This idea of having two elements 
of the parent – child relations has already been seen in Croatian family law theory, which 
says that these two elements are biological and social element. The biological element 
emphasizes the fact that parents give birth to children and that children cannot take care of 
themselves, so their parents take care of them. The social element gives a framework, most 
importantly a legal one that sets out the rights and obligations which parents have over their 
children. The biological element was, and remains the same, but the social one changed 
throughout history.1 In that manner the relation of parent – child relations plays a key role. 
 
2. Legal theories on parent – child relations: a brief historical overview   
 
Throughout history, there has been several theories on relations between children and 
parents that have developed consequently with social and historical developments. First 
traces were seen in ancient Greece where the term filia was used for family that falls into the 
natural law theories. In ancient Greece Aristotle attributed the subordinacy of children to 
parents with the rule of ancestors and progeny, meaning that each one once had an 
 
1 PROKOP, Ana: Odnosi roditelja i djece [Parent – Child Relations]. Zagreb, 1972, p. 11. 
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ancestor and that at one time in the future will be himself an ancestor.2 Roman law as it is 
commonly known also had a specific patriarchal family and social system that gave full and 
absolute power to the father of the family over the children. This meant that the father could 
e.g. sell his child or even kill him since he had the right called ius vitae ad necis.3 The middle 
ages developed the children – parent relations on hierarchy, conventionalism and 
functionalism.4 Hierarchy says that parents have potestas over children that comes from the 
Roman law ius in personam (rights over the person); this theory’s biggest lack is comparing 
a child with an object.5 Conventionalism on the other hand claims that the parental right, 
potestas, derived from the consent of the child that parents can perform parental rights.6 
Lastly, in the Middle Ages functionalism as a theory sees parental rights over children as a 
natural thing in a way that it exists over the fact that children cannot take care of themselves 
and that is where parents jump in. Members of this legal theory school saw this parent – 
child relations mainly from the purpose perspective and viewed the rights and obligations 
of parents from that angle. 7 
 
3. Austrian General Civil Code as a base for the regulation of parent – child relations in 
Croatia from 1852 to 1947 
 
The ABGB (Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch für die gesammten deutschen Erbländer der 
Oesterreichischen Monarchie) went into power by the Emperor patent in 1852 in the 
Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia and made an effect inter alia also in family law, and 
specifically for the topic of this paper, a legal source for the parent – child relations.8 Even 
though it is called a Civil Code, it has within itself a patriarchal system, meaning that the 
father of the family still had most of the rights focused in his person. The important articles 
 
2 HRABAR, Dubravka: Dijete – Pravni subjekt u obitelji [The Child – Legal Subject in Family]. Zagreb, 1994, pp. 16–
17. 
3 PROKOP, op. cit., p. 11. 
4 Ibid., p. 18. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., p. 19. 
8 Cesarski patent od 29. studena 1852. kriepostan za kraljevine Ugarsku, Hrvatsku i Slavoniju, vojvodinu srbsku 
i tamiški banat, kojim se za ove krunovine uvodi sa više stegah i s potanjim ustanovami obći gradjanski zakonik 
od 1. lipnja 1811., i u kriepost stavlja počamši od 1. svibnja 1853. In: RUŠNOV, Adolf: Tumač obćemu austrijskomu 
gradjanskomu zakoniku – knjiga I [The Commentary on Austrian Civil Code – Vol. 1]. Zagreb: Naklada Hartman 
(Kugli), 1910, 19–26. 
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of the ABGB that are relevant for the topic are those from the Third Chapter on the rights of 
parents and children, articles 137 to 186, which were a legal source until the December 1st 
1947 when they were put out of force by the Basic Law on Parent – Child Relationship 
(Osnovni zakon o odnosima roditelja i djece). 
Firstly I will analyse the first article of the Third Chapter, §137 which says that the legal 
source of the regulation of parent – child relations is the fact that rights from this relation 
are derived from marriage in essence, so if children were born out of wedlock they do not 
have the same rights as children born in a marriage. 9 Also, §138 defines legitimate children 
as those born in a marriage or those born ten months after the wife’s husband died.10 Then 
in §139 the ABGB sets out general principles of the duties and rights parents have over their 
children. Those are their obligation to raise their children, foster about their life and health 
and to give them sufficient maintenance, develop their physical and mental powers and 
teach them religion and useful knowledge for their future happiness.11 Interestingly, in my 
regard for that time advanced, is that the ABGB talks about religious upbringing of children 
saying that the laws establish in which religion will the child be raised, also concerning 
marriages in which there are mixed religions, and as well when does the child have the right 
to choose his religion different from the one he/she was raised in.12  
The first of the patriarchal characteristics can be seen in §141 that says that the father has 
a duty to take care of his children until they cannot take care of themselves. On the other 
hand, it also says that the mother is especially obliged to take care of their body and health.13 
In the next article the ABGB discusses who of the parents take care of the children if they 
divorce or can’t agree on who takes care of the children, so the ABGB sets a rule that the 
mother must take care of the male children until their age of four, and take care of the female 
children until they are seven. Nevertheless, the father must spend for their upbringing and 
care. Continuingly the ABGB sets out principles that are visible in modern legislation as well, 
it claims in §143. If the father is poor, the mother must spend for their children. If they do 
not have a mother, or she is poor as well, then this duty falls on the father’s parents and after 
them on the mother’s parents. 
 
9 SPEVEC, Franjo Josip (ed.): Opći austrijski građanski zakonik [The General Austrian Civil Code]. Zagreb, 1911, p. 53. 
10 Ibid., p. 53. 




Regarding the child’s activities, the parents here in common agreement have the right 
to control those activities and the children must respect their decisions. This example gratia 
falls apart from modern understandings, today in modern family law the child has a right to 
choose his path of education.14Also differently from today, and more of an example of the 
patriarchal system is the fact that the child inherit their father’s surname, his coat of arms 
and all his other rights. In the following articles of the ABGB, now, can be blatantly seen the 
patriarchal element of the family law system of the codification. §147 deals with patria 
potestas and says that rights that belong to the father as head of the family make the supra 
said power of the father. Furthermore, that power is consisted of the father’s ability to 
regulate these aspects regarding: a) child’s class, b) property and c) child’s duties. The first 
aspect concerning child’s class prescribes that the father can choose to raise his child in the 
class he deems appropriate. Here the child, when it has grown up in age, can complain to 
the court to choose a different path if believes he/she will have more success in life. One 
interesting fact from that time’s practice is of minors joining military service - if a minor has 
joined military forces without permission of his father or tutor then if the father or tutor asks 
the court to dismiss the minor from military service it will be so that the minor will be 
dismissed.15 Secondly, regarding property of children, the ABGB prescribes that whatever 
the child gains from property in a legal way the management of that property will belong to 
the father. However, the incomes of that property shall be used for the care and raising of 
the child. If the child is not taken care of from their parents, at that instance the child can 
freely use what it has gained of income. Thirdly, concerning the duties of children the ABGB 
in articles 152–154 sets out the obligations. Children, which are still under the power of the 
father, cannot take legal obligations until their father has approved them.16 Here the father 
also has an obligation to represent their underage children.  
In further §§155–172 the ABGB discusses the position of legitimate and illegitimate 
children, i.e. those born in and out of wedlock. In §155 the ABGB explicitly states that 
illegitimate children do not enjoy the same rights as legitimate children do. §§156–159 
discuss terms and legal facts of when a child is considered legitimate, the time of birth of the 
child or if the father denies his parenthood. In §§160–164 is discussed how the illegitimate 
 
14 ALINČIĆ, Mira, HRABAR, Dubravka, JAKOVAC-LOZIĆ, Dijana, KORAĆ, Aleksandra: Obiteljsko pravo [The Family Law]. 
Zagreb, 2006, p. 251. 
15 SPEVEC, op.cit., p. 56. 
16 Ibid., p. 57. 
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children can become legitimate - the cases when the legal obstacle for marriage is removed, 
innocent non-knowledge of the husband and wife of the legal obstacle, by a next marriage 
in which the children that born out of wedlock can become legitimate to husband and wife, 
parents, in a new marriage, by mercy of the ruler, by proof that there is a father of the 
illegitimate child. Then in §§165–172 the ABGB discusses the legal regulation of the relations 
between parents and illegitimate children. Illegitimate children do not have the right of their 
family and relatives, they do not have the right to their father’s family name and they receive 
their mother’s last name. Nevertheless, illegitimate children also possess the right to their 
parents for care, raise and provision. Illegitimate children are not under the legal power of 
their father, but a guardian represents them. Their father is responsible for giving care to 
those children, and if he is not capable then that obligation falls onto their mother. The 
mother until she can and will to raise the illegitimate child on her own, the father of the 
illegitimate child must not take the child away from her and should provide for provisions 
for the child. If the mother would not be taking good care for the child, the father has a duty 
to take care of the child. The parents, father and mother, can freely arrange the agreement 
between them that regard raising the child, providing for the child, but it must not harm the 
rights of the child.  
Finally, important for the purpose of the paper is the moment when does the power of 
the father, patria potestas, end. It ends the moment the child has become of age, but the 
father can appeal for prolonging his power for reasons if the child has mental or physical 
disadvantages that implicated that the child could not take care of himself, if while under 
age the child went into big debts that would require him to be under his father’s supervision. 
Children can also exit their father’s power before they turn 24 years of age if their father 
dismissed them by permission of a court or if the father allowed his 20-year-old son to run 
his own household. Regarding father’s underage daughters, they would by marrying go into 
power of their husband, but regarding property rights, the father had the right until they 
become adults the rights of a guardian. If their husband would die, then they would return 
to the power of their father. Also in §§176–178 was prescribed how the father could lose 
power over his children. Those are cases when the father would completely not take care of 
his children, if he would disappear, if he would use his power by neglecting and 
deteriorating children’s rights. 
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For the time when the ABGB was in force in Croatia there is a quite modern for that time 
institute, and that is some kind of adoption, meaning that people that do not have their own 
children could take other children for their own which would become their stepchildren. In 
order to “adopt” children in that way there was legal prerequisites, the person had to be at 
least of 50 years of age and children would have to be at least 18 years younger than their 
stepparents. If the child was a minor, he/she could be “adopted” if it was accepted by their 
legal father. The relation between those parents and those children would then be equated 
with the relation between parents and legitimate children, the stepdad would then receive 
the power of the father, patria potestas. 
 
4. The parent – child relations during socialism  
 
We will not go into depth of the changes that were made in socialist Yugoslav regulation 
but only give a brief overview of the constitutional and legal framework that was set up 
regarding parent-child relations in the first years of the existence of new legal order. Articles 
24–26 of the 1946 Constitution set forth the general principles of a new family law, including 
equality of women with men in all fields, regulation of marriage and family relations and 
state protection of the family and minors.17 These principles were elaborated upon by 
enactment of special laws.   
The concept of parent – child relations has been fully changed solely on the fact that the 
power of the father was replaced by parental equality i.e. parental rights that belonged to 
the father and mother in common (§2) respectively and were prescribed by the Basic Law 
on Parent – Child Relationship (Osnovni Zakon o odnosima roditelja i djece, OZORD).18 Even 
by changing the term “power” into “parental rights” we can see a significant step towards 
modern ideas of protecting child’s interests. Also, following the constitutional principles, the 
illegitimate children were put on a par with the legitimate one (§3).19 
 
17 Ustav Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije [Constitution of the Federal Peoples Republic of 
Yugoslavia], Službeni list FNRJ, 1946. 
18 Osnovni zakon o odnosima roditelja i djece [The Basic Law on Parental – Child Relationship] Službeni list 
FNRJ, no. 104/1947. 
19 The principle of equality of illegitimate and legitimate children was also introduced into the inheritance law 
by the Law on Succession (1955). 
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Parental rights by OZORD was defined as a set of rights and duties. These were listed as 
following: 1. care and upbringing, 2. provision, 3. property management and 4. 
representation. The care and upbringing consisted physical care, moral-political care and 
intellectual care. Provision was duty to economically sustain for these rights of a child: place 
to live, food, clothes, electricity, heat, medical care, schoolbooks and other school 
necessities, and other general cultural education (visiting theatres, cinemas and other 
similar events). Property management was consisted in general principle that the parents 
should manage their property for benefit of their children. A significant step was made in 
the child’s right to have his own responsibility for property rights so a child turned 14 could 
go to work and manage his income from that work by his own will. Lastly, representation of 
children was a duty of the parents, and a right. This representation was to be in interest of 
the child as a principle, here also this belonged to both parents respectively. In addition, the 
parental rights could be taken away from parents if they did maliciously care for their 
children, against their interests and the purpose of parental rights. 
The parental right would ex lege end by maturity of the child, marrying before reaching 
maturity, by death, by decision of the court to remove parental right, by decision of the court 
to extend parental right and lastly by adoption.20 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
20th century Croatian family law and specifically relations between parent and child were 
firstly regulated by the Austrian General Civil Code introduced in Croatia and Slavonia in 
1852 by the Emperor’s Patent. The Austrian General Civil Code was an expression of a 
patriarchal system in family law relations which was seen through the regulations which 
gave men i.e. father most of the power over children, especially those regarding 
representing children and having control over their property. On the other hand, mothers 
did not have the same rights as fathers in family, but they did have obligations of care over 
children, which is one of the fundamental rights children have, but also accompanied with 
provisions that the father had to give provisions for child’s care. We can conclude that the 
 
20 PROKOP, op.cit. p. 194. 
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ABGB set out a system that had a lot of protection for children, which we can also see today, 
with the biggest flaw being the fact it did not give equal status to both parents in these 
relations and the fact that there was a division between legitimate and illegitimate children. 
After World War II and with the establishment of Yugoslavia family law principles on 
parent – child relations have changed by a significant margin. The most important change 
being giving the mother of the child same legal value in raise of their children as father, 
having the same power in deciding over care of their children and their upbringing and 
completely removing patriarchal system that was in effect until then. The changes that 
happened by Yugoslav regulation and their impact can be seen in only one word as 
mentioned supra in the text, “power of the father” was now defined as parental rights 
introducing the parental equality. 
Nevertheless, in essence, we can see that even in the ABGB the rights of children were 
protected at a reasonable level for that time period and that the biggest injustice we could 
say today was towards illegitimate children and making a difference in their rights compared 
to at that time legitimate children. In conclusion, parent – child relations were, as are today, 
an important part of everyday life as family is nucleus of a society and were given special 
attention in legal regulations, which was in ABGB especially very thorough. Therefore, we 
can say that the ABGB was core of family law regulation throughout Croatian legal history 
and set up a foundation for further family law making. 
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Marija ŽAMBOKI: Women's position in the Croatian Labour market during 
the 20th century 




The position of women as a workforce throughout history is closely linked to women’s rights 
and men’s perception of what a woman should be and what she should do. The World War 
I was the main driving force behind changes associated with the position of women in 
society, as well in the labour market. Until then Croatia was a part of Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, administratively divided between the Austrian and Hungarian half of the 
country.1 After 1918 it became a part of a Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The World War II even 
more contributed to the better position of women when they demonstrated their strength 
through participation in the Yugoslav Partisan movement. After the war, the UN has brought 
many documents that regulates discrimination against women. From the second half of the 
20th century, more and more women entered politics. One of the most important leaders in 
modern Croatian history was Savka Dabčević-Kučar, the first female Prime Minister in 
Croatian history, but also the first woman in West Europe to serve in such capacity. 
 
2. The beginning of the 20th century 
 
The legal position of women at the beginning of the 20th century was a representation of 
their family status and exclusion from political public life. Women didn't have a right to vote 
and they were subordinated to the husband's authority in the family. In Croatia and Slavonia 
women were given the partial right to vote in the municipal elections2 in 1920 by a special 
 
1 Međimurje and Baranja were part of the Hungarian part of the monarchy, as well as the Kingdom of Croatia 
and Slavonia. Dalmatia and Istria were in the Austrian part, while Rijeka was directly subordinated to Budapest. 
2 Prior to this, tax paying women were given right to vote in the municipal election during the ban Ivan 
Mažuranić. Although lasted shortly (just a few years) this extension of right to vote was very important. KREŠIĆ, 
M.: Žensko pitanje u reformama bana Ivana Mažuranića [The Woman Question in the Reforms of ban Ivan 
Mažuranić]. In: Intelektualac, Kultura, Reforma: Ivan Mažuranić i njegovo vrijeme. Zagreb, 2019, pp. 240–242. 
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decree that laid down additional conditions for women to be able to vote and to be elected 
as men: “if they independently managed their own and family farms on their own or 
cooperative property, public crafts or trade, or if they worked in public or private service and 
could prove that they had successfully completed four grades of primary school.3 
Their right to vote was supported by the Croatian Peasant Party, Social Democrats and 
Clerics, but, despite the pressure, on the Constitutional assembly elections in November 
1920 women didn't gain the right to vote.4 The Austrian General Civil Code from 1811., which 
was in force in that time for the territory of Croatia and Slavonia, was based on the principle 
of equality in family and marital law, but on the other hand, it regulated woman's position 
in marriage by giving the superior position to the husband. He was the „head of the family” 
and, as such, he had the right to manage a household and to represent his wife in all 
occasions.5 Austrian Civil Code, unlike some other European Civil Codes, guaranteed women 
a high degree of economic independence not limiting their freedom of practising 
independent professions. Nevertheless, at the turn of the 20th century Croatian women were 
mostly employed in agriculture. Also, many jobs that women did were so-called unpaid jobs 
and consequently they did not earn a tangible income. Finally, the income that working 
women earn was not high due to the unequal pay on the labour market.6   
Social reality changes in the mid-20th century by entering women at all levels of 
education, mostly paid, public work outside the home. Unfortunately, legislation slowly 
follows this process, doesn't meet the new needs of women, especially in the field of 
employment, job advancement and equal valuation of work. The first women who applied 
for equal working conditions and equal wages for women and men was teacher Marija 
 
3 Uredba o izboru gradskih zastupstava za gradove Hrvatske i Slavonije od 1. studenog 1919. [Decree on the 
election of city representations for the cities of Croatia and Slavonija from November 1919.]. In: PEIĆ-ČALDAROVIĆ, 
D.: „Ženska posla” između obitelji i profesije (profesionalna djelatnost žena u Hrvatskoj 1918–1941 u društveno 
ekonomskom kontekstu., Zagreb, 1999–2000, p. 68 
4 BOBAN, B.: „Materinsko carstvo“, Zalaganje Stjepana Radića za žensko pravo glasa i ravnopravni položaj u društvu 
[„Maternal empire”, Stjepan Radić's devotion for women's right to vote and equal status in society]. Žene u 
Hrvatskoj: Ženska i kulturna povijest, Feldman, A. (ed), Ženska infoteka, Zagreb, 2004, p. 205. 
5 EISNER, B.: Privatno-pravni položaj žene po današnjem pravu Jugoslavije i njegovo uređenje u jedinstvenom 
Građanskom zakoniku za Jugoslaviju [The private legal status of women under today's Yugoslav law and its 
regulation in the Uniform Civil Code for Yugoslavia]. Spomenica Mauroviću o njegovoj šestogodišnjici, 
Štamparija Globus, Beograd, 1934, p. 8. 
6 KREŠIĆ, M.: Praesumptio muciana and the Status of Croatian Women with Respect to the Law of Succession 
according to the ABGB In: DRUWE, W., DECOCK, W., ANGELINI, P., CASTELEIN, M. (eds): "Ius commune graeco-
romanum". Essays in Honour of Prof. Laurent Waelkens, Leuven: Peeters, 2019, pp. 234–236. 
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Jambrišak back in 1871 at the First General Croatian Teachers' Meeting in Zagreb.7 One of 
the main problem was that highly educated and qualified women were faced with the 
impossibility of material and status progress. Furthermore, career was actually only desirable 
for unmarried women. For example, teachers had to apply for special permits in order to 
marry and work their profession and by the end of 1930 they were dismissed from service 
due to the unemployment of male teachers who had the advantage that way.  
Progress among the two World Wars was also seen through the Croatian women's 
professional associations. There were many charitable and social ones because women 
considered that they will fulfil their true feminine nature through the care of children, the 
poor and the sick ones. In that way, women compensated non-existent organized social 
welfare. Associations formed from 1990 to 1920 were more humanitarian, such as the 
Housewife’s Club, the Association of Female home services and the Association of Teachers 
of the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia, and those formed from 1920 until World War II were 
focused on the emancipation of women, as well as professional and social promotion of 
members, like Club of Fine artists, Society of Croatian female writers and the Association of 
university-educated women.8 However, some very important women of that time in Croatia 
weren't members of women's associations of their profession, but they emancipated 
individually, like Marija Jurić Zagorka and Ivana Brlić Mažuranić, famous Croatian female 
writers. But the women who pointed out the most in that time was Katarina Matanović 
Kulenović who became the first female graduate pilot in Croatia in 1936., the first female 
parachutist in Eastern Europe in 1938 and the first female military pilot in the Air Force NDH 
(The Independent State of Croatia).9 
 
3. Women's position in Yugoslavia 
 
On the territory of the former Yugoslavia, as well as Croatia, which was an integral part of it, 
women were unequal to men in all public affairs until World War II. In the Kingdom of 
 
7 BLASIN, B.; MARKOVIĆ, I.: Ženski vodič kroz Zagreb [Female guide through Zagreb], Meandarmedia, Zagreb, 2006, 
p. 77. 
8 RUDANČIĆ, M.: Žena, majka, radnica: Zaposlenost žena u središnjoj Hrvatskoj u međunarodnom razdoblju (1918–
1941) [Wife, mother, female worker: Employment of women in central Croatia in the interwar period], Diplomski 
rad, Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Filozofski fakultet, Odsjek za povijest, p. 86. 
9 Ibid., p. 92. 
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Yugoslavia, women didn’t have the right to vote and, for the most part, did not have primary 
education.  During the 1940s, 28% of the female population were employed, mainly in 
occupations with the lowest wages as textile, catering, etc.10 
The Communist Party of Yugoslavia recognized the problem of women's inequality. 
Women of Yugoslavia gained their rights in socialist times primarily through equal 
participation in the National Liberation Fight. The courage and determination of female 
participants, both Partisans and those who contributed in other ways, such as nurses, have 
largely contributed to the struggle against fascism and the struggle for the better world for 
them and their children. Also, equality of women was a part of the communist ideology.  
The Anti-fascist Front of Women (AFF), founded in 1942, was a mass organization that 
gathered women's energy to improve the position of women in society.11 It was a kind of 
school where women learned to be active in the public and political life of the country. The 
work was conducted under the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and it was 
based on the fundamental commitments that women are equal with men in all segments of 
life and work. In the post-war period, it had a great emancipatory role. It also had its own 
press, which was a great weapon for spreading the ideological plan of Socialist Yugoslavia.  
In the first Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in 1946 women 
formally won the right to vote.12 On the parliamentary elections for the Constituent 
Assembly of the People's Republic of Croatia, in November 1946, for the first time in history, 
the parliament has elected 6 female representatives. In addition to the right to vote, women 
have gained several important legal options in socialism. Through the marriage law of the 
1946, the position of women and men in marriage was equalized. The Law on Social 
Insurance also introduced insurance for all risks, which included paid maternity leave and 
substantiation of the right to a pension under the same conditions for both men and 
women.13  
 
10  LEINERT-NOVOSEL, S.: Žena na pragu 21. stoljeća – između majčinstva i profesije [Woman on the threshold of 21st 
century – between motherhood and the profession]. Ženska grupa Tod i Edac, Zagreb, 1999. 
11 ĐOKANOVIĆ, B., DRAČO, I., DELIĆ, Z.: Zabilježene – žene i javni život Bosne i Hercegovine, III. Dio: 1945–1990. Žene u 
socijalizmu – od ubrzane emancipacije do ubrzane repatrijarhalizacije [Recorded – women and public life in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, III. Part: 1945–1990, Women in socialism – from accelerated emancipation to accelerated 
repatriarchalization]. Sarajevo, 2014, p. 106. 
12 Article 24 states that all citizens, without discrimination of gender, ethnicity, race, religion, education and 
place of residence, who are 18 years of age, have the right to elect and be elected to all state authorities. 
13 ĐOKANOVIĆ, DRAČO, DELIĆ, op. cit., p. 109. 
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In order to facilitate somehow the life obligations of women workers, primarily of their 
family and domestic responsibilities as well as the upbringing of children who were only a 
woman's obligation, the socialist government has also adopted a series of decrees to 
address the issues of children and maternity and enable women to regardless of family 
establishment, remain dedicated to activities in the public sphere, but also to facilitate their 
work on physically demanding jobs. For example, by the decree on women's labour during 
pregnancy to menstruation, women were relieved of work. Although the purpose of these 
decrees was to facilitate women's business, they were still kept in the frames of biological 
frameworks.14 
On the labour market women were concentrated around certain professions (for 
example, the textile industry) and very few were in the leading positions. They were the 
majority workers in hotel industry, tourism, leather industry and elementary schools, while 
there only few female journalists, professors and judges. One of the reasons for these 
professional divisions was the risk that the employment of women in individual jobs would 
lead to the dismissal of male labour force that would have produced family conflicts.15 
From 1950 to 1953 the AFF was ending and ended, caused by obscure directives given at 
the Third Congress in 1950.16 The unprofessional character of the organization was 
determined in which activity soon became voluntary, and previously employed members 
were transferred or dismissed. The AFF was characterized by the fact that men could not 
prohibit women from going to AFF meetings because the AFF was a part of the National 
Front under the statute. Therefore, a large number of women attended these sessions and 
meetings where they felt secure, exchanged ideas and opinions and where they were 
educated, emancipated and had a political activity.17 So, the abolition of the AFF was a huge 
loss for women of Yugoslavia because it really represented an organization that took care of 
the establishment of new life for women in the socialist society. The place of abolished AFF 
was occupied by the Association of Women's Societies, which under the pressure of 1959 to 
1961 has grown into a Conference on the Social Activity of Women.18 In the Resolution was 
emphasized that the issue of women's equality is a common social issue and that women 
 
14 Ibid., p.115. 
15 Ibid., p.115. 
16 ĐOKANOVIĆ, DRAČO, DELIĆ, op. cit., p. 121. 
17 Ibid., p. 122. 
18 Ibid., p. 123. 
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should not be separated into special political organizations. Therefore, any political 
association of a large number of women was practically impossible. 
 
3.1. The mid-seventies 
In the mid-seventies, the second wave of feminism slowly came to Yugoslavia, triggered by 
student demonstrations in 1968. The generation of young and educated women from urban 
centres was a core of the new feminist movement of the early seventies. In 1978, an 
international gathering “Comrade Woman. Women’s Question: New approach?” was held in 
the Student Cultural Centre in Belgrade, which was the first burst of the emergence of 
feminists on the public scene in a socialist country and the first international conference on 
the position of women in Yugoslavia.19 The focus on the women's issue and the problem of 
gender division of jobs are underlined by the imaginative slogan of the conference: 
„Proletars of all countries – who is washing your socks?”. 
The conference pointed to all the hypocrisy of the regime that claimed that women's 
issue was solved in women's socialism and that women were equal with men. The 
significance of this conference is that it addressed women's issues and problems that no one 
in the country was dealing with. Special significance at the conference was given by the 
feminists of the developed West, who spoke almost the same story, but about how the West, 
which is so proud of its democracy, is in fact democracy without women.20 It is interesting to 
note that the conference was attended by a significant number of men, which was one of 
the reasons for the controversy between Yugoslav and Western feminists. It is even more 
important to mention that for many issues that were important in Europe (for example, 
abortion), in Yugoslavia due to advanced legislation these issues were not attached to some 
great importance.21 The conference was very well-attended by the media and it served to 
unite women and create feminist movements in the larger urban centres of Yugoslavia – in 
Zagreb, Ljubljana and Belgrade, and joint cooperation among feminists from these 
centres.22  
 
19 Ibid., p. 132. 
20 Ibid., p. 133. 
21  The right to an abortion was enabled by the Law from 1951. Constitution from 1974. (SFRJ) guaranteed the 
full right to free birth. According to the Law from 1978, which is still in force, abortion can be done on request 
up to 10 weeks after conception, and after that in special circumstances. 
22  ĐOKANOVIĆ, DRAČO, DELIĆ, op. cit., p. 133. 
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In 1979, the SFRY signed the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, adopted at the General Assembly of the UN.23 In 1987, the First Yugoslav 
Feminist Meeting in Ljubljana was held, followed by three in Zagreb and Belgrade and the 
last one was held in 1991 in Ljubljana.24 
 
3.2. Savka Dabčević Kučar 
Savka Dabčević-Kučar was one of the most important leaders in modern Croatian history. 
She was a Croatian social democratic politician who, together with Miko Tripalo, became 
one of the leaders of the Croatian Communist Party. She served as Prime Minister of the 
Socialist Republic of Croatia from 1967. She was, as it was already mention, the first female 
Prime Minister in Croatian history but also the first woman in West Europe to serve in such a 
capacity.25 In May 1969 she became 6th Secretary of the League of Communists of Croatia. 
She became a living symbol of the popular movement known as the Croatian Spring which, 
despite its brief duration, crucially determined the subsequent development of both Croatia 
and Yugoslavia. In December 1971 Tito held a party leadership conference in Karađorđevo, 
Serbia, and publicly turned against the Croatian Spring. This led to Dabčević-Kučar's 
response to the critic, in which she accepted all criticism except those intended to show her 
as nationalist, and enemy of the socialist self-governing system, to which she publicly 
expressed loyalty. She resigned from the Central Committee of the Croatian Communist 
Party and, ultimately, from public life. It is interesting that she was replaced by another 
woman, Milka Planinc.26 When multi-party democracy finally arrived in Croatia, Dabčević-
Kučar and Tripalo returned to the public stage, using their long-accumulated reputation. 
They refused to endorse a single party, and instead initiated the formation of a broad 
coalition of the moderate middle, called the Coalition of People's Accord. With the coalition 
falling apart, Dabčević-Kučar and Tripalo formed their own party, the Croatian People's Party 
 
23 Convention entered into force 3.9.1981 as global, comprehensive and legally binding international treaty 
which established Committee on the elimination of discrimination against women which controls how the 
Convention applies through reports which states are required to submit 
24 ĐOKANOVIĆ, DRAČO, DELIĆ, op. cit., p. 134. 
25 http://www.enciklopedija.hr/natuknica.aspx?id=13632 
26 JURČIĆ, LJ., VOJNIĆ, D.: Quo vadis Croatia? Od samoupravnog socijalizma i društva blagostanja preko ekonomije i 
politike tranzicije do divljeg kapitalizma i tržišnog fundamentalizma – Hrvatska na putu u Europsku uniju [From 
self-governing socialism and welfare society through economy and transition policy to wild capitalism and market 
fundamentalism – Croatia on its way to European Union]. 2012 
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(HNS) in late 1990. This new party was intended to attract moderates and had high hopes 
for the 1992 presidential and parliamentary elections, being perceived as the strongest 
opposition party in Croatia.27 
 
4. Post-socialist transition 
 
In the 1990s, during the wars in the Yugoslavia, the economic downturn, inflation and 
unemployment continued to grow, causing general job destruction. Deeply affected by 
these changes was textile industry. The result of privatization, deindustrialization and loss of 
workers' social protection was the deterioration of the social and economic position of 
textile workers.28 Feminist theory explored the negative impact of war and militarization on 
gender relations, emphasizing the process of redistributed retraditionalisation and re-
illumination of patriarchal values caused by nationalist discourses and violent conflicts.  
Women were mostly employed in the feminized professions, more vulnerable to 
discrimination when entering the labour market and often work in positions below their 
educational qualifications.29 They also become a huge „invisible “labour force on an informal 
labour market, where they work for a minimum fee and no registration. Also, there was a 
need for the economy to adapt to the needs of defence, which changed the position of 
women and access to gender roles. In addition to the economy suffering great damage, the 
demographic picture of Croatia was also in poor condition, so the role of the woman as a 
mother began to magnify again.30 
The dependence of women within the family has increased in times of social and 
economic insecurity. Militarization of post-conflict societies and male unemployment have 
led to a rise in domestic violence. At the same time, family-based solidarity networks have 
again started to serve as a survival unit, which had led to the revival of extended families in 
the 1990s and 2000s, especially in lower- and middle-class families in suburbs or provincial 
 
27 http://www.enciklopedija.hr/natuknica.aspx?id=13632 
28 BONFIGLIOLI, C.: Orodnjavanje socijalnog građanstva: tekstilne radnice u postjugoslavenskim državama 
[Engendering social citizenship: female textile workers in post-Yugoslav states]. 2014, p.131. 
29 Ibid., p. 132. 
30 DŽAJA, M.: Položaj žena na tržištu rada u Hrvatskoj i Rusiji: komparativna analiza [The position of women in the 
labour market in Croatia and Russia: a comparative analysis]. Završni rad, Sveučilište u Zadru, Odjel za socioogiju, 
Preddiplomski sveučilišni studij sociologije, Zadar, 2016., p. 9. 
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towns and villages. Family networks as a form of „social capital “that overcomes the loss of 
social security are a characteristic element of the post-socialist transition.  
The Catholic Church also had a strong influence during that period in Croatia by 
emphasizing the care of children and the household as the main role of women in society 





To sum up, it has been shown that, due to traditional and renewed forms of gender 
discrimination in the productive and reproductive sphere, women remain vulnerable to 
unemployment and pushed to the margins of the labour market, as well as in the sphere of 
informal economy. The textile industry in Croatia has remained marginalized, under – 
recognized by state institutions, and the necessary interventions have not been 
implemented.  
In the time of socialism in Yugoslavia, women exercise social rights, the right to 
education, political participation and work, but they do not achieve substantive equality. 
The socialist system didn’t address the issue of patriarchal gender division of labour, but 
focused on the way that, both men and women, serve to the ideological project of 
socialism.31 Today, women are represented in all spheres of life, even though men still play 
a leading role in politics, legislation, industry and management.32 The traditional division of 
roles in the family and society has largely changed, though it is still present. Examples show 
that, although in a small number, women have managed to compete with some of the 
highest state functions. For example, during the time of writing this paper the president of 
Croatia is a woman, Kolinda Grabar Kitarović. Changes in the status of women in society are 
noticeable throughout the years, however, there are still various examples of sex 
discrimination at work and women are still underpaid. Therefore, there are still many spaces 
for progress.  
 
31 Ibid., p. 10. 
32 MATOTEK, V.: Prava žena kroz povijest [Women's rights through history], Hrvatski povijesni portal, 2010, 
http://povijest.net/2018/?p=1456 
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Tamás SVEDA: The Formation of the Hungarian State’s Civil Liability for 
Damages caused by Legislation and its Current Recognition 




Nowadays, the Hungarian State is sued many times in order to establish its liability for the 
damages caused by legislation and to claim compensation for that. For instance, on January 
1 in 2014 the Parliament modified the Act No. 122 on agricultural land properties in a way 
that the usufruct of these properties created for a definite time became terminated from 1 
May 2014 without prompt and adequate compensation of the affected farmers. Therefore, 
Constitutional Court stated that as the Parliament omitted to regulate the compensation of 
these affected farmers, it resulted in an unconstitutional situation. The Court of Appeal of 
Szeged drew the conclusions in 2018 and stated that: “the legislative power, the Parliament 
and the Government, which is responsible for the initiative of an act, are liable for the omission 
of legislation”.1 
However, a lot of time and development in Hungarian civil law had to be passed and 
made in order to get such important decisions. In this essay, I aim to present this 
development tendency beginning from the end of the 19th century – when this 
phenomenon only appeared in some decisions of the Supreme Court of Hungary and 
lectures of the Assembly of Lawyers – which established the current perception. I will begin 
with the presentation of the contradiction between State immunity and liability. After that, 
I will examine the development tendency in Hungarian civil law practice during the 19th and 
20th centuries, when the liability of the State for damages caused by legislation could not 
develop completely because of the dominant perceptions all among European states as 
well. Lastly, I will present two recent and important decisions of the Hungarian court 
practice, which will lead us to the conclusion that even David can triumph over Goliath, 
namely, the individuals can successfully claim compensation from the State for the damages 
caused by legislation. 
 
1 BDT. 2018. 3816. 
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2. The nature of immunity 
 
To present immunity, I would like to rely on the definitions created by László Kecskés, who 
is one of the most frequently cited scholars when it comes to damages caused by legislation. 
He defines immunity as the irresponsibility of the State.2 Immunity has a procedural nature 
and grants the State the right not to be liable for wrongful acts. The reason that made the 
Hungarian State impossible to sue for damages caused by legislation for so many decades 
was actually its immunity. 
In the beginning, state immunity was absolute, which made the state irresponsible for 
every act it committed, unless it waived its discretional right not to be sued. In customary 
international law the doctrine of relative immunity started to become more and more 
frequent in the 20th century. It means that state acts can be divided iure imperii and iure 
gestionis, those made with public authority and those with commercial ones. Today, this 
theory makes it possible to declare the state liable in case of international trade of goods, 
concluding loan agreements or based on contracts that have trading, industrial nature.3 
Besides these doctrines, the so called fiscus theory also has to be mentioned which makes it 
possible to sue only some parts and organs of the state, for example the treasury.4  
 
3. The liability of ministers during 1848 
 
The idea that State organs shall be liable for damages caused to individuals appeared in the 
19th century. During the civil reform of 1848, the founding fathers of the modern and civil 
Hungary wished to create a State model based on democratic and liberal theories. We can 
state that the liability of the State for damages caused by legislation appeared during these 
movements and covered the civil liability of the ministers. The §18 of the Act No. III of 1848 
 
2 KECSKÉS, László: A jogalkotásért és a jogharmonizációért való állami kárfelelősség összekapcsolódása 
[Connecting the State’s liability for damages caused by legislation and harmonization]. Jura, 2001/1. p. 265. 
3 KENDE, Tamás – NAGY, Boldizsár – SONNEVEND, Pál – VALKI, László: Nemzetközi jog [International Law]. Budapest, 
2014, Wolters Kluwer Kft., p. 273., p. 281. 
4 STIPKOVITS, Tamás: A jogalkotással okozott kár megítélése alkotmányjogi és polgári jogi szempontból [Liability for 
damages caused by legislation from the point of view of constitutional law and civil law]. https://dfk-
online.sze.hu/images/optimi nostri/2017/stipkovits.pdf, p. 262. 
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stated that “each minister is liable for the directive he signs.” The §32 further expanded the 
liability of ministers and specified that “the ministers are responsible for every act and decree 
that violates (…) individual freedom or property.” Based on this regulation, it is clear that the 
civil reform in 1848 considered individual freedom and property as so important 
constitutional interests that required the liability of ministers to be expanded in the above-
mentioned way. Based on such perceptions, the countersigning ministers became liable for 
the decrees passed by the sacrosanct monarch.5 Nowadays, the countersigning also means 
takeover of the liability of the Head of State. Based on the above-mentioned declarations of 
the legislative acts, not only the political but maybe the civil law liability was taken over by 
the ministers as well. 
 
4. The “results” of neoabsolutism 
 
The enthusiasm at the beginning was soon torn down after the defeat of the revolution and 
civil war and with the beginning of the era of neoabsolutism. At the top of all that, the 
Austrian law forced on Hungary. The Civil Code of Austria, the ABGB did not want to hear 
about the liability of the State organs, moreover, the liability for the damages caused by the 
state officials was not regulated either.6 We can see that the development tendency 
regarding the State liability for the damages caused by legislation was tore down 
relentlessly by the Austrian monarchy. This forced perception soon became to influence and 
determinate the Hungarian state court practice and the viewpoint of the scholars in 
Hungarian civil law. 
 
5. Building the system of State liability during the 19th-20th centuries 
 
The establishment of State liability started again in the 1870’s. The liability of the state 
officials for their unlawful behaviour and the State liability for unlawful conviction were soon 
 
5 NAGY, Ernő: Magyarország közjoga [Public Law of Hungary]. Budapest, 1905, Athenaeum Irodalmi és Nyomdai 
R-T., pp. 358–359. 
6 KECSKÉS, op. cit., p. 251. 
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recognized. The first legislative act in this particular case dates back to 1871. The articles 19 
and 73 of the Act No. VIII of 1871 made the State liable besides the embezzlement of judges 
and court officials. 
Beside the fact the legislative power started building the system of State liability step by 
step, this phenomenon was soon at the centre of attendance and debates of the Assembly 
of Lawyers as well. At the 5th and 6th sessions held in 1874 and 1876 the need for the 
effacement of State immunity became more and more urgent.7 In order to establish the 
State’s liability for the damages caused by state officials, they used the construction of the 
liability of the legal person for their employees. The individual who suffered damages could 
only turn to the courts against the State if they exploited all the possible legal remedies. It is 
interesting to realize that this rule can still be found after centuries in the effective Civil Code 
of Hungary.8 
After the above-mentioned regulation, a groundbreaking decision was made in 1878. The 
Curia, the Supreme Court of Hungary rewarded compensation against the Treasury for 
damages caused by legislation. In that case the damage was caused based on the Acts 8 and 
9 of 18489 because these acts did not contain rules on due compensation after 
expropriation.10 In this decision, the Supreme Court applied the principles of 1848 and stated 
that: “In case of an expropriation the general rule shall be applied that no one can be 
expropriated without compensation and the judge may be relieved applying this rule only in case 
the act has already rendered compensation or the legislative power found rights in private 
means abolished so clearly that the individual cannot claim for compensation.”11 Based on this 
decision, we can see that even without a codified statute laying down the doctrine of the 
prohibition of expropriation without prompt and adequate compensation, it was applied 
and recognized by the court practice. 
The proposal on the Civil Code of 1913 did not recognize the liability of the State for the 
damages caused by legislation expressis verbis. However, the scope of liability was extending 
 
7 DÁRDAI, Sándor: A VI. magyar jogászgyűlés tárgyalásainak eredményei [Results of the negotiations of the 6th 
session of the Hungarian Association of Lawyers]. Jogtudományi Közlöny [Jurisprudential Bulletin], 1876/27. p. 
261. 
8 2013. évi V. törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvről [Act No. V of 2013 on Civil Code] 6:548. §(1) 
9 The Act 8 regulated the common charges and the Act 9 was about the taxes of the villain. 
10 LAJER, Zsolt: Felelősség a jogszabályalkotással okozott károkért a magyar jogban [Liability for damages 
caused by legislation in Hungarian law]. Jogtudományi Közlöny [Jurisprudential Bulletin], 2001/2. p. 74. 
11 Döntvénytár [Case-book], Volume XXI. 1879. Judgment No. 74 
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continuously. The proposal made the State liable for the procedures of the state officials in 
the scope of their authority or if they exercised public authority and caused damage 
unlawfully to third persons. Moreover, in the cases regarding judicial deposit and the land 
registration, the State also became liable for the wrongful procedure of the authorities if the 
state official with authority was culpable. A very important criterion also appeared – which 
is in use nowadays as well – that the State could not be sued if the individual could have 
prevented the damages with legal remedies, however he/she omitted to act so negligently.  
The interesting side of the regulation was that it never came into effect because the 
liability of the State was regarded as a common affair with Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia. 
Therefore, a separate act would have been necessary to be passed. 
What differentiated the liability of the State and the liability of the ministers was that 
according to the regulation of the Act 3 of 1848 and the Act 10 of 1920 on the liability of 
ministers, their liability could prevail only through a special commission of Parliament. The 
authors criticized this method already at the beginning and added that “the question of 
compensation was exactly the same as in the proceedings against state officials as in the 
proceedings against the minister”. Therefore, they urged the importance of extending the 
authority of state courts instead of the procedure of the commissions of Parliament.12 
 
6. The liability of the State nowadays 
 
Here, I would like to close the analysis of the topic from a legal historical point of view and 
in the last part of my essay I will present the current state court practice of Hungary through 
two recent decisions: one based on national law and the other based on the law of the 
European Union. By way of introduction we can say that the Hungarian court practice was 
on the point of view until the middle 2010’s that: “the entry into force of a legal norm that 
causes damages to individuals will not create a civil law obligation between the State and the 
individuals. Therefore, in such cases the rules of civil liability cannot be applied.”13 The courts 
 
12 TOMCSÁNYI, Móricz: A vagyoni felelősség elve a közigazgatásban: az állam (közhivatalnokok) vagyoni 
felelősségének rendszere [The principle of the financial liability in the administration: the system of the State’s (state 
officials) financial liability]. Budapest, 1905. Politzer, p. 173 
13 EBH 1999.14. 
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were on the opinion that the State enjoys immunity, and this makes it irresponsible from the 
point of view of civil law.  
However, by the drafting of the new Civil Code of 2013, this perception changed radically. 
The drafters recognized that there is no doubt that the State can cause damage to 
individuals by unconstitutional legislation or by violating the obligation of implementation 
of the law of the European Union. According to the reasoning of the minister, in such cases, 
the individual can claim for compensation against the State based on the general concept 
of non-contractual civil liability. 
 
7. Liability based on the national law of Hungary 
 
After a great amount of cases, where the court refused to award damages to the plaintiffs in 
case of damages caused by legislation, in 2014, the Court of Appeal of Budapest terminated 
this court practice. In the underlying case the Prime Minister of Hungary appointed Péter 
Kaderják as the president of the Hungarian Energy Authority for six years starting from 
February 1 in 2002. His mandate suddenly ended before the six-year period would have 
expired, when on October 30 in 2003 the Hungarian Parliament modified the Act 42 on gas 
supplying. The most interesting part of the regulation was §85, which reads as the following: 
“the Minister invites entries for a competition in 15 days from the entry into force of these 
provisions for the presidential and vice-presidential positions of the Authority. The mandate of 
the president of the Authority terminates in 90 days from the entry into force of these provisions.” 
Analysing this rule, we can see that the legislative power did not issue a normative act. 
Contrary to that, we face a customized act issued as a part of a legislative act. The 
Constitutional Court declared that the legislation is dysfunctional if the legislative power 
makes a customized decision in a normative regulation subject.14 According to the decision 
of the Court of Appeal of Budapest, this dysfunctional regulation makes the conduct 
unlawful not only from the point of view of public law, but from civil law as well. 
Furthermore, it was also a very important statement of the forum that the Parliament does 
 
14 Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 5/2007 (II. 27.) 
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not have civil law personality. Therefore, without legal capacity in a procedure, the 
Hungarian State is liable for its dysfunctional regulation towards the damaged individual.15 
 
8. Liability based on the law of the European Union 
 
In the other case, the plaintiffs concluded a contract with a travel agency that soon went 
bankrupt. Therefore, the agency was not able to pay back those millions of Forints that have 
been paid by the plaintiffs in advance, moreover, their holiday has not been realized either. 
Their claim was based on the Article 7 of the Directive of the European Union that regulates 
package tours and package holidays. Based on this regulation, the contracting consumers 
must be granted a refund if the travel agency cannot make their travel happen based on 
causes in its interest. They argued that the Hungarian State did not implement the directive 
correctly as it regulated the amount of guarantee that it was not sufficient enough to satisfy 
the damages of the consumers. Even before the procedure, the ECJ in 2013 declared – in a 
preliminary ruling procedure – that the Hungarian legal grounds for the amount of the 
guarantee of the travel agencies are not in harmony with Article 7 of the Directive. As a 
matter of fact, the Court of Appeal of Budapest considered the claim admissible and 
rewarded almost 37000 EUR for the three plaintiffs and its default interests. The court 
recognized that in such cases the omission of the legislative power has to be attributed to 
the State; therefore, it is the member State of the European Union that is liable for violating 




As a summary, we can say that the State’s liability for damages caused by legislation can be 
considered as one of the most recently discovered and continuously developing fields of 
civil law. Only a few judgments of the Supreme Court and some lectures held among the 
Assembly of Lawyers let us draw the conclusion that only the basic theories of the State’ 
 
15 1/2014 PED 
16 PJD2018. 24. 
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liability from this aspect have appeared in the discussed era. Until the middle 2010’s the 
court practice was on the point of view that there is no relation regulated by civil law 
between the damaged individual and the State in connection with damages caused by 
legislation. Finally, thanks to the new conception of the Civil Code of 2013, by the mid 2010’s 
the state court practice has changed radically. We reached the point that we can declare that 
even David can triumph over Goliath, namely the individual can successfully claim damages 
against the State if he/she suffers damages because of legislation. 
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Ákos KOVÁCS: „Lineal succession”: special rules for intestate succession 
regarding particular assets in the Hungarian Private Law 




Humans have been thinking a lot about their fortune after death. There is a serious debate 
about the existence of the “other world” and we may never get an answer for that. Today’s 
knowledge we know that life goes from birth to death for certain and during our life we 
acquire rights and incur liabilities, that’s how our means come into existence. But what will 
be the fortune of these means after our death? For this question the law of succession gives 
the answer. Within the law of succession there is a huge role of consistence1, it is proved by 
many facts especially that some expressions from the Hungarian law of succession date back 
to the Provisional Judicial Regulations (referred to “PJR”) from 1861 and the Act 16 of 1876. 
During the creation of the Act V of 2013 (referred to “The new Civil Code”) the changes in 
the rules of law of succession were justified by changes within the society as the increasing 
significance of private property and the increasing value of estates.2 
Nowadays, in the constantly changing legal system there is one particular point within 
the law of succession – which dates back to the entail and the Tripartitum of István Werbőczy 
– and this is the “lineal succession”. In my study, I am going to describe the evolution of lineal 
succession and I am going to present the heated debates concerning to its existence. 
 
2. Connection between the entail and the lineal succession 
 
The lineal succession relates to the entail and because of that connection it was, and it is a 
controversial legal institution. Let’s examine this connection beginning with the definition 
 
1 VÉKÁS, Lajos: Magyar polgári jog – Öröklési jog [Hungarian Private Law – Law of succession]. Budapest, 2014, 
Eötvös József Kiadó. p. 9. 
2 MENYHÁRD, Attila: Az új Polgári Törvénykönyv [The new Civil Code]. In.: JAKAB, András – GAJDUSCHEK, György (eds.): 
A magyar jogrendszer állapota [The state of the Hungarian legal system]. Budapest, MTA 
Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont, Jogtudományi Intézet, pp. 342–343 
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and presentation of entail. The development of the feudal Hungarian private law before 
1848 was determined by Werbőczy’s because of the system of donations relating to 
nobleman’s estate and the entail.3 In the intestate succession there was a significant role of 
the entail because there were some binding rules based on that: 
• Principle “paterna paternis, materna maternis”: The father’s property was inherited by 
the father’s inheritors and the mother’s property was inherited by the mother’s 
inheritors. That’s why the entail is rooted in the definition of clan4, because if the 
property’s owner was the clan, the property could escape neither way of marriage nor 
succession. 
• The order of inheritors: It was strictly determined, first the descending line, in the lack 
of the descendants the ascendants and in the lack of ascendants the collateral 
relatives. 
• The closer relatives precluded from the succession the farther relatives. 
“The proprietor could dispose over his land openly if there was nobody who had the right of 
succession based on unity on title.”5 However, thanks to the changing condition of ownerships 
the entail became an exploded idea, because the nobleman’s estate couldn’t be seizure by 
a bailiff, prevented the economic development and the disintegration of feudal conditions.6 
Because of these arguments, in István Széchenyi’s reform plans, it was one of the first thing 
to do, to abolish the entail, which had happened with the Act 15 of 1848, but practically only 
the royal command on 29th November 1852 abolished it. 
The High Judge Conference in 1861 introduced the lineal succession into the order of 
intestate succession. In some aspects, the lineal succession reminds us to the entail and this 
situation generates a long term debate. Gusztáv Szászy-Schwarz summarised excellently the 
pros and cons referring to the lineal succession. The supporters firstly, bring forward the 
national origin of the lineal succession; secondly, keeping the assets in the family; finally, 
prevention of breaking-up the assets. The opponents firstly, refer to the anachronistic 
background of this legal institution; secondly, the modern condition of ownerships; finally, 
 
3 MEZEY, Barna (ed.): Magyar jogtörténet [Hungarian legal history], Budapest, 2007, Osiris, (4th ed.), p. 86. 
4 Révai Nagylexikon [Big Encyclopedia of Révai]. Vol. XV. Budapest, 1922, Révai Testvérek Irodalmi 
Részvénytársaság. p. 52. 
5 Ibid. 
6 MEZEY, op.cit., p. 217. 
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the modern European tendency that each European country abolished the lineal 
succession.7 
But why is there such a strong relationship between the entail and the lineal succession? 
Furthermore, why do we originate the lineal succession from the Middle Age and the feudal 
law? First of all, the Hungarian law like the Western European law distinguish the allodial 
property and the property acquired in common. This distinction served efficiently the feudal 
order of property, because it kept in one piece the family’s assets, increased the assets and 
encouraged to saving. However, vainly the feudal order of property was wounded up, there 
are a considerable number of factors which gave the reasons to create the lineal succession.8 
 
3. The importance and basic definitions of law of succession9 
 
The duty of the law of succession that the inheritance doesn’t become unclaimed. The rules 
of law of succession have to make sure that the testator dispose over his means without 
restrictions, but the state duty to hinder the freedom of testamentary disposition due to the 
matrimonial relationship and the child-parent relationship. So, the law of succession 
determines the future of the testator’s inheritance. The condition of ownerships has a huge 
impact to the law of succession. In Hungary, the inheritance is distributed proportionally 
among the successors. The succession can be justified in three different ways. Firstly, the 
intestate succession is put into practice when there isn’t a will. Secondly, the succession 
based on a will, when the testator cut off the intestate succession with a will or with a 
testamentary contract. Thirdly, when the successors can get by inheritance in spite of the 
will. 
After the “April Acts” in 1848, the new acts had not affected efficiently to the order of 
succession, so in the cases relating to succession the courts passed sentences based on the 
ancient law. After this temporary period, with the help of the Provisional Judicial 
Regulations, the Hungarian private law was restored. In the Provisional Judicial Regulations, 
 
7 SZÁSZY-SCHWARZ, Gusztáv: Ági öröklés és özvegyi jog [Lineal succession and jointure]. In: Újabb magánjogi 
fejtegetések [New private law wrtitings]. Budapest, 1901, Politzer Zsigmond és Fia Kiadása, p.153. 
8 SZÁSZY-SCHWARZ, op.cit., pp. 173–174. 
9 MEZEY, op.cit., pp. 189–190. 
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a new order of succession was created with regard to the abolition of entail. However, the 
lineal succession was created which is reminds us to the entail as a legal institution. 
 
4. The creation of lineal succession 
 
The High Judge Conference was held from 23rd January to 4th March 1861, the members of 
this conference were the most prominent representatives of the legal profession. The task 
of this conference was to limit the scope of application of the Austrian private law rules and 
take effect the rules of Hungarian private law. This body had to recreate the rules of 
Hungarian private law and root out the feudal originated rules. The conference had really 
good results. The Provisional Judicial Regulations had 8 parts, the rules for the private law 
were in the first part. 
The High Judge Conference wasn’t a democratically elected legislative body, so due to 
the rules of constitutional law, it wasn’t the part of the legislation. That’s why the House of 
Commons declared on its session in 12th June 1861 that the old private law acts had to apply, 
but in some cases where the old rules would be inapplicable the Provisional Judicial 
Regulations should be applied. Furthermore, the Hungarian Supreme Court declared that 
courts should apply the Provisional Judicial Regulations. “So, the Provisional Judicial 
Regulations became the part of Hungarian private law through the customary law.”10 
The rules of the lineal succession were the part of the intestate succession from 10 to 12 
Articles. Article 10 says that “In the lack of descendants, the father and the mother should inherit 
up to that value which had fallen to the testator from the father or the mother, or from their line; 
the property which originated from the paternal line descends to the father and the property 
which originated from the maternal line descends to the mother.” Consequently, the marriages 
without children gave the importance of the lineal succession, because if the mother or the 
father had given property to their child, this ancestral property would have devolved to the 
survivor spouse in case of the death of the testator and in this way, it would have devolved 
to an outsider family. However, if we apply the rules of the lineal succession, “the property’s 
 
10 Ibid., p. 159. 
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fair devolution will happen.”11 Referring to article 11 of TJR, if neither the father nor the 
mother lives, then the father will be represented by the paternal side, the mother will be 
represented by the maternal side collaterals. If neither the parents, nor the collaterals live, 
then the grandparents and their collaterals will inherit. Even the great-grandparents and 
their collaterals would inherit the ancestral property. The rules of the lineal succession were 
applied if there weren’t descendants and exclusively in connection with the ancestral 
property. But, among the Provisional Judicial Regulations, we can’t find the exact definition 
for the ancestral property. 
 
5. The dispute of István Teleszky and Béni Grosschmid 
 
After the Compromise of 1867 the Government wanted to create a Civil Code to western 
European impact. During the codification process only partial results sprang up, among 
them one of the first one was István Teleszky’s12 proposal13. This proposal left out entirely 
the traditional legal institutions in connection with the law of succession like the lineal 
succession. Teleszky’s proposal was divisive in spite of that the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences appreciated it and the Parliament had a debate about it. But the jurists had serious 
critics, for example Béni Grosschmid defined his position many times, moreover he made a 
counterproposal, which contained the lineal succession.14 
So, during the codification of the law of succession, the biggest debate was about the 
sustainability of the lineal succession. Teleszky – as one of the opponent of the lineal 
succession – wanted to reform the Hungarian law of succession, he referred to that the lineal 
succession is not a Hungarian legal institution and then he quoted that it is originated from 
 
11 VÉKÁS, Lajos: Az ági öröklés "hamleti vívódásához" [About the agony of the lineal succession]. Jogtudományi 
Közlöny [Jurisprudential Bulletin], 1973/5., p. 286. 
12 Pallas Nagylexikon [The Big Encyclopedia of Pallas]. Vol. XVI. Budapest, 1897, Pallas Irodalmi és Nyomdai Rt., p. 
56.: „Under-secretary in the Ministry of Justice, writer and codifier. In 1874, he was elected to representative from 
Nagyvárad.” 
13 TELESZKY, István: Az általános magánjogi törvénykönyv tervezete. Öröklési jog [The proposal of Hungarian Civil 
Code – Law of succession]. Budapest, 1882, Egyetemi Nyomda 
14 GROSSCHMID, Béni: Öröklési jogi tervezet [Proposal about the law of succession]. In: Magánjogi tanulmányok, 
tervezetek és kisebb dolgozatok főként az öröklési, kereskedelmi és családi jog köréből [Essays on private law, 
proposals and papers on law of succession, commerce and family]. Budapest, 1901, Politzer Zsigmond és Fia, pp. 
589–743. 
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the feudal law and the entail.15 Furthermore, he brought forward that after the testator’s 
death that relative should inherit, who had been the closest relative.16 Finally, Teleszky 
mentioned the difficulties relating to the verification process in the probation. Teleszky’s 
proposal have never became an act, the Minister of Justice instructed Béni Grosschmid to 
make the proposal of the new Hungarian Civil Code. 
Grosschmid was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the lineal succession and he 
had serious arguments relating to the continuance of it. Grosschmid’s first argument was 
that the lineal succession has Hungarian origin and it is embedded into the society’s mind. 
Secondly, he mentioned the saving of family’s assets and thirdly, he brought forward the 
unity of family.17 Grosschmid’s proposal contains the rules relating to the lineal succession 
from article 31 to 42. Article 31 says that: “The descendants or the collaterals in the family line 
can wish the inheritance excluding the spouse and other relatives.” So, the lineal succession is 
applicable only in the lack of descendants. The proposal defines the ancestral, so we can 
consider as an ancestral property the followings (Article 32): 
• those assets which devolve to the testator from one of his/her parents, 
• those assets which devolve to the testator from one of his/her grandparents, 
• those assets which devolve to the testator from one of his/her further ascendants, 
• finally, that assets which replaced the ancestral property. 
Up to present, the most difficult action in connection with the lineal succession is the 
demonstrability of the property’s origin, because it results the protraction of probates. 
 
6. The appearance of the lineal succession in the private law proposals of 1900 and 
1928 
 
In the codification process of the Hungarian Civil Code, time to time came up the question 
of existence of the lineal succession and in the same time the supporters and the opposers 
 
15 TELESZKY, István: Öröklési jogunk törvényhozási szabályozásához [To the legislation of our law of succession]. 
Budapest, 1876, Franklin 
16 CSIZMADIA, Andor: The legal traditions as the obstacles of legal reforms in Hungary in the 19th century. 
Jogtudományi Közlöny [Jurisprudential Bullettin], 1979/1., p. 36. 
17 GROSSCHMID, op.cit., p. 21. 
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brought forward nearly the same arguments. In 1900 the first unified private law proposal 
came out thanked to the previous years’ codification work. The “unified” proposal was the 
summary of the partial proposal that’s why it was criticized by many jurists because they 
told that “it couldn’t be a unified work either in structure or in contain.”18 The proposal from 
1900 19contained the rules of lineal succession from article 1811 to 1816 among the rules of 
the intestate succession but the legal institution wasn’t named explicit verbis. 
Article 1811 says “Those assets which devolved (through succession or donation) from the 
parent or from his/her ascendants to the testator can be required by the parent under article 1805 
and 1806. If the parent died sooner, this right is his/her descendants’ legal due.” Thus, the 
ancestral property in the proposal of 1900 is those assets which devolved (through 
succession or donation) from the parent or from his/her ascendants. Article 1811 contains 
two references to two further articles, the lineal succession is possible when there are no 
descendants of the testator or if there is no survivor spouse, the parents can inherit half-and-
half portion. If there are no living parents, the ancestral property devolves to the collaterals 
so the sisters and brothers. If neither the parents nor the collaterals live the grandparents 
will be the successors. If there are no survivor grandparents, the ancestral property devolves 
further to the descendants of the grandparents, so the sisters and brothers of the parents 
concluded the aunts and uncles. In article 1815, there is an interesting rule: “Those means 
which had devolved more than thirty-two years before the testator’s death, the ancestral 
property can’t be inherited under the rules of lineal succession.” This rule is very logical, because 
the origin of the property is hardly provable back to more than thirty-two years. Finally, 
article 1816 assures the widow’s beneficial interest till her death on the half of her child’s 
inheritance and on the entire ancestral property. 
After the Great War, the codification of the Hungarian civil law came up again, so with the 
leading of Béla Szászy – who was one of the under-secretary of Ministry of Justice – a 
committee was formed, which started to codify with the help of many western European 
Civil Codes. This proposal was the most worked out and the best, but because of the 
economic crisis it has never became an act. In spite of this, the courts started to apply these 
rules. This proposal contained the rules relating to the lineal succession from article 1795 to 
 
18 MEZEY, op.cit., p. 163. 
19 Az általános magánjogi törvénykönyv első tervezete [The first proposal of Hungarian Civil Code]. Budapest, 1900, 
Grill Könyvkiadó, pp. 405–407. 
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1811. In this proposal the rules were more worked out than any other proposals of law of 
successions. 
In the proposal of 1928, the rules of the lineal succession could be applied when the 
testator had no descendants, and there was an ancestral property. This proposal contained 
precisely the definition of the ancestral property: “In the inheritance, the ancestral property is 
that pure value which devolved through free legal transaction or succession from one of the 
common ascendants to the testator except the occasional donations and the expenses of the 
provisions and schooling.” Relating to the amount of occasional donations the judicial 
custom is decisive and about the provisions and schooling we can refer to the testator’s 
costs of education. The inheritance above the ancestral property is property acquired in 
common and it belongs to the rightful successors. The proposal contains rules to determine 
the value of ancestral property: we have to consider the present value or the value at the 
time of sale or using up. The proposal contains rules when the ancestral property loses this 
quality. Article 1805 states “The ancestral property loses this quality, when through legal 
transaction between living person devolves to a person who is outside the circle of the common 
ascendants or his/her descendant and the ancestral property doesn’t retrieve this quality if the 
testator get back from another source.” So, if the ancestral property falls out from the family it 
becomes property acquired in common. There are assets which aren’t the part of the 
ancestral property: those assets which were destroyed before the testator’s death, those 
assets which are the part of the common household except the gold and silver and other 
treasures (for example: paints, statutes etc.) and the accessories of the common house. The 
ancestral property can demand in cash, but there are some exceptions when it can demand 
in nature. Furthermore, it’s a rebuttable presumption that the property is a property 
acquired in common and the lineal successors have to prove the lineal origin. 
Judge of the Curia, István Sándorfalvi Pap expounded in his study20 the importance of 
lineal succession. He enumerated the opposers arguments. The origin of the lineal 
succession is hardly provable and that results the protraction of probate and in the course 
of this the family members will quarrel with each other. In spite of this, he wished the survival 
of the lineal succession because “it is such an original, national and beautiful creation which 
 
20 SÁNDORFALVI PAP, István: Az ági öröklés [The lineal succession]. Jogtudományi Közlöny [Jurisprudential Bulletin], 
1931/31., pp. 254–255. 
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we have to preserve, and we can’t draw back to it.”21 The lineal succession serves the familial 
community of property and the familial connection. Moreover, he expounded that the 
Supreme Court tried to eliminate the contradictions in connection with the lineal 
succession. 
 
7. The controversy about the lineal succession in connection with the old Civil Code 
 
When the socialist era set in Hungary, the Hungarian jurists had to acquaint themselves with 
the oddities of the soviet law, but the negative effects avoided the law of succession. Act 18 
of 1948 limited the lineal succession that the circle of successors closed with the first cousins. 
In 1959 the first Hungarian Civil Code came into effect, so it took almost 80 years to codify 
the Hungarian private law. But the Marxists’ and communists’ principles had a huge impact 
on this act, and it resulted that the lineal succession almost disappeared from the Code. 
Because of the feudal origin of the lineal succession and because of the connection with the 
entail it was qualified as the survival of the old social system. “Many people referred to the 
feudal origin of the lineal succession in such a period when even the feudal form of ownership’s 
memory had gone.”22 However, Miklós Világhy disproved this statement in his study: “it is not 
necessary to change the rules of law of succession which is habitual and mainly the peasantry 
feels fair and right.”23 So the social and economic circumstances were wound up, but nothing 
accounted for the cessation of this legal institution because there were other standpoints 
which insured the reason of existence of it. 
Before the first significant amendment of the Civil Code the debates had flared up again, 
three studies were published on the columns of the Hungarian Law Journal which 
supported or opposed the lineal succession. The first one is József Boros’ study24 who was a 
big opposer of the lineal succession because it became old-fashioned. According to him, 
there is no place for the lineal succession in a socialist Civil Code because it is a feudal relic. 
He said that the lineal succession defends the feudal property. In response to this study 
 
21 Ibid., p. 254. 
22 VÉKÁS, op.cit., pp. 114–115. 
23 VILÁGHY, Miklós: Az ági öröklés a polgári törvénykönyvben [The lineal succession in the Civil Code]. 
Jogtudományi Közlöny [Jurisprudential Bulletin], 1966/1–2., p. 20. 
24 BOROS, József: Az ági öröklés jövője [The future of lineal succession]. Jogtudományi Közlöny [Jurisprudential 
Bulletin], 1972/ 11., pp. 559–565. 
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László Réczei also published his thoughts about the lineal succession, he disproved Boros’ 
arguments one by one and he tried to find out why this legal institution stayed in the 
socialist Civil Code.25 Firstly, he mentions that the lineal succession is not just relating to 
estates but to personal property as well, so that’s why is absolutely not exploiting. Moreover, 
the private estate practically has been disappeared during the socialist era because of the 
collectivization but, the standard of living increased and it appeared in buying valuable real 
estates and personal property. In the short-term, childless marriages, it is important that 
these valuable estates don’t get to an unknown family and don’t result an unfair situation 
due to the public opinion.26 Réczei argued Boros’ statement which said that the modern 
family become closer and closer that’s why the law should protect this closer circle. 
However, what would happen with those old people who had donated a valuable gift to the 
testator. If the lineal succession didn’t exist and the testator hadn’t got any descendants, the 
ancestral property would be inherited by the survival spouse’s family. Boros said that the 
lineal succession is not an often-used legal institution, thus the lack of that wouldn’t be such 
a big deal. For that statement, Réczei put a funny question: “Isn’t it offensive to threaten the 
whole country with the Criminal Code when just a small part of the society commits crimes?”27 
Finally, Réczei concluded that it would be regrettable to abolish the lineal succession if the 
legislators wouldn’t make an alternative rule. 
This scientific debate was closed with the Lajos Vékás’ study. Vékás is clearly the supporter 
of the lineal succession. Vékás has a very appropriate expression: he resembles this scientific 
debate to a struggle in a Shakespeare drama, because the main question in connection with 
the lineal succession is the same like in the Hamlet: “To be, or not to be: that is the question.” 
Vékás also points out, that the condition of ownerships has changed comparing to those 
conditions which existed at the time of the “born” of the lineal succession. Vékás writes in 
his study that in the socialist economy, the number of agricultural lands in private property 
practically decreased to zero in comparison to that time when the lineal succession was 
born. But this legal institution is accustomed in the Hungarian society so the maintenance 
of it is justified and useful. Vékás highlights that the lineal succession is very important when 
there is a valuable real estate or personal property. Gyula Eörsi was on the same side with 
 
25 RÉCZEI, László: Az ági öröklés jelene [The present of lineal succession]. Jogtudományi Közlöny [Jurisprudential 
Bulletin], 1973/ 4., pp. 218–221. 
26 VÉKÁS, op.cit., p. 286. 
27 RÉCZEI, op.cit., p. 220. 
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Vékás, because in his opinion the lineal succession is for “the satisfaction of real needs”28 and 
“only with the help of lineal succession can be secured the legal order of succession.”29  Finally, 
Vékás concludes that the lineal succession should be maintained but it is needed to exclude 
the applicability for usual furnishings and equipment. 
We can establish that the first bigger amendment of the Civil Code didn’t touch the rules 
of lineal succession, so the supporters won. Let’s see the rules of the lineal succession in the 
old Civil Code! We can apply the rules of the lineal succession if the testator has no 
descendants or not the descendants are the intestate successors and if the testator had got 
assets through free legal transaction or succession. Furthermore, we can apply the rules of 
lineal succession from brother or sister or from their descendants if they got assets through 
free legal transaction or succession from the ascendant who is common with them and the 
testator. That person should prove that the property is ancestral who refers to that legal title. 
So, the parents inherit those assets which the testator had got from them or their 
ascendants. If there are no survival parents, the testator’s collaterals will inherit. If there are 
no parents, no collaterals, then the grandparents will inherit and if the grandparents died, 
the further ascendants will inherit. If nobody is ancestral successor, the ancestral property 
will become be the part of the inheritance. There are certain cases when we can’t apply the 
rules of the lineal succession: 
• that ancestral property which is not available at the time of the testator’s death, 
• those assets which were bought on the price of the ancestral property, 
• the usual amount of donation. 
If the marriage took fifteen years, we won’t be able to apply the rules of lineal succession for 
usual furnishings and equipment. In most cases the ancestral property has to be required in 





28 EÖRSI, Gyula: Megjegyzések a Legfelsőbb Bíróság Polgári Kollégiumának iránymutató döntéseire [Comments 
to the decisions of the Supreme Court’s Civil Council]. Állam- és Jogtudomány [Political Science and 
Jurisprudence], 1966/2., p. 254. 
29 Ibid. 
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8. The rules of the lineal succession in the new Civil Code of 2014 
 
After the fall of the Iron Curtain, it was a priority to harmonise the Civil Code with the new 
political and economic environment, so it had been transformed based on a democratic and 
capitalist society’s requests. However, the rules of the lineal succession haven’t changed 
both in content and in placement. It’s worth to examine the commentary about the old Civil 
Code relating to the lineal succession. “The High Judge Conference in 1861 wanted to preserve 
something from the entail and the created the lineal succession to preserve the property of 
testator’s family.”30 Due to the commentary, the lineal succession’s basic idea was that the 
ancestral property had to stay in that family who had obtained it before. The fundamental 
stipulation of the application of the rules of the lineal succession is that the testator hasn’t 
got descendants, or the descendants are excluded from the intestate succession. For lack of 
descendants, we must separate the ancestral property from the other party of the 
inheritance.31 In the next few paragraphs, I would like to analyse the rules of the lineal 
succession in the new Civil Code, also I would like to present the judicial practice and the 
judicial literature. 
In 2014, on March 15th the new Civil Code came into effect in Hungary. Many articles were 
written about the similarities and differences of the new and the old Civil Code. It’s more 
important to compare the rules of the lineal succession in the old and the new Civil Code 
and find the place of this old legal institution in our legal system. According to the 
Commentary the lineal succession is for “release the smaller contradictions and amounts of 
injustice in the in the intestate succession.”32 But what are these smaller contradictions? The 
corrections offered by the lineal succession are needed in those marriages where there are 
no children and the spouses died in a short period of time. In this case, the ancestral property 
which was given by the testator’s family can easily come to another family’s property. It’s a 
rare situation, but it can happen that the testator is an infant and the ancestral property can 
be shared between the two ancestral lines. In this situation, the lineal succession is a kind of 
fairness. According to another commentary, the lineal succession is an exceptional order of 
 
30 GELLÉRT, György (ed.): A Polgári Törvénykönyv magyarázata [Commentary on the Hungarian Civil Code]. 
Budapest, 2007, p. 1822. 
31 Ibid., p. 1890–1891. 
32 VÉKÁS, Lajos – GÁRDOS, Péter (eds.): A Polgári Törvénykönyv magyarázata [Commentary to the Civil Code] vol. 2. 
Budapest, 2018, Wolters Kluwer Kft. p. 2624. 
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succession within the intestate succession. We must distinguish the ancestral property from 
the other parts of the inheritance because the rules applied to them are different. On the 
other hand, the Court can’t take into consideration the property’s ancestral character 
officially.33  
Article 7:67. the Civil Code determines the assets belongs to the ancestral property and 
article 7:68. refers to the ancestral successors, these parts are unchanged comparing to the 
old Civil Code. When we attempt to determine the definition of the ancestral property, we 
have to take into consideration the notion number 81 of the Civil Council which says: 
“Ancestral property contains real and personal assets which were bought by the testator’s 
ascendants or if the testator’s ascendants gave the purchase prices to the testator.” Article 7:69. 
contains new rules for the spouse’s beneficial interest on the ancestral property. The act is 
clear, the survival spouse has beneficial interest on the ancestral property until his/her 
death. Both the ancestral successor and the survival spouse can claim the redemption of the 
beneficial interest. However, the beneficial interest on the apartment and the belonged 
furnishing can’t be redeemed. According to paragraph 3 of article 7:69. the survival spouse 
gets one third of the ancestral property in case of redemption. 
Though, the assets which don’t belong to the ancestral property has significantly 
changed comparing to the old Civil Code. On the one hand side, the proposal ceased the 
prohibition of redintegration. This means that the rules of the lineal succession cover those 
assets which were bought on the purchase price of the ancestral property and those assets 
which replace the ancestral property. On the other hand, the second bigger amendment 
that the effective law doesn’t maintain the fifteen year timeout, according to that “no claim 
can be filed, on the grounds of lineal inheritance, for furnishings and/or household accessories 
of common value against a surviving spouse or registered partner after a marriage or registered 
partnership of fifteen years.”34 The rules of the lineal succession can’t be applicable to the 
usual amount of donations. It’s hard to determine what we consider to usual amount of 
donation, but we can rely on the judicial practice, the economic situation of the family and 
the social customs. So, it can be a usual amount of donation a car or a valuable asset. The 
 
33 WELLMANN, György (ed.): Bevezető és záró rendelkezések. Az ember mint jogalany, öröklési jog. A PTK. 
magyarázata. I/IV. [Introductory and final clouses. The man as legal entity, law of succession. Commentary to the 
Civil Code. 1/VI.] Budapest, 2014, HVG-ORAC Lap- és Könyvkiadó Kft., p. 281. 
34 Act IV of 1959 Section 613 paragraph 3 
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successors inherit the ancestral property in nature, however if the inheritance in nature is 




The lineal succession generates serious debates since its existence. Many jurists think that 
the lineal succession is an old-fashioned legal institution and in the socialist time the 
arguments got a strong ideological influence. However, the supporters said that the lineal 
succession is a needed correction and equity in the intestate succession. The judicial practice 
and the probates in front of the notaries show that the application of the rules of the lineal 
succession is not that common. As if the society would forget about that opportunity, as if 
less and less people would keep on file what is in the ancestral property. Maybe, when there 
will be a bigger amendment of the Civil Code, the legislators will refashion the lineal 
succession or entirely terminate it.  
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András SZABÓ: History of the joint-stock companies 
Eötvös Loránd University, Faculty of Law 
 
1. Judgement of joint-stock companies 
 
The establishment of corporations made changes all around in the world in people’s lives. 
According to words of the German professor, Heinrich Dernburg, which are drawing up what 
the establishment of corporations gave to humanity: with the help of this form of 
companies, empires were grounded, changed the shape of the world, by digging sees and 
drilling mountains through, built huge highways and increased the production 
unbelievably…1 
Not just Dernburg but also other legal experts were praising the joint-stock companies. 
According to Eugené Thaller, our world cannot be imagined without joint-stock companies.2 
This view is shared by Georges Rippert, because he cannot imagine the life in big cities 
without them. He supports his statement with the followings: it would be impossible to 
dwell, heat, light, move, have fun and even die in the biggest cities. If we see the example of 
today’s big cities, he is right about it, because most of the water and the sewage works and 
the construction companies are operating in this form. 
Among Hungarians István Széchenyi was the first, who paid attention to joint-stock 
companies in his work “Hitel” (“Credit”) and wrote about them: the united work is stronger, 
because that is the only way that a mortal is able to succeed everything.3 Despite all these, 
the first manufacture, which tried to launch shares was not linked to Széchenyi but to the 
county family Forgách, who founded a textil factory in 1767 and tried to launch shares while 
expanding the enterprise.4 
 
 
1 DERNBURG, Heinrich: Bürgerliches Recht. Berlin, 1884, 1st edition, p. 252. 
2 HORVÁTH, Attila: A részvénytársaságok és a részvénytársaság jog kialakulása Magyarországon [Joint-stock 
companies and the evolution of the joint-stock company law in Hungary]. Budapest, 2005, Rejtjel Kiadó, p. 10. 
3 SZÉCHENYI, István: Hitel [Credit]. Pest, 1830, p. 32. 
4 HORVÁTH, Attila: Széchenyi István részvénytársaság-alapításai [Foundation of joint-stock companies by István 
Széchenyi]. Jogtörténeti Szemle [Review on Legal History], 2003/2, p. 20. 
80 
2. The evolution of the joint-stock company law in Hungary 
 
Because of the demolition of the Turks, the commerce fell back, and the industry was 
neglected, namely the first goal was to start the agricultural production. It was not 
substantial to bring in new achievements into the country, because there were so many 
wasteland, that by using the old technology, they could produce enough food.  
The conditions of founding a joint-stock company started to evolve after the 1830’s. To 
this belonged the modernization of agriculture, increasing of accumulation of capital, inner 
investments, founding the food industry, start of configuration the modern transportation 
and infrastructure, the rising amount of manufactures and factories, the growth of import 
(so the Hungarian enterprises could have bigger profit), creation that part of the population, 
which wants to fund their savings, shaping of an economical intellectual layer which became 
gradually suitable for operating the technics of the industrial revolution and for its 
development.5  
Prior to this, there was a longer process, which secured the opportunity the foundation 
of commercial companies. We can deem the Act 67 of 1790 as the beginning of commercial 
law’s codification, which stays that a committee should have to be put together.6 In 1795 an 
amendment was filed in to the parliament about the commercial courts, about proper 
commercial, insolvency and bill law. But this was not negotiated by the parliament, its 
revision was only ordered by the parliament 1825-1827, which got the name “Opinio”. In its 
first part was the exchange law, in its second part was proper commercial and insolvency 
law. The counties had to negotiate first, from where the amendment did not get forth, so 
only the next two parliament could negotiate it.7 
The Parliament in 1840 was pretty productive connected to the joint-stock company law8. 
The bill of exchange was created as well as the act about merchants, about factories legal 
 
5 HORVÁTH, op. cit. 2005, p. 110. 
6 Ibid., p. 151. 
7 Ibid., p. 152. 
8 GOSZTONYI, Gergely – BÓDINÉ BELIZNAI, Kinga: Az országgyűlés [The Parliament]. In: Képes György (ed.): A 
hatalommegosztás államszervezete, 1848–1949. Magyar alkotmány- és közigazgatástörténet a polgári korban 
[The state structure of separation of powers, 1848–1949. History of Hungarian constitution and public 
administration]. Budapest, 2013, ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, pp. 91–117. 
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relationships and about general partnerships.9 They set up a committee, which got the task 
to draw up and formulate an act about commercial law. This committee was not supported 
by Vienna after all, so the committee did not get help from them. So the members of the 
committee got information form the merchants from Bratislava, Vienna and Prague.10 Their 
amendment was written so good, that the parliament altered it only a little and accepted it 
as Act 18 of 1840.11  
 
3. Definition of joint-stock companies 
 
Many tried to define joint-stock companies, but until today no one succeeded to find out a 
definition that was not contradicted by a legal expert in a whole book, who found out 
another one, which was contradicted by another. In these attempts, it was common, that 
they mention a big capital with lot of owner which means, that more people are bearing the 
risks which made this company form. The first general rules were codificated by the 
Commercial Code, after the first joint-stock companies were grounded on permission 
granted by privilege letters.12  
This was followed by the German Commercial Code accepted on 24. June in 1861, which 
defined the joint-stock companies: the commercial company, whose partners are taking 
part only by their deposit without taking any personal liability. The capital of the company 
can be divided into shares or partial shares which cannot be divided, and can be bearer share 
or inscribed share.13 The joint-stock companies were first regulated in Hungary by the Act 18 
of 1840 and the aforementioned bearer share was forbidden by it.14  
Act 37 of 1875 tried to define the joint-stock companies: that company is a joint-stock 
company, that was founded with a capital, which stays out of shares, that has 
predetermined, equal value and amount and where the owners are responsible only with 
their shares.15 Levin Goldschmidt highlights the limited responsibility which appears at most 
 
9 Act 15, 16, 17, 18 of 1840 
10 HORVÁTH, op. cit. 2005, p. 110. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., p. 15. 
13 Ibid., p. 16. 
14 Act 18 of 1840: sec. 54–67. 
15 Act 37 of 1875: sec. 147. 
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of the legal experts and in my opinion, this is the only attribute of joint-stock companies that 
remained until now.16  
 
4. Sources of joint-stock company law 
 
The primary source of joint-stock company law was the aforementioned Act 37 of 1875, 
named as Commercial Act. During the interpretation of this act, the law enforcer could use 
those foreigner sources of law, which were the ground of the Hungarian act.17 This act 
regulated it when a joint-stock company could have been deemed as established: the 
capital had to be secured, the bylaws of the company are accepted and the company had to 
be registered into the company register.18  
Secondary source of the joint-stock company law was private law at the end of 19th 
century, which became primary according to §19 in the Act 10 of 1923, because commercial 
law had been put under general private law in the hierarchy of source of law.19 In this act the 
warranty for animals was regulated, which had to be used despite the general warranty in 
Commercial Code.  
Other source of joint-stock company law is the Act 27 of 1876 about the bill of exchange, 
the Act 23 of 1898 about cooperatives, the Act 57 of 1908 about business transmission, the 
Act 17 of 1881 about Industry, Act 25 of 1883 about usury and about harmful credit 
transactions and if specific acts allowed it then the rules of the Budapest commodity and 
stock exchange.20  
The common law served also as a source of joint-stock company law, because the 
legislation was a reaction for the new forms of company, solutions, and institutions. 
Legislation was necessary because of the establishment of new organizations, which was 
sometime replaced by judiciary custom if the legislation have not done it.21 For this there are 
many examples from the 19th century: share subscription insurance, judicial control, 
 
16 HORVÁTH, op. cit. 2005, p. 19. 
17 Ibid., p. 42. 
18 Act 37 of 1875: sec. 149. 
19 HORVÁTH, op. cit. 2005, p. 43. 
20 Ibid., p. 44. 
21 Ibid. 
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requiring the realistic operation of joint-stock companies by the opportunity to repeal the 
general meetings decision, establishing the private responsibility of the member of the 
supervisory board and the board for directors, defining the condition of a capital increase, 
securing the old shareholders, and joint-stock companies interest in case of a new potential 
shareholders buy in, regulating the legal position of the general manager.  
Act 18 of 1840 was based on Commercial Code and defined in its first paragraph joint-
stock companies: “companies where none of the members are named in the title and the 
whole capital is shared for predefined amount of equally valued shares and the shareholders 
are risking only the money they spent on their shares, they are not obliged with other part 
of their fortune. These companies are named joint-stock companies.22 §54 stays, that 
everyone can buy a share and be part of a joint-stock company (this is limited by the 
founder’s rights). It was not necessary to get a permission to found a company, the members 
only had to sign an agreement about it. Only limited datas of the joint-stock company 
should have been submitted to the so called bill courts: purpose of the company, datas 
which served as base for reaching this purpose, amount of the necessary capital, amount of 
shares, time of its pay in and rule of their distribution, the public parts of the shares and the 
preparatory bylaws. The act forbade the bearer shares, which meant that registered shares 
were only allowed. It was also forbidden to ask for interest after the shares and the maximum 
amount of votes were limited in ten on corporate meetings independently from owning 
shares.23 But the joint-stock companies inner leadership, structure and the shareholders 
control rights were not regulated in the act.24 
The Act in 1840 was followed by the Act in 1875, which re-regulated joint-stock 
companies. There were three proposals for the new act. Writing a completely new act, which 
could have been too different from the international norms. A Commercial Code could have 
been taken over from another country, which had been against the countries dignity and 
independence or - which the parliament chose - another country’s Commercial Code could 
have been individualised.25 This is why the differences between the German and the 
Hungarian Commercial Code has to be mentioned in my presentation. In Hungary, the joint-
 
22 Act 18 of 1840: sec. 1 point b. 
23 Act 18 of 1840: sec. 59–60. 
24 HORVÁTH, op. cit. 2005, p. 159. 
25 APÁTHY, István: A magyar kereskedelmi törvénykönyv tervezete [Proposal of the Hungarian Commercial Code]. 
Budapest, Franklin, 1873, pp. 13–14. 
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stock companies could not get their own shares and these shares could not have been 
pledged.26 The limited joint-stock companies were not taken over, as well as the silent 
partnership and maritime law. The last one is today is obvious, but at the acceptance of this 
act Hungary still had coast for forty years.  
But there were some new regulations in the Hungarian, which was not in the German. 
These were the part about the cooperatives, depositories, mainland insurances. Along 
cooperatives, limited partnerships, general partnerships and joint-stock companies were 
also regulated.27 Joint-stock companies were define by this act: joint-stock companies are 
those companies, which are having from predefined amount, equally valued (whole or part) 
shares staying capital and where the owners of shares are responsible only limited to their 
shares.28  
 
5. Normative system of joint-stock company’s foundation 
 
Before the 19th century there was no state regulation, because it depended from the kings 
will, who, with what conditions, what ground rules and with which shareholder circle, how 
big company people can establish. In Germany the regulation consisted the need of a state 
permission for establishing a joint-stock company only after 1838. Its conditions were 
however defined in 1845: the company had to have an activity that is useful the public 
purposes, which is worthy to support. Another important factor was, that the new company 
could not endanger the existing industry. After these, a sharenovel was accepted on 11th of 
June 1870, which introduced the normative system instead of the state permission system. 
This meant, that the king or the public body could not measure about giving the permission 
if the joint-stock company was conforming to the legal requirements, it had to be put in the 
register. Only they legitimacy could have been checked by the courts.29  
 
 
26 Act 37 of 1875: sec. 161 
27 PAPP, Tekla: A magyar társasági jog fejlődése [The improvement of the Hungarian corporate law], In: Acta 
Universitatis Szegediensis: acta juridica et politica, Szeged, 2000, p. 413. 
28 Act 37 of 1875: sec. 147. 
29 HORVÁTH, op. cit. 2005, p. 213. 
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6. Foundation of joint-stock companies 
 
The state needed to focus on the foundation of joint-stock companies, because the big 
amount of participants represented national economically a huge capital. In my opinion it 
was necessary to put the foundation under national inspection, because lot of people’s 
money counted on these companies and it caused certain public outcry if a joint-stock 
company just got the money of the shareholders but did not fulfil its purpose, leaving the 
shareholders bumped. The most outcries were connected to railway constructions and 
some joint-stock companies should have been taken over by the state because they were 
only founded for speculative reasons. 
There were two options the ground a joint-stock company: simultaneously or 
successive.30 Simultaneously meant, that the founders subscribed the shares and only after 
the foundation will be the shares published for signing. Successive meant that the founders 
went to the public so that they get enough investor to sign the shares.31 The Hungarian 
legislation chose the successive method, which was criticized by Ödön Kuncz, by a 
Hungarian legal expert, because in Hungary the other type of foundation was widespread, 
so the act did not regulate what it supposed to.  
The “General Decisions” chapter of the Commercial Code regulated the progress of the 
foundation. It defined it from the beginning, from signing the shares, through the 
acceptance of the bylaws from statutory meeting, the rules of announcement, the 
registration and the publication. In the following chapters were regulated those questions, 
which are important for today’s joint-stock companies also. About the rights linked to the 
shares, the obligations of the shareholders, the protection of minority, the organization of 





30 Ibid., p. 203. 
31 Ibid. 
32 PAPP, op. cit., p. 414. 
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7. Founders of joint-stock companies 
 
Those natural and legal persons counted as founders, who called the public on for signing 
the shares and not those who were actually founding the company.33 The actual founders 
had many advantages from founding a company. Everyone got preferred stock, they had 
pre-emption right for the future launched shares, they could name the first director 
together, they got reward and they deserved a defined amount of money and the got the 
defined percent of the profit. They got the right to decline anyone’s share signing, if in that 
person they did not see guaranteed the fulfilment of their duty.34  
But the founders were responsible in the direction of the company. They were privately 
responsible for the reality of the datas mentioned in the bylaw-draft, for the income from 
signing the shares, for the duties that came from deals before registry and publishing of the 
company, and for damages caused by those shares that were signed before registry and 
publishing, and for assembling the general meeting after closing the foundation process.35 
The founders had criminal liability also if they shared false datas or the committed 
something during the foundation of the company which broke the Penal Code.36  
 
8. The draft 
 
The foundation of a joint-stock company needed a draft according to Commercial Code, 
from which the future shareholders can have knowledge about the company which shares 
they are about to buy. This sheet had to consist the subject of the company and its contents, 
the amount of the ground capital, the amount and value of common stocks and preferred 
stocks, and the end of time for signing the shares. It had to be published also, whether the 
founders or someone else wanted to take part in the company with shares that are not out 
 
33 HORVÁTH, op. cit. 2005, p. 204. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Act 37 of 1875: sec. 150–152. 
36 HORVÁTH, op. cit. 2005, p. 206. 
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of money, and what kind of privileges are secured for the founders and the preferred 
shareholders. For the content of this draft, founders were joint and several responsible.37  
These informations were written on the share-signing paper and if according to this 
anything did not happen, then the shareholder could charge his signing. If the content of 
the draft was accepted by the general meeting, then its content became part of the joint-
stock company’s bylaws and it became obligatory for those who signed a share.  
 
9. Bylaws of a joint-stock company 
 
The bylaw of the joint-stock company defines the organization, the purpose, and how the 
company wants to reach its goal. First the Act 18 of 1840 dealt with bylaws of a joint-stock 
company which did not make obligatory to show the bylaws for the bill of exchange courts.38 
The regulation in 1875 made up some requirements for the bylaw, which the act in 1840 did 
not consist. It had to contain the seat of the joint-stock company, the amount of the capital, 
amount and value of shares, the way of paying for the shares and consequences of a late 
payment. The amount and value of preferred stock had to be also written in the bylaws and 
the exact rights linked to these shares. The bylaws had to consist rules about the invitation 
to the general meeting, how the general meeting works, when it takes part and its 
authorities so that no one could change these autocratically only with the majority. It was 
also part of the bylaw how the directory board had to be chosen, because it prevented 
someone’s autocratical takeover. 
 
10. The stock 
 
The stock itself would have been before decades just a piece of paper which today as it 
appears from its names: securities. This was made by the business life, because near money 
and other value a new form of asset acquisitions was needed. Working out the conception 
was not linked to the legislation, because they could not give adequate definition, so first 
 
37 Act 37 of 1875: sec. 150. 
38 HORVÁTH, op. cit. 2005, p. 213. 
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the jurisprudence worked out the definition of securities and in it the definition of stocks.39 
Exactly Friedrich Carl von Savigny was the one who gave first a scientific definition securities 
and started the development this field of law.  
In Hungary, Ferenc Nagy was the first who started the development of securities: every 
instrument is a security, if it is set out about a right and which embodies this right and which 
has some kind of value.40 To this definition I would like to add my opinion, because I think it 
is important that a stock has got that much value as people maintain to them just like as 
they do at money. With economical terms: everything that much value, how big their 
demand is. 
Issuing securities had a simple reason: by buying one of these someone got the right to 
benefit from it and has to opportunity to horn into the work of the company. The paper and 
the rights cannot be separated; they can be sold only together because in another way it 
would be impossible to proof the ownership of the stocks. 
The stock is a security, issued at the foundation of the joint-stock company or at the 
increase of capital, which represents a predefined proportion and value of the company’s 
capital.41 This definition grabs the essence, because it is not specifying the rights linked to 
the stocks or what obligations do the owner has. From this definition is deductible, that the 
capital is shared for predefined amount parts, which narrows the number of assigned stocks, 
which is written in the bylaws.  
Between the stocks, there are two type of them: the signed stock and the bearer stock. In 
the first type, the owner of the stocks was registered into the register of shareholders, they 
had different value and a permission was necessary to convey the shares. The bearer stock 
was the one that has been established later, at that time when todays system has been 
established, that the owner of the paper has the shareholders right. At this time stocks 




39 Ibid., p. 216. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., p. 217. 
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10. Rights of shareholders 
 
The shareholders’ liability is limited to their shares for the company’s debts, which is the 
biggest benefit this form of company, because the risks were divided and this brought 
people’s fun to invest. The rights of shareholders can be divided into two groups: those 
which can be altered by the general meeting, and those which cannot because they are 
based on law or the bylaw of the company.42  
The rights can be divided into three other groups: financial rights, membership rights and 
minority rights. To the first belongs the right for those part of the company’s property that 
belongs to the value of the stock.43 From this was deducted the right for dividend, and for 
liquidation quota. To the membership rights belongs the right to take part on the general 
meeting and the right to decide about the foundation. With the second right only that 
shareholder could live with, which signed shares at the foundation at the acceptance of the 
draft. Every shareholder had the participation right, where they could address on the 
meeting, could vote and could have a motion linked to the company’s work. The prior 
regulation consisted a limit of votes in 10 which were modified by the Commercial Code and 
let the bylaw to regulate this.44 The minority rights became important when the interest of 
majority’s became different from the minorities. They got the right for inspection, which 
could have been used if enough shareholders were on the same opinion.  
  
 
42 OPPLER, Emil: A részvényes külön (egyéni) jogai [The special (individual) rights of a shareholder]. Jogállam 
[Rule of Law], 1917, p. 89. 
43 Act 37 of 1875: sec. 147 and 163. 
44 HORVÁTH, op. cit. 2005, p. 232. 
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Réka HERNÁDI: The history and role of the commercial papers during the 
civil period in Hungary 




In the 19th century not only the art and the political regime changed a lot, but also the 
commerce developed so fast. Due to this improvement commercial law became even more 
important. Legislators tried to create the rules of the commercial law quite precise. The first 
commercial partnerships like joint-stocks companies appeared that time, and more and 
more banks opened their gates too. Tradespeople recognized that they could pursue their 
work according to better conditions in a company. In this century the rules of the bankruptcy 
law became even more elaborate. Beside money commercial papers had a special role 
because of these facts.  
 
2. The concept and features of the commercial paper 
 
It is not easy to tell what was a commercial paper because it had no concrete concept despite 
that legal experts like Gusztáv Wenczel, István Apáthy, Ferenc Nagy, Ödön Kuncz and Géza 
Magyary dealt with this question.1 In general we can say that these papers were documents, 
which incorporated entitlement and had some kind of value. On the other hand Savigny said 
that „Commercial papers are papers, in which a debit or demand incorporates, and exists only 
by the papers.”2  According to these definitions the papers included some kind of value in 
connection with private law3 and this could be validated against the bank or the exhibitor. 
Commercial papers had several different types which could be used for disparate 
purposes, however most of the features were in common. The concept of commercial paper4 
 
1 SZÉCSÉNYI, László: Értékpapírjog [Law of the commercial paper]. Budapest – Pécs, 1995, Dialóg Campus, pp. 35–
36. 
2 MEZEY, Barna (ed.): Magyar jogtörténet [Hungarian legal history], Budapest, 2007, Osiris, (4th ed.), p. 215. 
3 SZÉCSÉNYI, op. cit., p. 26. 
4 Ibid. 
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included several general characteristics. These papers incorporated rights connected to 
wealth, which could not be separated from the document, so they were special thing, not 
only a right but also they were goods, too.5 So their owner could validate his entitlement 
only with the document together, the right not only incorporated in the paper, but also 
became a property.6 Rules of the property law and the law of the obligations were also used 
for these papers.7 The debtor was bound to accomplish the demand, if the entitled showed 
him the commercial paper. If the entitled changed, the property of the commercial paper 
had to be transfer to the new person. 
Furthermore, if the document perished or vanished, that meant the perishing of the 
demand, too. 8 In addition, these papers were negotiable, so they could change their owner 
easily and the entitlement came to the new person.9 They were indivisible, so the possessor 
got the whole right, which was incorporated in the paper.10 The person got only the 
entitlement included in the commercial papers, not all of the rights of the previous 
possessor. What is more, the debtor could use only that excuses which were named in the 
paper.11 However, some commercial papers assigned the person of the entitlement, who 
could validate it. The fact that, the rights could be used only by showing it to the adequate 
people, protected the debtor and the entitled, too. Because of these facts commercial 
papers functioned as proof, so they had to be written, and in this way, they became an 
authentic document.12 First, they were written by hand, but it was not the best solution as 
the papers were became widespread. After that, the exhibitors created these commercial 
papers in printing houses and tried to make all pieces to be a special, different one in order 
to avoid falsification.13 In 1914 30% of the Hungarian national wealth was presented in 
commercial papers.14 
 
5 BÁCSKAI, Tamás – BÁNFI, Tamás – JÁRAI, Zsigmond – SULYOK-PAP, Márta – SZÁZ, János: Értékpapírok és 
értékpapírpiacok [Commercial papers and markets of the commercial papers], Budapest, 1991, Közgazdasági és 
Jogi Könyvkiadó, (2nd ed.), p. 43. 
6 MEZEY, op. cit., p. 215. 
7 SZÉCSÉNYI, op. cit., p. 27. 
8 BÁCSKAI – BÁNFI – JÁRAI – SULYOK-PAP – SZÁZ, op. cit., p. 43. 
9 MEZEY, op. cit., p. 216. 
10 SZÉCSÉNYI, op. cit., p. 63. 
11 Ibid., p. 31. 
12 Ibid., p. 28. 
13 BÁCSKAI – BÁNFI – JÁRAI – SULYOK-PAP – SZÁZ, op. cit., p. 43. 
14 MEZEY, op. cit., p. 215. 
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Unfortunately, there were no standard legal regulations in connection with the 
commercial papers, only some special act referring to the several types. Because of this fact, 
in Hungary the activity of the judge and jurisprudence had a special role.15 
 
3. Types of the commercial paper 
 
As it was mentioned previously, the commercial papers had several different types 
especially because of dissimilar purposes and features of the trade. These types can be sort 
according to several aspects.16 The most important ones are the next. We can distinguish 
between short (like the bill of exchange), middle (treasury bills), long term (like the 
mortgage-bond) and commercial papers without expiration (like stocks).17 Furthermore, we 
can speak about constitutive papers, if the exhibition was necessary by the entitlement and 
declarative, if this action was not indispensable.18 According to the rules of the substantive 
law we can make difference between three types. First ones are the papers which 
incorporated demands and the documents were created to prove these requirements for 
example the cheques and the bill of exchange. On the other hand, some types of the papers 
included participation, which certified that the owner added money to the capital stocks 
and entitled to dividend. The most important example was the stock. The last one are the 
commercial papers of the property law, which provided ownership or mortgage on the 
object like the mortgage-bond.19 
 
4. The bill of exchange 
 
One of the most important and widespread commercial paper was the bill of exchange. A 
deferred payment was incorporated in this document. It was a one-sided promissory note, 
which was created according to strict rules.20 It is also necessary to mention that this paper 
 
15 Ibid. 
16 BÁCSKAI – BÁNFI – JÁRAI – SULYOK-PAP – SZÁZ, op. cit., p. 45. 
17 Ibid., p. 47. 
18 SZÉCSÉNYI, op. cit., pp. 52–53. 
19 MEZEY, op. cit., p. 216. 
20  BÁCSKAI – BÁNFI – JÁRAI – SULYOK-PAP – SZÁZ, op. cit., p. 49. 
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was an abstract, constitutive, short term commercial paper and was applied to a certain 
amount of money.21 The bill of exchange was the pawn of the commercial lending.22 Because 
of the development of the trade it was becoming even more important in the industry.  
We have to mention the endorsement, which made the paper complete and with the 
help of endorsement the bill of exchange could change its owner.23 By these commercial 
papers there was a legal relationship which was especially in connection with loan, as the 
bill of exchange was widely used as pawn of the commercial lending. The exhibitor 
obligated himself to pay the loan back.24 However it was abstract, so was independent from 
this relationship.25 The bill of exchange was favourable for the entitled as he could get the 
money faster. It was especially used for short term loans, so became widespread in the 
commerce and in the industry, too.26 Another important feature that the bill of exchange 
was negotiable, but only in a complete and unconditional way and with the help of 
endorsement.27 There were two different kinds of the document. By the unknown bill of 
exchange the exhibitor promised the paying for another, third person, however by the own 
paper he obligated himself to pay the certain amount of money.28  
As was mentioned previously, the bill of exchange had to meet with strict requirements 
which made it valid. For example, the document had to include the title of bill of exchange, 
the certain amount of money, the debtor’s name, date and place of the exhibition, and it 
had to be signed.29 Lately, there were no standard regulations referring to the bill of 
exchange, but there were some acts in connection with this paper. The first attempts were 
in the 18th and in the 19th century. In the time of the neo-absolutism legislators introduced 
the German Act of the bill of exchange, however later the Hungarian regulation came back. 
Unfortunately, this act was not adequate, so the Parliament adapted a new bill in 1876 
 
21 SZÉCSÉNYI, op. cit., p. 117. 
22 ADAMECZ, Péter – KOMLÓS, János: Értékpapírok a gazdaságban [Commercial papers in the economy], 
Budapest,1986, Pénzügyi Szervező és Tanácsadó Vállalat, p. 11. 
23 MEZEY, op. cit., p. 217. 
24 BÁCSKAI – BÁNFI – JÁRAI – SULYOK-PAP – SZÁZ, op. cit., p. 49. 
25 SZÉCSÉNYI, op. cit., p. 117. 
26 MEZEY, op. cit., p. 218. 
27 BÁCSKAI – BÁNFI – JÁRAI – SULYOK-PAP – SZÁZ, op. cit., p. 52. 
28 MEZEY, op. cit., p. 218. 
29 SZÉCSÉNYI, op. cit., pp. 131–133. 
94 
(1876:27), which was created by a famous representative, István Apáthy. In addition, 




Another important example for the commercial paper was the cheque. It was similar to the 
previously mentioned paper, however there were several differences, too. It was a short-
written voucher. Compare to the bill of exchange by the cheques banks had a special role, 
as there was a contract or agreement between the exhibitor and the bank. If someone 
showed this commercial paper to the bank, it had to pay the certain amount of money to 
that person.31 According to these facts this paper was used between private people instead 
of trade companies.32 
It did not function as the pawn of commercial lending, people used it as a payment 
instrument. On the other hand, this paper needed to fit strict rules in order to be valid. As I 
have mentioned previously some regulations were also adaptable for the cheque and it was 
also a negotiable instrument. The commercial paper had to include the title of cheque, the 
certain amount of money, the banks’ name, whom the exhibitor had contract with, the place 
of the payment, the date and place of the exhibition and it needed to be signed. If one of 
the requirements was missed the commercial paper was not valid.33 Another rule could be 
that the bank accepted the cheques which were created only by that bank.34 The cheque 
was also negotiable, however it was not so important, because this commercial paper had 
to be fulfilled in a short time.35 Firstly, it was not so typical in the everyday life, but after that 
it limited and even replaced money.36 It became necessary to regulate the paying by 
cheques, so for the first time in 1888 the Bank of the Astro-Hungarian Monarchy made it 
possible. 
 
30 MEZEY, op. cit., p. 218. 
31 Ibid., p. 218. 
32 SZÉCSÉNYI, op. cit., p. 185. 
33 Ibid., p. 85., pp. 193–194. 
34 ADAMECZ – KOMLÓS, op. cit., p. 17. 
35 BÁCSKAI – BÁNFI – JÁRAI – SULYOK-PAP – SZÁZ, op. cit., p. 59. 
36 ADAMECZ – KOMLÓS, op. cit., p. 17. 
95 
The next step of the legal regulation was to accept the first Act about cheques in 1908, 
which was used till 1930. It was also significant that Hungary joined the Agreement about 
Cheques in 1931, but it was valid only till 1965.37 At the end of the century cheques became 
very important because people did not need to have much money if they went somewhere 




The third important commercial paper was the bond. This bill incorporated demand, and 
the exhibitor obligated himself to pay the previously determined money (the nominal value 
of the bond)39 and certain percentage of interest. In contrast to the other ones it was usually 
for long terms, however it was also negotiable.40 First these bonds were got out by the state, 
loan offices, or certain companies.41 That is the reason why in the 1870s several bonds were 
got out by the Hungarian State and were bought by Austrian salesmen. The bonds were sold 
in the stock-market with the stocks. These commercial papers were secure as the state did 
not go bankrupt easily, so the chance of any risk was smaller.42 This document proved only 




It incorporated participation and proved that the owner added money to the capital stock 
and entitled to dividend. These papers had no expiration date. Stocks could also change 
their owner. Compare to the other papers with this commercial paper the owner became 
 
37 BÁCSKAI – BÁNFI – JÁRAI – SULYOK-PAP – SZÁZ, op. cit., p. 61. 
38 MEZEY, op. cit., p. 219. 
39 ADAMECZ – KOMLÓS, op. cit., p. 16. 
40 MEZEY, op. cit., p. 219. 
41 SZÉCSÉNYI, op. cit., p. 219. 
42 MEZEY, op. cit., p. 219. 
43 BÁCSKAI – BÁNFI – JÁRAI – SULYOK-PAP – SZÁZ, op. cit., p. 62. 
44 SZÉCSÉNYI, op. cit., p. 16. 
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the member and even the owner of the corporation.45 It counted as commercial paper 
because the entitlement could be validated only by the paper.46  
The bills were sold and bought in the stock market and made profit for the owners. It was 
riskier than the bond, but the profit was also bigger.47 These papers compare to the other 
ones incorporated rights connected to membership. Like the other papers, it also had to 
meet strict rules. The document had to include the name and the seat of the joint-stock 
company, rights, the types, the value of the capital, the date of the exhibition and it had to 
be signed by two leaders.48 The owner could not return the stocks, if he wanted to give away 
he had to sell it to another person. 
It is necessary to mention the joint-stocks companies, because their appearance made 
stocks indispensable. For their start or establishment huge amount of capital was needed, 
and that was provided by the stocks. With the buying of the bills, the owners guaranteed 
the capital and became members, so they had rights to take part in the company. Their 
responsibility was not unlimited. Because of this facts, the joint-stock companies had more 
advantages than other companies, even the profit could be bigger, but the risk could be 
smaller.49 In Hungary in the 19th century there were only a few of them, but in the 20th century 




It was the most typical ius in re commercial paper. Mortgage-bond was a special paper, as 
the loanee insured mortgage on the possession, usually on an estate and the loaner 
provided loan in parts. This bond proved these affairs. For fulfilling the mortgage-bond the 
company or the institute was responsible with its own property, too.51 
 
45 MEZEY, op. cit., p. 220. 
46 SZÉCSÉNYI, op. cit., p. 209. 
47 MEZEY, op. cit., p. 221. 
48 SZÉCSÉNYI, op. cit., p. 216. 
49 BÁCSKAI – BÁNFI – JÁRAI – SULYOK-PAP – SZÁZ, op. cit., pp. 73–78. 
50 MEZEY, op. cit., p. 204. 
51 Ibid., p. 220. 
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It was different because the cover was mortgage on a real estate and its interest was fix.52 
However, it was also a negotiable commercial paper, the owner could give it away. The 
mortgage-bond was used especially in the agriculture as it was adequate for long term plans 
and beneficial for the equipment. Beside it fitted to the claim of the market and agriculture.53  
Most of the mortgage-bonds were used in the time of the Dualism, they were carried out 
by the Bank of Astro-Hungarian Monarchy. After that the cover was not only the farmers’ 
field, but houses and buildings, too. What is more, mortgage-bond played special role in the 
year of the Millennium, when the thousand years’ anniversary of the Hungarian Settlement 
was celebrated. That time several new buildings, monuments were built.54 Beside the 
common commercial papers there were several other types, which presented in the second 
half of the 20th century. For example, the treasury bills, investment bill, deposit bill and the 




To sum up, commercial papers’ appearance was a huge step in the development of the 
economy. It enabled the move of bigger amount of capital, which influenced the number of 
investments and the measure of the improvement, so for economic reason this was a big 
effort. On the other hand, because of these documents the use of the cash decreased, and it 
became easier to pay bigger amount of money. These papers were payment instrument and 
also the pawn of the commercial lending, and with the help of it bigger amount of ware 




52 BÁCSKAI – BÁNFI – JÁRAI – SULYOK-PAP – SZÁZ, op. cit., p. 102. 
53 ADAMECZ – KOMLÓS, op. cit., p. 15. 
54 MEZEY, op. cit., p. 220. 
55 SZÉCSÉNYI, op. cit., p. 12. 
56 Ibid., pp. 38–39. 
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Mateo VLAČIĆ: The Codification of the Commercial Law in the interwar 
Yugoslavia – Why lasted so long and what happened at the end? 




The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was a heterogeneous state, with different legal, political, cultural 
and economic heritage. The legal particularism caused a specific legal structure of the state 
marked by the existence of many different legal areas.1 
Each of the legal areas had its own legal regulations. Such legal particularism prompted 
the government making of laws that would be valid for the whole Kingdom eliminating 
collisions between legal areas. The process of unification sought to speed up and make law-
making easier through a shortened legislative process. However, we will see that working 
on equalizing was not simple and finally legal unification in Yugoslavia was not even ended 
in some branches of the law.2   
The perfect example of the aforementioned problems, as well as the lengthy work on 
codification in the efforts to draft a single law, was commercial law. Despite some branches 
of the law completed unification, having the law valid for the whole state area, commercial 
law remained, after all, unified postponing the new commercial law into force. 
 
2. Legal areas, its sources and the reason for codification 
 
2.1. Legal areas 
In the Kingdom in the area of commercial law, legal particularism was in power. It was 
manifested in the existence of six legal areas with their valid Commercial Codes. The law in 
force in the Dalmatian-Slovenian legal area was the Austrian Trade Law (1862). Also Austrian 
 
1 KREŠIĆ, Mirela: Yugoslav private law between two World Wars. Modernisierung durch Transfer zwischen den 
Weltkriegen. Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 2007, pp. 153–154. 
2 Ibid. 
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law with the Trade Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1883) was applied in the legal area of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Montenegro had its own Trade Law (1910), as well as Serbia (1860), 
but in some parts of Serbian legal area the Bulgarian Trade Law was in force (1898). The 
Croatian-Slavonian area and so-called Hungarian legal area applied the Hungarian (-
Croatian) Trade Law (1875).3 
It is important to differentiate between the trade laws made under the influence of the 
1861 German Trade Law (Austrian, Hungarian (-Croatian), and Bosnian-Herzegovinian trade 
laws) and those made under the influence of the 1807 French Code de Commerce (Serbian 
and Montenegrin trade laws).4 
 
2.2 Why codification? 
The codification of the commercial law was necessary because keeping legal heterogeneity 
disrupted legal transactions and caused legal inequality, especially regarding economic 
development. The heterogeneity of the Yugoslavia’s legal system included working on 
equalizing the law with the goal of making the state united in the legal aspect. Although 
working on equalizing the law started within the first days of the existence of the new state, 
it was shown that it was extremely complicated and long-lasting.5  
 
3. Commercial jurisdiction 
 
There were not so many commercial courts in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In the period after 
1929 (when started harmonization of commercial judiciary, as a part a harmonization of 
state judicial organization) operated only two specialized commercial courts stipulated by 
the Act on the organization of the ordinary courts.6 One was in Belgrade (established in 
1859), while the other was new one established in 1939 in Zagreb. In rest of the country 
 
3 KREŠIĆ, Mirela, PASTOVIĆ, Dunja: Koenigreich Jugoslawien (1918–1941). In: Martin Loehnig und Stephan Wagner 
(hrgs.): Das ADHGB von 1861 als gemeinsames Obligationenrecht in Mitteleuropa. Tuebingen, 2018, p. 227. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., p. 254. 
6 Zakon o uređenju redovnih sudova za Kraljevinu Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca od 18. januara 1929. [Act on the 
organization of the ordinary courts], Službene novine Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca od 25. januara 1929., 
no. 20-X. 
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there were a county courts with a commercial division where one of the judges was so-called 
commercial judge – “honourable” judge recruited from respected members of business 
community.7 
According to the Act and in relation to the their jurisdiction, “they keep registers of 
commercial companies and act as first instance courts in civil and non-contentious, 
commercial and bills of exchange cases according to the regulation on actual jurisdiction in 
the laws on court proceedings and in other laws.”8 Although significant changes in 
commercial jurisdiction were expected with the introduction of the Code on Court 
Procedure in Civil Litigations,9 they did not occur and it retained its previous characteristics. 
The presence of a trader as a member of the panel in cases where the defendant is a 
merchant and the parties did not agree on the jurisdiction of a regular court or arbitration 
indicated that the expertise of the courts could still not be discussed. In addition, there were 
discussions regarding the jurisdiction of ordinary councils of county courts and commercial 
division of county courts, as well as the existence of a special commercial court or councils 
of commerce that bring difficulties regarding “honourable” judges in relation to their 
passive and indecisive role.  
It is worth noting that commercial disputes could also be brought before institutional or 
ad hoc court of arbitration. There were three types of institutional court of arbitration: 
Exchange court of arbitration, Arbitration court at chambers of commerce and Arbitration 
court at association of merchants and industrialists. Exchange courts of arbitration had the 
most widespread activity, they were effective and quick as well reliable.10 
 
4. Codification of Commercial Law  
 
As it was mentioned, more or less extreme legal particularism that existed in Yugoslavia 
induced intense governmental efforts to eliminate collisions between the areas through a 
 
7 SIROTKOVIĆ, Hodimir: Pravosudne strukture u hrvatskim zemljama od 1918. do 1945. godine [Judicial structures in 
Croatian countries from 1918 to 1945]. VIA, no. (1) 32, 1991, p. 21. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Zakon o sudskom postupku u građanskim parnicama (građanski parnični postupak za Kraljevinu Srba, Hrvata 
i Slovenaca) [Code on Court Procedure in Civil Litigations (Civil Litigation Procedure for the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes)]. Službene Novine Kraljevine Jugoslavije, no. 179-LXXV, 1929. 
10 KREŠIĆ, PASTOVIĆ, op.cit., pp. 270–271. 
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unification of Yugoslav law, which began soon after the common state had been founded. 
The unification process, according to 1921 Constitution (Art. 133),11 had to be completed 
within a five-year term. However, the legislators subsequently made use of their 
constitutional right to prolong this deadline.  
Unification and codification of commercial law also started very early. What actually is a 
“unification”? It is the process of approximating several legal systems and achieving some 
measure of integration where previously there was diversity. Unification aims at complete 
unity in substance and detail. A new law is made and substituted for the diverse national 
laws which existed before; they are repealed and replaced by the new law.12 
 
4.1. What kind of a trade code to make?  
Unification of the law was responsibility of the Ministry of Justice alongside the Ministry of 
Legal Unification. In the Ministry of Justice, the Legislative Council was founded (1919), and 
its duties were divided among three departments: private-law, criminal-law, and public-law. 
Based on the decisions made by the Minister of Justice, the Private-Law Department of the 
Council oversaw the working on unification of the trade legislature.13  
Work on the trade law started in 1921. The main question to be resolved was what kind 
of a trade law to make. Should one of the existing laws be chosen that its validity would be 
extended to the entire state? An aggravating circumstance was that all valid laws were made 
in the second half of the 19th century when different economic conditions were in place. By 
choosing this way of unification, the lawmaker would have to modernize the chosen trade 
law. The other option included longer process of making a new, modern, unique trade law 
which required a number of principal questions to be decided such as what foreign trade 
law would be taken as example.14  
The Unification Board of the Trade Law decided to follow the 1912 Serbian Bill of the 
Commercial Law as a base, accompanied by the 1897 German Commercial Law, as well as 
 
11 Ustav Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca [The Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes]. 
Službene Novine, no. 142a, 1921. 
12 SCHMITTHOFF, Clive M.: American and European Commercial Law. Journal of Legislation, vol. 6, no. 1, 1979, p. 
45. 
13 KREŠIĆ, PASTOVIĆ, op.cit., p. 254. 
14 SLADOVIĆ, Eugen: Trgovačko pravo [Commercial Law], Zagreb, 1934, pp. 120–121. 
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the 1920 Austrian Draft of the Commercial Law. German and Austrian sources were used 
because of the interrelations between commercial and civil law for whose codification the 
Austrian General Civil Code with novellas was used as base.15  
Furthermore, the original content of the Commercial Code was supposed to be included 
regulations on maritime law, cooperative regulations, regulations on the right to insurance, 
on unfair trade competition and copyright law, while the provisions on the bond and 
cheque were to be contained in the new special laws. Afterwards it was agreed that by 
special laws would be regulated private maritime law and the refutation of unfair 
competition.16 
 
4.2. Objective or subjective system? 
While drafting the unique trade law, the area of application of the trade law, i.e. the 
acceptance of an objective, subjective or mixed system popped up as one of the key 
questions. Using usual criteria to define concept of commercial law, merchant or commercial 
transaction, we can say that trade codes used both sets of criteria without one being clearly 
more important than the other. So, the German type codes primarily regulated who is a 
merchant, but included rules on so-called objective or absolute commercial transactions 
applying also to non-merchant, as well as rules applicable to a non-merchant in so-called 
mixed transaction (between merchant and non-merchant). Speaking of Serbian trade code 
and trade code of Montenegro, we already said that they were modelled upon French code. 
According to Serbian Trade Code, merchants are those who are engaged in commercial 
transactions and make them their habitual profession. The Code does not provide any 
guidelines or definitions what these “commercial transactions” are. Trade Code of 
Montenegro also define who is a merchant, but unlike Serbian Code, define as well 
“commercial transaction”.  
The consequence of adopting the objective system would allow the strict regulations of 
trade law of obligations would’ve been applied to parties neither of which was a trader or 
 
15 KREŠIĆ, PASTOVIĆ, op.cit., p. 255. 
16 Ibid. 
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knew the way of trading, while the subjective approach stated to which regulations are 
merchants subjected and who they are. Ultimately, the Board opted for subjective system.17 
 
4.3. Process of codification 
Warnings about the need for compatibility between civil and commercial law could be 
achieved in a mutual process of codification, so the preparation for the trade code was 
supposed to happen at the same time as the preparation for the civil law, or at least follow 
it. For as an example Germany was given, where the new Trade Code was made based on 
the Civil Code.18 Unification of civil law started immediately, and, according to the 
agreement, it should have been based on ABGB, or to be more precise its Croatian 
translation from 1853. This drafting process was slow in advancing, it was even stopped for 
a short period, so the result was finally out in 1934 – Preliminary Principles of the Yugoslav 
Civil Code – but, never became a code. But, its existence, and continuing work on this project 
influenced the codification of commercial law since drafting the part of commercial code 
connected to the real property and obligation was put on hold waiting to see what will be 
with the Civil Code.   
For waiting in the process of making the new trade law were multiple reasons. Firstly, it 
was necessary to make draft of bills on the bond and cheque law. Another problem were 
drafts of new trade laws in post-war Europe, especially parts on joint stock and other trade 
companies which had to be taken into consideration as well as the criticisms of those drafts. 
In the end, contemporary solutions from a number of other European codes were included 
in the Draft of the Commercial Law – Polish Law on Stock Companies (1928), the Civil Code 
of Liechtenstein (1926), the Swiss draft amendments to the law of Obligations and the Italian 
trade law draft (1925).19 
In the beginning of 1928 enough material was prepared to be able to start having 
sessions. However, the code was not worked on for two years because of the change in 
membership and the fact that due to the proclamation of January 6th dictatorship (1929) the 
Legislative Council and the Private-Law Department were abolished. Although the Supreme 
 
17 KREŠIĆ, PASTOVIĆ, op.cit., p. 258. 
18 KREŠIĆ, PASTOVIĆ, op.cit., p. 261. 
19 KREŠIĆ, op. cit., p. 164. 
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Legislative Council was a new body founded within the Ministry of Justice, with the same 
authority, and the Minister of Justice was authorized to establish a commission of experts if 
needed, it was done so in 1930, when the commission continued its work in a new 
structure.20 
In the same year, in two readings the first part of the draft of the law was completed, 
thereafter next year Titles I, II, and V from the second part of the draft were completed with 
explanation such as first part of the draft. Title III of the second part with explanation was 
proclaimed in two reading by February 1932, and Titles IV and VI by May 1933.21 
The critical opinions of all Yugoslavian law schools, higher courts, trade, attorney, and 
notary chambers, as well as other economic organizations and institutions on the adopted 
parts of the draft were systematically processed as the base for the third reading during 
1934.22 After two-year consideration the new Commercial Code of the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia was adopted in the National Assembly in 1937, and sanctioned according to the 
then-valid constitutional regulations by the King.23 
Content-speaking, the adopted Code was not complete. It encompassed the regulations 
on the trader and merchant staff, as well as regulations on trade associations and secret 
associations, but not commercial and legal norms of property law and law of obligations. It 
was considered purposeless to pass it before a unique civil law was passed, given that it was 
tightly connected to civil law.24  
According to the last paragraph of the Code, the day of coming into the force of the Code 
had to be decided by a special law. However, the mentioned law was never passed in the 
coming years. Mostly, because the Yugoslav bankers whose activity would be affected by 
the Commercial Code managed to put its application off ad infinitum. Also, the WW2 started 
soon so as a result the Commercial Code was not put into effect and the regulations valid 
until then continued to apply.25 
 
 
20 KREŠIĆ, PASTOVIĆ, op. cit. p. 256. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Trgovački zakon za Kraljevinu Jugoslaviju [Commercial Code for the Kingdom of Yugoslavia] Službene novine 
Kraljevine Jugoslavije no. 245 – LXXIV, 1937. 
24 KREŠIĆ, PASTOVIĆ, op. cit. p. 258. 




The obvious example of the legal particularism in interwar Yugoslavia were six legal areas 
with their applicable laws including different trade codes. The elimination of heterogeneity 
of law system through unification was general approach, accepted also in the field of 
commercial law by drafting a unified state-wide law.  
During the drafting of the code, a subjective system was chosen, while it was agreed to 
choose for the base of the making the new Yugoslav trade code the Draft of Commercial 
Code for the Kingdom of Serbia (1912) followed by the German Commercial Code as well as 
Austrian Draft of the Commercial Code. There were lots of obstacles for the new Commercial 
Code, but one of the main problems was frequent change of government in the interwar 
Yugoslavia, which additionally delayed its adoption. 
At the end, commercial legislature, despite the efforts made and even with the unification 
process completed, remained non-unified postponing the new Commercial Code coming 
into force.  
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Mia MILANOVIĆ: Stabilisation of the dinar in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia – 
Legislative framework 




After World War I, in 1918, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formed. 
According to the first constitution of the SCS Kingdom called St. Vitus' Day Constitution 
(1921) the new state was a parliamentary and heredity monarchy. The Kingdom suffered 
from political crisis, economic backwards and inter-ethnic disputes. Despite its unitary and 
centralistic administrative organisation, the Kingdom was characterised by variety in the 
organisation of the judiciary and law taken over from the previous legal systems. As a result, 
there were six legal areas in the SCS Kingdom which caused a lot of legal issues. Legal 
particularism remained characteristic of the state during its existence. In 1929, in 
circumstances marked by further ethnic conflicts, economic underdevelopment and 
political crises (i.e. 1928 assassination of Stjepan Radić, the leader of the Croatian Peasant 
Party), king Alexander proclaimed dictatorship on January 6th and abolished the 1921 
Constitution changing the name of the country into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. After few 
years, in September 1931, King proclaimed a new constitution, so-called Octroyed 
Constitution. It didn’t change the former political regime but offered a pseudo - 
parliamentarism together with an official legitimation for covert absolutism.1  
During the interwar period the Kingdom pursued liberal economic policy but due to the 
Great Depression the State was forced to pursue a serious intervention measures. One of the 
fundamental issues that had to be addressed it the first years was the issue of monetary 
policy - the unification of money and the remediation of currency chaos. Why? Because after 
the War and at the beginning of a new State five currencies were in circulation: the dinar of 
the ex-Kingdom Serbia, the perper of the ex-Kingdom of Montenegro, the Bulgarian lev and 
 
1 KREŠIĆ, Mirela: Yugoslav private law between two World Wars. Modernisierung durch Transfer zwischen den 
Weltkriegen. Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 2007, pp. 151–155. 
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the German mark and in the largest part of the country was the Austro-Hungarian krone.2  
So, at the beginning of the paper I will describe the process of monetary unification and its 
consequences. In the second part I will be focused on the stabilization of a dinar and the 
legal aspect of it, as well as why it was so needed. At the very end, I’ll give some final remarks.  
 
1. Monetary unification 
 
As it was mentioned, one of the fundamental issues that had to be addressed was the issue 
of monetary policy - the unification of money and the remediation of currency chaos. The 
solution for the monetary issue was related to the interpretation of the newly created state. 
There were two possible answers: the SHS Kingdom was a new state or the SHS Kingdom 
was a political continuity of the Kingdom of Serbia. This problem needed to be resolved 
because economic, political and legal problems came from this unclear situation. This legal 
doubt opened up the possibility for the lump sum application of legislation in the sphere of 
finance and economic policy general.3 Following the idea of political and legal continuity of 
ex-Kingdom of Serbia in the SCS Kingdom, the most striking example of this was the 
acceptance of Serbian dinar and the replacement of other currencies, especially the Austro-
Hungarian krone, with the dinar.4 The first monetary policy measures followed as early as 
December 12, 1918 when a decision was taken to ban the entry of krone from abroad into 
larger denominations than a thousand. One of the results was a large shortage of a small 
denominations coins which resulted in an increase in food prices. Also, fake banknotes 
circulated so money had to be checked and handed carefully.5 After that, the Government 
made the decision to stamp validate all krone denominations in the country (1919). The 
process was ill-prepared so the next step was labelling the previously stamp validated krones 
 
2 KOLAR DIMITRIJEVIĆ, Mira: The History of Money in Croatia 1527–1941. Croatian National Bank, Zagreb, 2018, p. 
147. 
3 KRŠEV, Boris N.: Monetarna politika i problem unifikacije novca u Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (1918–1923) 
[Monetary policy and the problem of unification of money in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918–
1923], Civitas, MMXII, no. 3, p. 114. 
4 The replacement of crowns had to be done pursuant to Article 206 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain which, in 
addition to the stamping, required all countries in which the crown was in circulation, including Hungary and 
Austria, to replace the stamped banknotes by their own currency within 12 months after the treaty came into 
effect. PANTELIĆ, Svetlana: Dinarsko – krunske novčanice [Dinar-Crown Banknotes], Bankarstvo, 2017, vol. 46, issue 
3, p. 133; see also BECIĆ, Ivan M: Za dinar ili za krunu – ko je dobio, a ko izgubio [For the dinar or for the kruna 
– Who lose? Who won?], Historija 20. veka, 2/2013, pp. 41–58. 
5 KOLAR DIMITRIJEVIĆ, op. cit., pp. 148–149. 
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(1919-1920).6 After labelling the krone notes was completed, the Government began 
initiative on the transformation of the Privileged National Bank of the (ex) Kingdom of Serbia 
into the National Bank of the SCS Kingdom as the leading financial institution that was 
granted the privilege of banknote issue by the state.7 National Banks first task was to finish 
the monetary reform so for this purpose the Ministerial Council passed the Act on the 
unification of money. According to it, begins the withdrawal and conversion of all those 
found currency for the newly issued the krone - dinar banknotes, which apart from the 
names of the two former currencies, also contained their parity ratio of 4: 1.8 From a legal 
point of view it was a precedent in monetary policy because a single banknote was issued 
that reads in two currencies which are individually withdrawn from circulation and whose 
countries of origin do not formally exist. Unlike the krone the Serbian dinar hardly devalued. 
Thanks to French and English loans, first and foremost, as well as guarantees allies, the dinar 
represented a relatively stable and convertible currency. The Bulgarian lev was exchanged 
for the krone - dinar without major fluctuations and was replaced on a 2: 1 parity basis. 
Montenegrin perp was the last caught currency in progress in April 1921 and it was 
exchanged on a parity basis of 1: 1.9  
By the end of 1921 a complete unification of money was made in the SCS Kingdom and 
the only banknotes in the circulation were krone – dinar banknotes. Then it was decided that 
the only currency will be the new dinar, so starting from the 1923 all legal entities were 
obliged to use only dinar for their business transactions.10 Although dinar was stabilised at 
an overly high exchange rate soon it caused economic stagnation which continued in the 






6 BIĆANIĆ, Rudolf: Ekonomska podloga hrvatskog pitanja [The Economic background of the Croatian issue], Zagreb, 
1938, pp. 41–42. 
7 Zakon o Narodnoj banci od 26. januara 1920 [The Act on the National Bank], Službene novine Kraljevine Srba, 
Hrvata i Slovenaca, no. 22. 
8 KOLAR DIMITRIJEVIĆ, op. cit., p. 155. 
9 KRŠEV, op. cit., pp. 120–121. 
10 PANTELIĆ, op. cit., p. 133. 
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2. Dinar stabilization 
 
The value of the dinar was influenced by a financial policy that was reckless, based on a 
fiction about the unification accomplished by war reparations, symbolic donations and 
positive credit arrangements with foreign creditors. All of the above could not change the 
reality and developments in the money market where the new currency was experiencing 
its first historical sunrise. Neglecting investment in the economy rebuilding the country, the 
state spends almost all its resources on servicing wages of an over-employed state 
administration. Political disorder with the unresolved border issues and inter-ethnic 
conflicts of interest additionally impedes and adversely affects the economic development 
of the country and its value currency.11  
In response to solve the problem of inflation and economic instability, measures were 
adopted to stabilise monetary relationships in the country. The stabilisation lasted from 
1925 to 1931 and it started with the reforms to stabilise the dinar. 
 
2.1. De facto stabilization  
The strengthening of the dinar began in 1923, and it was reached in 1925. Period of de facto 
stabilised dinar lasted for six years, from 1925 till 1931. In the meantime, all the pre-war and 
war debts had been regulated, which influenced favourably the state’s creditworthiness 
abroad and indirectly also the trust in the Yugoslav currency. Owing to its interventions on 
world money markets the National Bank managed to maintain the exchange rate of the 
dinar in the range between 9.12 and 9.13 Swiss francs against 100 dinars. The state 
apparatus had been set up, the need for stringent border security measures had ceased and 
new state loans both in the country and abroad, were not incurred till 1931. Government 
revenues rose from 9.8 to 13.4 billion dinars. Revenues generated from all sources grew alike, 
both from direct and indirect taxes and from the state economy The increase in the 
government revenues was partially a proof of strengthening of the economic power of the 
 
11 KRŠEV, op. cit., pp. 122. 
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population and economic growth during the observed period, whilst at the same time 
resulting from the tax system unification and modernisation. 12 
Nevertheless, this de facto stabilisation had negative impact on the economy of the 
previous Austro-Hungarian provinces who had, compare to Serbia and Montenegro, quite 
developed monetary economy and because of that seriously felt every currency and 
monetary changes. For example, the initial weakening of the Croatian economy after 1918 
started in the field of monetary politics, yet the collapse of Croatian private banking which 
occurred after 1918 in the field of monetary politics, as well as the fall of private banking in 
Croatia after the Great Depression, totally destroyed the economic domination of former 
Austro-Hungarian provinces in the Kingdom of SCS/Yugoslavia.13 Political crisis, stagnation 
and deflation have affected the distrust of citizens in the government, so stabilizing the 
dinar was one of the solutions to restore hope in the government.  
 
2.2. De iure stabilisation 
De facto stabilisation didn´t mean de iure stabilisation. Despite the efforts, the first de iure 
stabilisation failed in 1928.14 So, following a period of a de facto stabilisation, Kingdom again 
undertook legal measures towards its de iure stabilisation in 1931 as one of the latest 
European countries to do that. To stabilise currency legally meant establishing the value of 
national currency against a certain quantity of a gold. Every country that undertook this 
measure gave an additional stability element in foreign transactions. Currency stabilisation 
was either preceded by a long-term gradual strengthening of gold and foreign exchange 
reserves of the central bank or by means of huge foreign loans thus creating conditions for 
an instant and considerable strengthening of gold and foreign exchange reserves of the 
central bank.15 
 
12 GNJATOVIĆ, Dragana: Foreign Exchange Policy in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia during and after the Great 
Depression. The Experience of Exchange Rate Regimes in South-eastern Europe in a Historical and Comparative 
Perspective, Second Conference of the South – Eastern European Monetary History Network, April 13th 2007, 
pp. 334–335. 
13 BIĆANIĆ, op. cit., pp. 45–46.; KOLAR DIMITRIJEVIĆ, op. cit., p. 167. 
14 For more about these attempts see: RUPČIĆ, Vjenceslav: Zakonska stabilizacija dinara i zlatni standard u 
Kraljevini Jugoslaviji [Legal stabilisation of the dinar and the golden standard in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia]. 
unpublished, 2018, pp. 27–32. 
15 GNJATOVIĆ, op. cit, p. 336. 
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Basically, de iure currency stabilisation envisaged that the total banknote contingent that 
was in circulation had to be covered for by a legally prescribed amount of gold and foreign 
exchange reserves. In order to secure such a guarantee, the Yugoslav government took a 
stabilisation loan from French banking consortium (May, 8th 931).16 Shortly after, on May 11th 
1931, Act on the Currency of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was brought and it stipulated that 
the value of dinar equalled to 26.5 milligrams of pure gold.17 For the purpose of application 
of the Act, the Agreement on the Execution of the Currency Act between the State and the 
National Bank was brought on 13 June 1931.18 Based on this Act, the French monetary 
system was accepted, with the coverage of banknotes and sight obligations of 35%, of which 
25% was in gold and 10% in foreign currency.19 Also, the National Bank was under obligation 
to exchange all amounts surpassing 250 millions of dinars for either golden bullions or 
foreign exchange. According to this Act, the exports of gold and foreign exchange were free, 
that is, the foreign exchange regime of restrictions was formally abolished. When the Act on 
the Currency came officially into effect on 28 June 1931, the gold exchange standard was 
formally established in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia for the first time. Following the changes 
in the position of the National Bank two additional laws was brought, the Act on the National 
Bank of 17 June20 and the Statute of the National Bank of 25 June21, creating a legislative 
framework for the stabilisation of the dinar in 1931. For the first time National Bank was 
define as a public institution responsible for determining and implementing the monetary 
and foreign exchange policies. The influence of the National Bank grown gaining for 
example the advisory role in completing the loans. Although legal stabilization was 
expected to facilitate the lending of the economy by the National Bank, the introduction of 
gold parity increased the dependence of the dinar currency on its reserves, which 
significantly limited the lending capacity of the National Bank. Moreover, with this new role, 
 
16 For more see: JELČIĆ, Božidar: Razvoj javnih financija u Jugoslaviji [The development of public finance in 
Yugoslavia]. Zagreb, 1985, pp. 107–111. 
17 Zakon o novcu Kraljevine Jugoslavije od 11. maja 1931. godine [The Act on the Currency], Službene novine 
Kraljevine Jugoslavije, no. 107-XXXII. 
18 Ugovor za izvršenje Zakona o novcu između države i Narodne banke od 13. juna 1931. godine [The 
Agreement on the Execution of the Currency Act between the State and the National Bank], Službene novine 
Kraljevine Jugoslavije, no. 112. 
19 RUPČIĆ, op. cit., p. 34. 
20 Zakon o Narodnoj banci od 17. juna 1931. godine [The Act on the National Bank], Službene Novine Kraljevine 
Jugoslavije, no. 137. 
21 Statut Narodne Banke od 25. juna 1931. godine [The Statute of the National Bank], Službene Novine 
Kraljevine Jugoslavije, no. 140. 
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lending has become merely a side activity of the bank.22 Introduction of the golden dinar 
was seen as a huge success although it was carried out during a very inconvenient period, 
at the peak of the Great Depression. Dinar remained stable but monetary conditions in the 
Kingdom were affected by the collapse of Wiener Kreditanstalt, a large Viennese monetary 
institution and the Hoover Moratorium of 20 June 1931 on payments of Germany’s war 
reparations and debt, which decreased foreign currency inflows by 450,000,000 dinars 
annually in net terms. This was followed by an event that caused a widespread distrust in 
the currency: the abolition of the gold standard in England, on 21 September 1931.23 
But, after only three months of applying the Act (i.e. after 101 days), at the moment when 
both economic and financial crises were already seriously afflicting the country, the 
Government was forced, as well as other European governments to reintroduce restrictions 
in both domestic currency and foreign exchange transactions. On 7 October 1931, a Book of 
rules regulating foreign exchange transactions was brought.24 It sustained various 
amendments and stayed valid till the end of the period in between the two World Wars. The 
stipulations in this Book of Rules legislated exclusively for monetary transactions whereas 
trade in goods remained free.25 Introduction of these restrictions meant that a dinar 




In the interwar Yugoslavia in order to solve the problem of different currencies, namely the 
unsettled financial situation, monetary unification was started. From the text it is possible to 
conclude how complicated the procedure really was. After the decision on the unification of 
money began the withdrawal and conversion of all found currency. Subsequently, over the 
next years it was decided that the dinar would be the national currency. The new currency 
was more than inflationary, experiencing dire crashes in the money market. Stabilization of 
 
22 RUPČIĆ, op. cit., p. 34. 
23 KOLAR DIMITRIJEVIĆ, op. cit., p. 170. 
24 Pravilnik o regulisanju prometa devizama i valutama od 7. oktobra 1931. godine [The Book of Rules 
regulating foreign exchange transactions], Službene novine Kraljevine Jugoslavije, no. 239. 
25 GNJATOVIĆ, Dragana: Sto ine n dan konvertibilnega dinarja med svetovnim vojnama [The One hundred and 
one days of dinar convertibility between the Two World Wars], Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino XLVI – 2/2006, 
pp. 27–40. 
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dinar satisfied the politicians, economic and government interests. Namely, for the Yugoslav 
political leaders and businessmen a strong dinar was not only an economic interest but a 
matter of national prestige as well. 
The process of stabilisation lasted long as well. After a period of a de facto stabilisation 
(1925-1931), during which a first attempt of legal stabilisation failed, Kingdom again 
undertook legal measures towards its de iure stabilisation in 1931 as one of the latest 
European countries to do that. The beginning seemed satisfactory although the 
circumstances were quite unfavourable primarily because of the Great Depression and 
difficult economic and political situation in the Yugoslavia and Europe. But very soon 
economic and financial crises start to influence the country and the Government was forced 
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1. Introduction  
 
The Kingdom of Yugoslavia (further in text: Yugoslavia) was a multinational Southern Slavic 
state that existed from 1918 until 1941. Its legal system was not unified, therefore the 
process of equating of laws started soon after the common state was constituted.1 The paper 
seeks to explore the creation of the first unified Yugoslav code of civil procedure adopted in 
1929 under the name "Code on Court Procedure in Civil Litigations". The significance of the 
Code derives from two reasons. First, the process of the creation of the Code considered not 
to be an easy path because, as previously mentioned, Yugoslavia consisted of several legal 
areas with diverse legal rules and principles, and unstable social and political circumstances. 
Second, the Code was almost a literal copy of the 1895 Austrian Code of civil procedure (the 
so-called Zivilprocessordnung) which means that the Code accepted a new procedural 
model introduced by the Austrian Code. 
According to that, intention of this paper is to show that the legal particularism was 
extreme and to settle a unified law was a demanding task, not just in a single codification 
but in practise too. Also, the difficulties that emerged during the unification process, i.e. the 
creation of the two legal fronts, lead us to the conclusion that only two laws (Austrian and 
Serbian) were taken into the consideration while drafting the Code. So, can we talk about 
the two main sources? The central part of the paper is referred to the drafting of the uniform 
civil procedural law in relation to the unification process in general. Also, a significant part 
of the paper deals with result of that process - adoption of the Austrian procedure and its 
main characteristics. In the end I will try to answer why the unification of laws in Yugoslavia 
 
1 On 29 October 1918 Slovenes, Croats and Serbs residents of the Austro-Hungary constituted a new state – 
"State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs", which on 1 December the same year with Kingdom of Serbia founded a 
common state - "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes". In 1929 the state is renamed the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia. See more: KREŠIĆ, Mirela: Yugoslav private law between two World Wars. Modernisierung durch 
Transfer zwischen den Weltkriegen. Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 2007, pp. 151–155. 
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is significant and what was the role of the civil procedural law within the process of 
unification. 
 
2. Legal areas in the Interwar Yugoslavia 
 
The new state was divided into the six legal areas. Each legal area was applying different 
legal sources and had a separate jurisdiction, meaning that Yugoslavia at that time formed 
a vast network of legal sources. As follows, areas are divided into the three groups with 
common procedural principles and only the most important legal sources are allocated. 
The first group consists of three legal areas which were largely governed by Austrian law 
and had incorporated the principle of orality and immediateness, and the principle of free 
assessment of evidence.2 Those areas were Slovenia and Dalmatia (autonomous regional 
laws were also in force), Vojvodina, Međimurje and Prekomurje (with Hungarian law also in 
force) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (with many other sources in force of which the Sharia law is 
significant).3 
Areas of the second group applied Serbian laws in force which were considered national 
regardless of the fact that it were mainly consisted of the reception of French, Austrian, 
Prussian and other German countries.4 There also ruled the principle of the free assessment 
of evidence, but only the procedure in the first instance had been immediateness and oral.5 
Those areas were ex Kingdom of Serbia and ex Kingdom of Montenegro (with its laws 
preceding 1918).6 
The last legal area is ex Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia7 which was governed by 
autonomous Croatian law of the Sabor and the provincial government, Croatian-Hungarian 
 
2 WERK, Hugo: Teoretsko-praktični priručnik jugoslavenskog građanskog parničnog prava, Prvi deo: GPP u teoriji i 
praksi. [Theoretical-Practical Manual of Yugoslav Civil Procedural Law, First part: Civil Procedural Law in theory and 
practice]. Tisak nadbiskupijske tiskare u Zagrebu, Zagreb, 1932, p. 1. 
3 See more: KREŠIĆ, op. cit., p. 154. 
4 PAVLOVIĆ, Marko: Problem izjednačenja zakona u Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca / Jugoslaviji. [The 
Unification of Laws in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes / Yugoslavia], Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u 
Zagrebu, Zagreb, vol. 68, no. 3-4, 2018, p. 494 
5 WERK, op. cit., p. 1. 
6 KREŠIĆ, op. cit., p. 154. 
7 In Croatia and Slavonia from 1 January 1853 in force was the Temporary Rules of Civil Procedure of 1852. Its 
main principles were almost exact contrary to the ones with which they were replaced in 1929 by accepting 
the new civil procedural model. See more: ČEPULO, Dalibor: Hrvatska pravna povijest u europskom kontekstu od 
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law approved by the Sabor, and also by Austrian law - the so-called recipient law introduced 
during the Bach’s absolutism.8 In this legal area ruled the principle of free disposition of the 
parties and the principle of the formal truth, and this legal area turned to be exclusively in 
written form.9 
 
3. Two Legal Fronts  
 
This brief review of different legal areas clearly indicate that two sources of law prevail within 
the new legal system, which was confirmed during the unification process. “The game of 
imposing the law” has begun when lawyers separated into the two legal fronts. The lawyers 
from the parts of the former Austro-Hungary, known as Prečanian lawyers, have shown a 
tendency to extend the Austrian legislation to other parts of the country in which it wasn’t 
introduced. On the other side, lawyers from the territory of the former Kingdom of Serbia, 
who generally performed as members of the "Serbian front", stressed that they could not 
reject the results of Serbian legal evolution, especially where the experience of the certain 
legal institutions responded to the needs and legal comprehension of Serbians. They were 
for keeping those of Serbia's legal institutions that have yielded positive results and 
accepting those Austrian institutions which are not sooner introduced but should have been 
introduced in the past, as well as in certain cases the laws of other European countries.10  
 
4. The Unification of Civil Procedural Law 
 
The most important task of the new government was drafting the new legal codes that 
would apply throughout the whole territory of Yugoslavia. Work on new legislation was 
 
srednjeg vijeka do suvremenog doba. [Croatian legal history in the European Context from Middle Ages to 
Contemporary Period], Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Zagreb, 2016, pp. 154–155. 
8 See more in: KREŠIĆ, op. cit., p. 154. 
9 WERK, op. cit., p. 1. 
10 One example of the dispute between Serbian and Prečanian lawyers is the dispute over the ban of witnessing 
in disputes with a value exceeding 2000 dinars. This prohibition was considered a part of Serbia's legal tradition 
and an element of legal identity. Contrary to Serbians, Prečanian lawyers energetically advocated the 
expansion to the entire country of the institute of unrestricted use of witnesses from the Austrian civil 
procedure. Legislator accepted the Prečanian proposition. PAVLOVIĆ, op.cit, pp. 494, 502–505. 
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supervised by the Ministry of Justice, as well as by the Ministry of Legal Unification. Soon the 
Permanent Legislative Council was drawn up by a decree of the Ministry of Justice. The body 
consisted of 34 members (permanent, honorary and temporary) and three departments: the 
Department of private law which dealt with civil procedural law, the Department of criminal 
law and the Department for public law.11  
Till the Vitus' Day Constitution of 1921 no significant work has been done.12 The new 
constitution constituted Legislative Committee which has been entrusted with two tasks: 
legalization of earlier government decrees and enacting the laws by shortened procedure, 
but on government proposal. This legislative procedure, with which the government 
remained the decisive legislative factor, did not serve its purpose. For the equating of laws, 
a five-year term has been foreseen, with possibility of statutory extension of this deadline. 
Due to a numerous of replacement of the governments, the Legislative Committee was 
completely ineffective body and the work was extended in June 1926. The culmination of 
political crisis was the assassination in the People's Assembly on 20 June 1928.13 
On 6 January 1929 the King Alexander brought the proclamation of Royal Dictatorship 
and parliamentarism came to its end. Most of the laws were uniformed during this period. 
Mainly because the government has been empowered to impose the laws without the 
approval of the legislative body. But the reason why the legislative activity is reinforced 
during the Dictatorship lies in the fact that the dictatorship itself rests on the foundations of 
creating a national unity. Accordingly, most of the enacted laws in the first year of the 
Dictatorship had administrative nature and their aim was to settle rules on the organisation 
of state.14  
 
11 See more in: DRAKIĆ, Gordana: Formiranje pravnog sistema u međuratnoj jugoslovenskoj državi. [The 
Formation of the legal system in interwar Yugoslav state], Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Novom Sadu, Novi 
Sad, vol. XLII, no. 1-2, 2008, pp. 647–652. 
12 Ustav Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca [Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes], 
Službene Novine, no. 142a, Beograd, 1921. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croata and Slovenes 
known as "The Vitus' Day Constitution" introduced the basic principles of democracy and in the time of its 
validity all legislation in the country should be rested on these principles. 
13 See more in: DRAKIĆ, op.cit., pp. 647–652. 
14 See more in: ČULINOVIĆ, Ferdo: Jugoslavija između dva rata, knjiga 2. [Yugoslavia between two World Wars, 
second book], Historijski institut Jugoslavenske Akademije znanosti i umjetnosti, Zagreb, 1961, pp. 10–14. 
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One of the codes drafted in the period of the Dictatorship was also the Code on Court 
Procedure in Civil Litigations.15 The Code was adopted on 13 July 1929, but it hasn`t entered 
into force until 1933. Entering into force was delayed due to the principle of purposefulness 
and unfinished work around the Rules of procedure for the court finally adopted in 1932.16 
Therefore, it is interesting to note that at the same day when these two acts entered into 
force Yugoslavia created one cultural heritage in the field of civil procedural law.17 
 
5. Austrian Code on judicial proceedings in civil litigations  
 
As a basis for their work on the new Code that will regulate civil procedure, the draft editors 
adopted the Austrian Code on judicial proceedings in civil litigation (Zivilprozessordnung) 
from 1895 - which was effective in Slovenia and Dalmatia, and in Vojvodina in the Hungarian 
edition, while in the Bosnia-Herzegovina its principles were also applied. They highlighted 
that Zivilprozessordnung is one of the most perfect modern procedures, based on the 
principles of interpretation, immediateness and free assessment of evidence, ensures fast 
and simple procedure and prevents the tightening of litigation and "abuse of rights" by the 
parties.18 
 
6. Social Function of Civil Litigation – a new model of civil proceedings  
 
Austrian Zivilprozessordnung contained principles contrary to those introduced by French 
code in 1806, which dominated the European legal scene for most of the 19th century. Due 
to the ideas of the “welfare state”, the French non-interventionist liberal model of civil 
litigation in which the judge didn`t have an active role because civil procedure was a "kind 
of battle" between the parties, was replaced by the new Austrian model at the end of the 
 
15 Zakon o sudskom postupku u građanskim parnicama (građanski parnični postupak za Kraljevinu Srba, Hrvata 
i Slovenaca) [Code on Court Procedure in Civil Litigations (Civil Litigation Procedure for the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes)], Službene Novine, no. 179-LXXV, 1929. 
16 Sudski poslovnik za sudove prvog i drugog stupnja od 25. listopada 1932 [Rules of the procedure for the 
courts of the first and second instance], Zbirka zakona i uredaba, Zagreb 1933 (1–19). 
17 WERK, op. cit., p. 4. 
18 WERK, op. cit., p. 2. 
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19th century. The new model rests on the so-called social function of civil litigation which 
meant that the litigation should not only be considered as a means to solve individual 
lawsuits between private litigants but should serve the public interest and had to be viewed 
from an economical perspective as well.19 
In order to create a new procedural model in which the social function of civil litigation 
was recognized, it was necessary to find a new balance between the powers of the judge 
and those of the parties. The most important characteristics of the new model were: 
a) Case management powers of the judge and the search for the substantive truth. The 
judge was in charge for the duration of the lawsuit and exercised important powers in 
the area of the fact gathering by asking questions ex officio and also by the collecting of 
evidence on the judge’s initiative. This active role of the judge promotes the search for 
the substantive truth. The substantive truth means that the judgement should base on 
the facts as they had occurred, as opposed to the formal truth; the truth as advanced by 
the parties. The substantive truth also implies that every party can ask her opponent 
questions, or have questions asked, about facts and circumstances unknown to her as 
well as about proof.  
b) Division of the lawsuit into a written preparatory stage and an oral main stage. The 
intention of that kind of division of the lawsuit was to increase the speed of litigation. 
During the mainly written preparatory stage the judge was provided with instruments to 
prepare the case to such an extent that it could be decided in a single session in the oral 
main phase. Also, apart from adjournments that were explicitly provided by law, the 
judge was under no circumstances to allow other adjournments. Exception is that the 
case could be stalled for a period of time at the request of both parties. 
c) The pushing back of the role of preliminary defences. Well-known fact is that 
preliminary defences have the delaying effects, because the judge usually had to decide 
on these preliminary defences in a separate judgement and until this judgment was 
pronounced, the proceedings were halted. Limitation of the raising of preliminary 
defences was achieved in a way that preliminary defences were only to be permitted at 
the moment that the case came before the judge the first time. And the appeal 
 
19 See more about the French model of civil litigation, and about Franz Klein, the author of the new Austrian 
model, in: VAN RHEE, C.H. (ed.): European Traditions in Civil Procedure. Ius Commune Europaeum., Intersentia, 
Antwerp–Oxford, 2005, pp. 5–12. 
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proceedings concerning preliminary defences were simplified and the pace of the 
hearing of these proceedings was increased. Besides this, it was left to the judge’s 
discretion whether to decide by separate judgement about a preliminary defence raised. 
In this manner he could leave the possibility of appeal against this judgment open or 
postpone the decision about the preliminary defence until the final judgement. 
d) A strict implementation of the Preclusion principle. The Preclusion principle is the 
principle that specific procedural steps cannot be taken anymore after the given time 
period has expired. In this way, a quick and easy process was ensured.20 
 
7. Implementation of the Code in the practice and its repealing 
 
The Code on Court Procedure in Civil Litigations was adopted in 1929 and entered into force 
in 1933. But, one fact is significant. The Code was literally translation of the 
Zivilprozessordnung21 and even though the new procedural principles were accepted, they 
were never fully implemented in reality because the law in action continued its own 
autonomous way. Both the prevailing practice of earlier written, formal and secret 
proceedings, as well as new doctrine created a specific mixture of forms. So, the model of 
quick, efficient, simple and concentrated proceedings never became a complete reality in 
the territory of Yugoslavia.22  
The reasons for unsuccessful implementation also laid in constant political crisis and 
moreover, only ten years had passed since the adoption of the Zivilprozessordnung until the 
beginning of World War II, which represents a relatively short period of time for a profound 
transformation of the sluggish legal institutions.23  
 
20 VAN RHEE, C. H.: Judicial Case Management and Efficiency in Civil Litigation. Intersentia, Antwerp–Oxford, 2005, 
pp. 13–16. 
21 UZELAC, Alan: Turning Civil Procedure upside down: From Judges' Law to Users' Law. Van Rhee, C.H ; Heirbaut, 
Dirk ; Storme, Marcel (ed.): The French Code of Civil Procedure after 200 years. The civil procedure tradition in France 
and abroad. Wolters Kluwer Belgium, Mechelen, 2008, p. 416. 
22 UZELAC, Alan: Accelerating civil proceedings in Croatia – A history of attempts to improve the efficiency of 
civil litigation. Van Rhee, C.H. (ed.): The Law's Delay. Essays on Undue Delay in Civil Litigation. Ius Commune 
Europaeum. Intersentia, Antwerp–Oxfort–New York, 2004, pp. 288–-289. 
23 UZELAC, Alan: Ist eine Justizreform in Transitionsländern möglich? Das Beispiel Kroatien. [Is judicial reform 
possible in transition countries? The example of Croatia], Jahrbuch für Ostrecht, 43, 2002, p. 180. 
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In 1946 the Yugoslav Federation enacted the Law on immediate voiding of regulations 
passed before 6 April 1941 and during the enemy occupation, which was also valid for the 
Code on Court Procedure in Civil Litigations.24 The Law has determined that the provisions 
of law in force until that date can be applied as legal rules, provided that the underlying 
matter is not regulated by the new regulation and that the rules are in line with the new 
order. 
All provisions from the first unified Yugoslav code has ceased to be valid when the Code 
of Civil Procedure of 8 December 1956 came into force on 24 April 1957.25 Procedural 
legislation in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia continued to follow earlier models, 
but it was adjusted in some respects to socialist political doctrine. The inquisitorial elements 
and judicial activism of the Austrian procedural legislation became a socialist instrument 
with the primary purpose of protecting the state from party autonomy and the uncontrolled 
actions of civil society.26 
 
8. Peculiarity of Yugoslav Law Unification Process and Civil Procedure 
 
Doubtless, the importance of creating a single legal system in each country is reflected in 
the need for legal certainty and the equality of citizens before the law. However, the 
unification of laws in Yugoslavia was of far greater importance because it was a multi-ethnic 
country that emerged under the great transformation of countries in southeast Europe, 
which occurred after World War I. The state, which brought together different political, 
cultural and economic heritage, and had unresolved national relations, as well as weak 
economic development, had the only integrative factor in a single legal system.27 
Furthermore, the unification of procedural legislation was only a part of the new political 
trend of unitarisation, so the main function of the adoption of the Austrian 
Zivilprozessordnung was unification and not an improvement in the quality of procedural 
law. The reception of Zivilprozessordnung was largely mechanical, textual and technical, 
 
24 Zakon o nevaženju pravnih propisa donesenih prije 6. travnja 1941. i za vrijeme neprijateljske okupacije [Law 
on immediate voiding of regulations passed before 6 April 1941 and during the enemy occupation], Službeni 
list FNRJ, 86/1946. 
25 Zakon o parničnom postupku [Code of Civil Procedure], Službeni list FNRJ 4/1957. 
26 See more in: UZELAC, 2004, op. cit., p. 289. 
27 KREŠIĆ, op. cit., p. 167. 
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without great reflections on what one wanted to achieve with it in essence because the main 
reasons for Austrian reform, the social and ideological reasons for its introduction, the ideals 
which they sought to establish, and the criteria for the success of its introduction were never 
subject of a more detailed discussion.28 
By taking into the consideration the previous thesis on legal and political unitarism, one 
fact arises as controversial. Till the breakdown of Yugoslavia in 1941 only its public law was 
unified. Not entering into a deeper discussion as to why it is so, while well-known fact is that 
legal particularism in property relations has negative influence on the economic state of a 
country, I'll try to compare non-unified substantial civil law with civil procedural law. Maybe 
the reason that substantial civil law was not unified in the period up to 1941 was the fact 
that it didn't bothered legal life of citizens so much because institutions of civil law didn’t 
differ in a great degree.29 In contrary, civil procedure seeks to be equal to all because it deals 
with protecting substantive rights of citizens. Furthermore, I would venture to say that the 
Preliminary Principles of the Civil Code has never become law because of the irreconcilable 




Considering the short validity of the Code on Court Procedure in Civil Litigations of 1929, 
and its slow and almost non-existent implementation into the real life of citizens, my 
personal opinion is that it is much more important to observe this Code in the context of the 
general unification of law in the Yugoslav state, and not in the view of its most important 
characteristics. As aforementioned, the process of unification of laws in Yugoslavia, which 
despite of its purpose and its role, was slow, inefficient and in some branches of law never 
completed, remains one major controversy. The question arises why the unification of law 
did not approach more seriously, why it was stalling. The process of creating the Code of 
civil procedure was also too long, which is completely inexplicable due to it was only 
translation of the Austrian Zivilprozessordnung with minor modifications. Accordingly, a 
 
28 See more in: UZELAC, 2002, op. cit., pp. 176–181. 
29 See more in: KREŠIĆ, op. cit., pp. 155–156. 
30 See more in: ČEPULO, op. cit., p. 282. 
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process that is one of the few that has bore fruit is yet another failure of the Yugoslav legal 
profession and Yugoslav legislation. Despite of that, the Code from 1929 will remain 
remembered in the legal history of the Yugoslav nations as the first law which established a 
unified court procedure and introduced more advanced civil procedural law institutes. As 
such, it was a good basis for drafting further laws and for the development of civil procedural 
law in former Yugoslav countries. 
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Anna GERA: The trustee in bankruptcy – who was he and what role did he 
play in the bankruptcy proceedings throughout the 19th century? 




Although bankruptcy has a significant economic importance ever since the appearance of 
the early forms of trade, its comprehensive legislation only developed in the 19th century. 
Earlier in the feudalist society, the legal consequences of going bankrupt were regulated by 
customary law, which was uncertain in several aspects and also stated that the regulations 
have no legal bearing on the aristocracy. It was the economic growth and the trade boom 
that evoked the need for a codified, detailed and inclusive bankruptcy law and resulted in 
Act 22 of 1840, the first attempt of drafting a bankruptcy legalisation with the aim of 
abolishing the differences between social classes. However, the true success of the era was 
the adoption of Act 17 of 1881, the first modern bankruptcy law drafted by István Apáthy, 
who also created the first complex and modern Commercial Act, Act 37 of 1875. 
The trustee in bankruptcy played an important role in the bankruptcy proceedings as he 
was responsible for administering the bankruptcy estate and representing the creditors’ 
interests in front of the authorities. He appeared in the proceedings as an outsider since the 
terms of his appointment included him not being personally concerned in the bankruptcy, 
yet he had a high level of responsibility: he created the bankruptcy estate by rounding up 
the debtor’s property, he sold the bankruptcy estate and he also distributed the payments 
to the creditors at the end of the proceeding. His role was therefore significant, thus the 
regulation regarding it was elaborated in detail and often raised questions among judges 
and in jurisprudence. In my article, I present the core principles of the legislation and also 





2. Act 22 of 1840  
 
Act 22 of 1840 was a particularly important step in the evolution of bankruptcy law as it 
broke the tradition of privileges connected with nobility and created a legislation equally 
binding for debtors of every social status. The act contained regulations on both substantive 
and procedural law, however, the two fields were not separated yet. After defining certain 
terms and clarifying key concepts, this chapter focuses on describing the bankruptcy 
proceeding as regulated in Act 22 of 1840, with special regards to the trustee’s position as 
well as his interaction with other actors in the proceeding.  
Although the act lacks the definition of “bankruptcy”, this word was commonly used to 
describe a state when a debtor had multiple creditors and was unable or reluctant to satisfy 
them. According to the definition, bankruptcy law was only applicable in case of multiple 
creditors, otherwise the single creditor could only initiate a civil procedure against the 
debtor. The bankruptcy proceeding aimed to satisfy all creditors of the insolvent debtor to 
the greatest possible extent while respecting the requirement of proportionality and equal 
treatment.  
The proceedings took place before and was conducted by the bankruptcy court. The 
interests of the creditors were represented by the creditors’ committee, whose members 
were elected by the assemblage of the creditors, from among their number. According to 
Act 22 of 1840, there were two people helping the court’s work, the trustee and the clerk, 
with the latter being responsible for the legal representation of the bankruptcy estate and 
the prior taking care of only the trusteeship as a merely financial task. 
In accordance with Act 22 of 1840, the bankruptcy proceedings are opened by a court’s 
decision called “proceeding-opening decision”1, which could have been initiated by either 
the debtor or the creditors (but not by the court itself)2. The decision includes the court’s 
order to round up the debtor’s property and the appointment of the clerk and the trustee3. 
Firstly, the clerk claims the debtor’s previous demands, then the court makes a second 
decision called “assembling decision”4, setting a specific date for the creditors to assemble. 
 
1 Act 22 of 1840, also known as the first Bankruptcy Act [hereinafter: fBA] §6. 
2 fBA §5. 
3 fBA §11. 
4 fBA §25. 
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When the day comes, the creditors (or their delegates) come together to elect the 
committee members5. 
The clerk also examines the creditors’ claims, which marks the beginning of a long 
process aiming to secure that every claim is valid6. First, the clerk examines them and give 
remarks about their acceptability, which remarks are forwarded to the creditors by the court. 
After that, the creditors are allowed to answer these remarks, according to which the clerk 
prepares the court’s decision. Lastly, the creditors have a second opportunity to reflect on 
the clerk’s work and after that, the court finally makes its decision on whether the claims are 
valid, and if so, what type of claims each creditor has (this latter defines the priority ranking). 
Against this decision, an appeal can be lodged by any of the creditors, and also by the clerk.  
Meanwhile, during this process, the trustee rounds up the debtor’s property and when 
the creditors assemble, he reports his calculations regarding the bankruptcy estate to the 
creditors’ committee7. With regards to the court’s decision on the validity of the claims, the 
committee makes a decision on the realisation of assets8. The immovable property, if it is not 
part of the noble legacy, will be auctioned by the committee, otherwise the court is 
authorized to hold the auction. The court also responsible for verifying the trustee’s 
calculations. 
The realisation of assets is followed by the establishment of the priority ranking9 by the 
trustee, which the court forwards to the creditors. The costs of the legal proceeding, 
including the salaries of the clerk and the trustee are on the top of the ranking, therefore 
those will be payed even before the satisfaction of the creditors. Having this settled, the 
trustee repays the creditors’ claims in the presence of a so called “judicial member”10 who is 
appointed by the court. The trustee is also responsible for reporting the court about the 
distribution of the payments and handing over the documents of justification. Finally, the 
court issues a statement called the “end-of-throng” statement that closes up the 
proceeding11.  
 
5 fBA §51. 
6 fBA §§65–78. 
7 fBA §94. 
8 fBA §95. 
9 fBA §80–85. 
10 fBA §§114–115. 
11 In Hungarian, the word “csőd” stands for “bankruptcy”, and the word “csődület” meaning “throng” also 
origins from that as when someone went bankrupt, it evoked a lot of people’s attention and created a throng. 
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To sum up, Act 22 of 1840 regulated the bankruptcy proceedings in detail and was 
applicable on debtors of every social status. According to it, besides the trustee, the clerk 
also played an important role in the proceedings: the clerk was responsible for the legal 
aspects of administering the bankruptcy estate, while the trustee took care of the financial 
tasks, therefore only the clerk was obliged to have a lawyer degree to exercise his profession. 
When Act 17 of 1881 entered into force, this system significantly changed as the clerk’s 
position ceased to exist and the trustee become responsible for both the legal and financial 
aspects of the administration. 
 
3. Bankruptcy proceedings according to Act 17 of 1881 
 
It was the trade boom that evoked the need of detailed bankruptcy regulations, and 
although Act 22 of 1840 was sufficient for a certain period of time, the further economic 
growth raised new questions. Act 17 of 1881, creating an even more detailed regulation, was 
adopted as an answer to these questions, and according to this, one of the most significant 
changes introduced by the act was that it separated the commercial bankruptcy from the 
pre-existing ordinary form of going bankrupt. The distinction was not as elaborated as today 
since commercial bankruptcy appeared as a special form of going bankrupt and in case of 
the lack of special rules, the ordinary bankruptcy’s general regulation had to be applied, still, 
this was a significant step towards creating a separate bankruptcy system.  
Act 17 of 1881 also made a few changes regarding the actors of the proceedings. As I 
mentioned before, the position of the clerk ceased to exist, and two new positions were 
introduced with one being the bankruptcy receiver and the other the trustee’s assistant. The 
receiver12 was one of the court members (either a judge or a notary qualified for judicial 
office) and he was responsible for taking all judicial measures that were not reserved for the 
court. The trustee’s assistant’s13 position, according to the Act, was equivalent to the 
trustee’s, however, in practice, it was uncertain whether his appointment was obligatory, 
and in case of being appointed, whether there was hierarchical relation between the trustee 
and him.  
 
12 Act 17 of 1881, also known as the second Bankruptcy Act [hereinafter: sBA] §93. 
13 sBA §95. 
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The bankruptcy process was opened by the court’s proceeding-opening decision14 which 
could have been initiated by the debtor or any of the creditors. It ordered the seizure of the 
debtor’s property and appointed the receiver, the trustee and his assistant. The decision was 
followed by the promulgation of the bankruptcy issue15, which shared the most important 
information about the bankruptcy (e. g. the name of the debtor, the deadline for lodging 
claims and the day of the trial). The creditors were called upon to declare their claims and 
liens (if they had any), and also to show the objects they possessed in order to have them 
evaluated.  
Firstly, the receiver made the inventory list16, and based on that, the bankruptcy issue was 
announced. After the creditors claimed their debts, the trustee drew up a statement on 
these claims and prepared a plan for the estate’s distribution (if according to the court’s 
decision, the proceedings had to end so). The receiver was in charge of leading the 
distribution process17, in the course of which the creditors were satisfied according to their 
position in the priority ranking18. Similar to the process established by Act 22 of 1840, the 
costs of the legal proceeding were on the top of the ranking meaning that the receiver’s, the 
trustee’s and his assistant’s salaries were payed before the satisfaction of the creditors.  
 
4. The main responsibilities of the actors in the bankruptcy proceedings, according to 
Act 17 of 1881 
 
According to Act 17 of 1881, the three main actors of the bankruptcy proceeding were the 
bankruptcy receiver, the trustee in bankruptcy and the creditors’ committee19.  As a member 
of the court, the receiver conducted the trials by himself and was entitled to take every 
measure and make every decision that was neither reserved for the court, nor the 
responsibility of the trustee or the committee. He mainly had executional and administrative 
duties like conducting the committee’s election and issuing the certification of the 
 
14 sBA §§82–87. 
15 sBA §§88–89. 
16 sBA §§114–117. 
17 sBA §134. 
18 sBA §§59–71. 
19 The III. Chapter of the second Bankruptcy Act regulates the position of the actors. 
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appointment20 or calling upon the debtor to claim their property21. Working conjointly with 
the trustee, he made the inventory list and he also approved the distribution plan created 
by the trustee22.  
The creditors’ committee represented every creditor’s interest and was responsible for 
supervising and helping the trustee23. According to Act 17 of 1881, two types of committee’s 
existed: the temporary24 and the permanent25 one. The members of the temporary 
committee were appointed by the court, while the members of the permanent committee 
were elected by the creditors from among their number. If the creditors did not elect a 
permanent committee, its competences were exercised by the court and the creditors’ 
assembly. From among their number, the committee’s members elected their president and 
notary: only the notary was entitled for salary, the members could only claim the costs 
related to the proceeding26.  
The trustee was responsible for overseeing the bankruptcy estate and performing various 
duties required by law, regarding the administration and liquidation of the estate. His tasks 
were the following: (1) accepting heritage in the name of the debtor27, (2) participating in 
suits initiated by or against the debtor before he went bankrupt28, (3) executing or 
terminating legal transactions concluded by the debtor29, (4) challenging these transactions 
and initiating actions against the debtor when appropriate30, (5) challenging the claims 
accepted by the debtor when appropriate, and (6) helping the criminal court in case of 
fraudulent bankruptcy.  
The trustee was appointed by the court, among the judges practicing in the given 
territorial division31. The court could not choose amongst the close relatives of the debtor 
therefore could not appoint their linear ascendants or descendants, brother in law, sibling, 
 
20 sBA §106. 
21 sBA §118. 
22 sBA §181. 
23sBA §109. 
24 sBA §96. 
25 sBA §106. 
26 sBA §111. 
27 sBA §4. 
28 sBA §9. 
29 sBA §18–25. 
30 sBA §139. 
31 sBA §95. 
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cousin, spouse, fiancé, the spouse of their sibling or the sibling of their spouse32. The trustee 
was obliged to perform his duties according to the principle of “bonus et diligens pater 
familias” and to give a detailed account on the estate’s administration, and he was also 
responsible for every damages he caused by his failure to act diligently33.  
The trustee was entitled salary and also to claim the costs related to his work, the 
bankruptcy process could not be closed up before paying or securing these claims. 
However, if the trustee failed to execute his duties properly, he could have been sentenced 
to a fine or removed from his position at the request of the receiver or the committee, or 
even ex officio by the court34. 
 
5. Inconsistencies concerning the position of the trustee in bankruptcy  
 
5. 1. The nature and extent of the trustee’s mandate 
According to the procedural regulations, the trustee’s role therefore was to represent the 
bankruptcy estate before third parties, the court and the authorities, yet, we cannot say that 
he was an agent in an agency relationship as the bankruptcy estate was (and is) not a person 
since a person cannot be an object of property. We cannot talk about transaction 
management either: the trustee cannot act on behalf neither of the creditors nor the debtor, 
since he is appointed by the court, yet there is no transaction management relationship 
between the court and him. “The position of the trustee is a completely unique creation of the 
law that cannot be squeezed inside the Procrustes-bed of general principles.” 35  
Since he is appointed by the court, which is a public authority, his mandate could be 
considered as a public mandate. The fact that the trustee serves public interest through his 
actions can support this standpoint: he rounds up the debtor’s property which is 
indispensable to start the bankruptcy proceedings, he exercises the state’s execute power 
and organises a bankruptcy procedure serving every creditors’ interests and he also has a 
certain right of objection to prevent the creditors from procuring an unjustified advantage 
 
32 sBA §97. 
33 sBA §100. 
34 Cstv. §104 
35 LADÁNYI, Béla: A tömeggondnok ügyvivői jogköre [The trustee’s mandate]. Ügyvédek lapja [Lawyers’ Journal], 
1904/4., pp. 4–6. 
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to the detriment of the other creditors. However, sometimes it is hard to separate serving 
public interest and private interest from each other, just like the last example showed. Yet 
the trustee still cannot be considered as an agent, since there is no person, he could be the 
agent of, he acts on his own behalf in lawsuits and concludes contracts in his own name 
within the legal framework.  
Therefore, the trustee’s mandate is formally a public mandate and substantively rights 
and obligations conferred by law36. However, in practice, his mandate tends to be 
considered as a form of agency and in accordance with this presumption, it is interesting to 
address two issues: firstly, whether it is possible to ask for a protest for better security of the 
bill of exchange from the trustee and secondly, whether he can act as a substitute private 
prosecutor. 
The first issue is connected with the law for bills of exchange. If the drawee goes bankrupt, 
the possessor of the bill, according to the Act on Bills of Exchange37, could ask for a protest 
for better security in order to ensure that he can also count on the acceptance of the bill he 
possesses. However, it was uncertain whether the trustee was entitled to give such a protest.  
A decision made by the Curia in the 7th of March, 1899, stated that the trustee was indeed 
entitled to give the protest for better security since “according to the Bankruptcy Act, he has 
to be sufficiently informed on the debtor’s financial state and the debtor is obliged to give him 
every required information.” However, the court’s standpoint was controversial. It was 
pointed out in the Jogtudományi Közlöny (Jurisprudential Bulletin) 38 that it is not possible 
according to the Bills of Exchange, and also not explicitly permitted by Bankruptcy Act that 
the trustee is the one to give the protest for better security. Besides, it is necessary for the 
trade certainty and security to deny the trustee the right to give such a protest, as the 
drawee can be identified with no hardship yet the trustee’s appointment is surrounded by 
uncertainty.   
The question of the substitute private prosecutor was also raised by a decision of the 
Curia. According to the 4789/1903. decision, “the trustee, by the rights conferred on him for the 
 
36 Ibid. 
37 Act 27 of 1876 on Bills of Exchange, §29, point 4. 
38 S. J.: Felvehető-e a biztonság hiánya miatti óvás a tömeggondnoknál? [Is it possible to ask for a protest for 
better security of the bill of exchange from the trustee?]. Jogtudományi Közlöny [Jurisprudential Bulletin], 
1899/34., pp.189–190. 
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sake of the procedures’ unification, is the agent of every creditor, therefore he represents the unity 
of creditors, thus, in case if a lawsuit is initiated because of the infringement of the creditors’ 
interests, it is not each creditor but the trustee who is entitled to act as a substitute private 
prosecutor if the public prosecutor drops the charge. This standpoint was challenged by Ferenc 
Vargha, who pointed out that according to the Bankruptcy Act, the trustee has rights only 
in the bankruptcy proceeding, he is not entitled to act as a prosecutor in any way.  
It is the victim of a crime who has the right to prosecute the perpetrator as a private 
prosecutor, the position of being the victim itself creates the title. Similarly, only the victim 
is entitled to act as a substitute private prosecutor, precisely, the victim who decides to act 
as a prosecutor after the public prosecutor drops the charge or decides not to represent it 
at all39. On the contrary, the trustee is appointed by the court that can only choose someone 
not personally concerned about the bankruptcy at all. Moreover, the end of the bankruptcy 
proceedings means the end of the trustee’s mandate, therefore it is only possible for him to 
act as a substitute private prosecutor if a separate contractual relationship creates a basis for 
it.  
To conclude, the trustee in bankruptcy exercised powers and performed duties defined 
by law, which were strictly limited to the period and the0 subject matters of the bankruptcy 
proceedings. However, the practice had a tendency to elaborate a wider range of powers 
and duties, which could have been able to satisfy the current needs but contradicted the 
legal regulation.  
 
5 2. The appointment of the trustee in bankruptcy  
It was a new rule introduced by Act 17 of 1881 that according to the terms of appointment, 
only a lawyer could have been chosen as a trustee, moreover, he could not have been 
personally concerned in the bankruptcy proceedings (e. g. as a creditor) or the close relative 
of the debtor. However, there were no other restrictions, therefore the critics tended to 
emphasise the high risk of corruption carried by the appointment. They pointed out the 
danger of judges appointing a certain lawyer only because they had previously agreed on 
sharing the trustee’s salary, which, besides the moral concerns, also entails the trustee 
 
39 Act 33 of 1896 on Criminal Proceedings, §42. 
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asking for higher payment on the expense of the bankruptcy estate, therefore against the 
interests of the creditors.  
As a solution to these potential threats, Gerzson Szendrey suggested the adaption of a 
new regulation40 according to which the lawyers could have been appointed to be a trustee 
in a certain predetermined order. In his draft, he wrote: “the practicing lawyers will be 
appointed by the court without exceptions and unconditionally in a way that no one could be 
appointed more times than the others.” Among other arguments, he emphasised how the Act 
of Bankruptcy is one of the most important exam subjects, therefore the lack of experience 
will not be a disadvantage when the trustee is appointed to administer the bankruptcy 
proceedings of an estate of high value. This draft was amended by István Bartha41, who 
pointed out that without a bond system, it is highly unsafe to restrict the court’s competency 
of choosing the trustee. He proposed the elaboration of a system in which any lawyer could 
be appointed, but those who are willing and able to pay a bond will be appointed in a 
predetermined order. However, neither of the proposals was accepted.  
 
5. 3. The salary and the responsibility of the trustee in bankruptcy  
The trustee’s salary was amongst the items on the top of the priority ranking. Occasionally, 
the need for a certain limitation of this primacy was addressed by academic writers as well 
as the jurisdiction (e. g. the 89/1903. decision of the Curia stated that the mortgaged 
immovable property was a distinct legal entity, therefore the trustee was not entitled to 
receive payment from it, even if no other property belonged to the estate), however, 
generally, paying the trustee’s salary precluded the satisfaction of the creditors.  
The amount of the payment was decided by the court, even though it was the interested 
parties (therefore the committee, the debtor and the assemblage of the creditors) who had 
to previously agree on it. The court was thereby enabled to change the amount of payment 
in its final decision, even though, as it was pointed out in the Jogtudományi Közlöny 
(Jurisprudential Bulletin)42, this should only have been acceptable in case if the parties had 
 
40 SZENDREY, Gerzson: A csődtömeggondnok kinevezése körüli visszásságok [Inconsistencies around the 
trustee’s appointment]. A jog [The law], 1889/8., pp. 75–76. 
41 BARTHA, Iván: A csődtömeggondnok kinevezése körüli visszásságok [Inconsistencies around the trustee’s 
appointment]. A jog [The law], 1889/8., p. 102. 
42 B. L. [probably BUCHWALD, Lázár]: A tömeggondnok díjazása [The payment of the trustee]. Jogtudományi 
Közlöny [Jurisprudential Bulletin], 1883/18., pp. 150–151. 
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failed to come to an agreement (as the court was only enabled to decide the amount of 
payment in that case).  
The fact that the trustee was entitled to payment, and also that he accepted the 
appointment voluntarily, entailed strict requirements of liability. As previously mentioned, 
the trustee was obliged to perform his duties according to the principle of “bonus et diligens 
pater familias”, he had to give a detailed account on the estate’s administration, and he was 
also responsible for every damages he caused by failure to act diligently. In case of his failure 
of executing his duties properly, he could have been sentenced to paying the relatively high 
fine of 200 forints or removed from his position (the latter could have been requested by the 
receiver or the committee, and also could have been executed ex officio by the court).  
However, besides the strict culpa levis liability requirements, the 4948/1912. decision of 
the Curia stated the following: “The trustee, who, by mistake, leaves such claims out of the 
distribution plan that were already accepted but not yet satisfied by the previous trustee, is not 
liable for the damage he caused as it occurred because the creditor did not inquire about the 
distribution plan and did not request its alteration.” The court’s decision evoked mixed 
reactions. Simon Medgyes, for instance, pointed out that when preparing the distribution 
plan, it is inevitable that the trustee notices the possibility of having a previously satisfied 
claim, and in this case, he cannot refer to the previous trustee’s notes but instead has to take 
measures to make sure whether the claim was indeed satisfied.  
To sum up, the trustee in bankruptcy was a highly qualified person who accepted his 
appointment voluntarily, therefore his payment was secured: its amount was decided 
collaboratively by the court and the interested parties, and its satisfaction was placed on the 
top of the priority ranking. This eminent salary was partly justified with the strict culpa levis 





The 19th century’s bankruptcy proceedings were firstly regulated in detail in Act 22 of 1840, 
which was then followed by Act 17 of 1881, and according to both legal sources, the trustee 
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in bankruptcy played an important role in the process. He was appointed by the court but 
accepted the appointment voluntarily, therefore his payment was eminent and he had culpa 
levis responsibility. During the bankruptcy proceedings regulated by Act 17 of 1881, he 
collaborated with the creditors’ committee and the bankruptcy receiver, and he also had an 
assistant.  
The second act entrusted him wider functions and responsibilities: he was responsible for 
both the financial and legal administration of the bankruptcy estate, therefore only a lawyer 
could have been appointed for the position. However, besides being a lawyer, the trustee 
had to be competent in financial issues. Therefore, he had to be a highly qualified person to 
perform the duties required by law: “He had to be a craftsman, a merchant and a jurist, all 
rolled into one, moreover, he had to be perfectly qualified in each and every one of these 
professions.” 43 
 
 
43 Ibid. 
